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Performance-based budgeting (PBB) is a variation of pay for performance that is applicable to
government programs. It works by increasing or decreasing funding based on pre-established
performance thresholds, which incentivizes organizations to improve performance. In late
2006, the U.S. Army implemented a PBB program in all of its healthcare facilities due to rising
concerns over costs and quality in its facilities. The U.S. Army’s PBB program tied hospitallevel funding decisions to performance on key cost and quality-related metrics. This study
examined the impact of this program and a subsequent PBB program on quality improvement in

U.S. Army healthcare facilities. Drawing from resource dependence theory, two hypotheses
were developed, predicting that PBB would have a positive and sustained impact on quality
performance in U.S. Army healthcare facilities. These hypotheses were tested using a
retrospective difference-in-differences analysis of quality performance data in facilities exposed
to PBB programs in comparison to Air Force and Navy facilities not exposed to PBB programs,
both before and after program implementation. Data for this study were retrieved and merged
from two data repositories operated by the Defense Health Agency in order to create a dataset
encompassing a wide range of administrative, demographic, and performance information about
428 military healthcare facilities. The sample of 428 military healthcare facilities was divided
into two groups based on exposure to the Army’s PBB programs. Facility-level performance
data on population health indicators and an inpatient clinical safety indicator were compared
between the intervention group of 187 Army facilities participating in PBB programs and a
comparison group of 241 Navy and Air Force facilities that did not participate in these
programs. The study findings supported both hypotheses and suggest that the Army’s PBB
programs had a positive impact on quality performance. Facilities that participated in PBB
programs increased performance after program implementation, relative to comparison
facilities, for over half of the indicators under investigation. Furthermore, performance was
evaluated for a 5-year period after program implementation for six quality measures.
Performance in PBB facilities, relative to comparison facilities, was either sustained or
continued to improve over the 5-year postperiod for five of the six performance indicators
examined. Although this study has several limitations, the results are promising. The findings
are relevant to clinicians and administrators in military and government-funded healthcare

organizations, as they offer evidence to support the future use of PBB as a mechanism for
improving quality performance

Chapter 1: Introduction

This chapter is divided into six sections. The first two sections frame the study problem
and its resultant research questions. The next two sections provide an overview of the
theoretical framework and an analytic approach for the study. The fifth section discusses the
significance of the study. The chapter concludes with an outline of the subsequent chapters in
this dissertation.
Study Problem
The Institute of Medicine (IOM; 2001) report on the quality of the U.S. healthcare
delivery system sparked almost two decades of research and experimentation to improve the
quality of healthcare in the United States. Healthcare quality is a major concern for public and
private payers alike, as medical errors and poor-quality care can increase the consumption of
healthcare services and lead to excess costs (A. DeVries et al., 2012; Encinosa & Hellinger,
2008; Zhan & Miller, 2003). As a result, public and private payers have implemented a wide
variety of financial incentive programs over the past 20 years to encourage healthcare
organizations to deliver higher quality care.
Pay for performance is one approach for improving the quality of healthcare services.
Pay for performance is an umbrella term used to describe the practice of providing financial
remuneration linked to performance metrics (Glickman et al., 2007). The underlying logic is
that when performance on an outcome metric is tied to financial incentives, organizations have a
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motive to pay more attention to that outcome and allocate internal resources to improve
performance (T. L. Jones, 2018; Ocasio, 1997).
Pay for performance programs gained popularity among health insurers in the United
States following demonstration programs sponsored by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid
Services (CMS) from 2003-2009 (James, 2012). In fiscal year (FY) 2013, CMS introduced a
reimbursement model in which a small percentage of revenues were withheld from hospitals
and had to be earned back through improvement on patient satisfaction and process of care
measures (Petrullo, Lamar, Nwankwo-Otti, Alexander-Mills, & Viola, 2012). It has also been
implemented internationally in countries such as England, where 70% of general practitioners
are subject to pay for performance structures (Lester, Matharu, Mohammed, Lester, & FoskettTharby, 2013).
Though pay for performance has been widely implemented in U.S. healthcare systems,
there has been little research consensus regarding its effectiveness. Pay for performance
programs have been studied extensively in Veterans Health Administration (VHA) hospitals,
public hospitals, and private hospitals, but these studies have yielded mixed results (Eijkenaar,
Emmert, Scheppach, & Schöffski, 2013; Emmert, Eijkenaar, Kemter, Esslinger, & Schoffski,
2012; K. K. Kondo et al., 2018; R. Werner, Kolstad, Stuart, & Polsky, 2011). Specifically, pay
for performance has only been shown to have a marginal positive impact on process of care
measures and have little to no effect on outcome measures (Chee, Ryan, Wasfy, & Borden,
2016; Eijkenaar et al., 2013; Emmert et al., 2012; Houle, McAlister, Jackevicius, Chuck, &
Tsuyuki, 2012; R. Werner et al., 2011).
Additionally, initial performance gains attributable to pay for performance incentives
tend to diminish over time (Chee et al., 2016; K. K. Kondo et al., 2018; Petersen et al., 2013; R.
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Werner et al., 2011). While some studies have documented pay for performance successes
(Calikoglu, Murray, & Feeney, 2012; Huang et al., 2013; Lin, Yin, Huang, & Du, 2016; Yip et
al., 2017), the overall evidence supporting its use is mixed and inconclusive (Damberg et al.,
2014; Eijkenaar et al., 2013; Emmert et al., 2012; Van Herck, De Smedt, Annemans, Remmen,
& Rosenthal, 2010).
A less common and less researched form of pay for performance is performance-based
budgeting (PBB), which is specific to government programs (Kong, 2005). It is a policy
mechanism that works by incorporating performance measures into the budgeting process in an
effort to stimulate higher performance (Dunning, 2014; Kong, 2005). PBB enables key
decision-makers to systematically account for the results achieved through public funding
through the use of key performance indicators, a performance measurement system, and
program evaluation (Dunning, 2014). The goal is to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of
public expenditure by connecting organizational funding to specific results (Dunning, 2014).
In broad terms, PBB can be categorized as a specific form of pay for performance.
Christianson, Leatherman, and Sutherland (2008) defined pay for performance as “any payment
arrangement that specifically rewards quality” (p. 6S). Though PBB fits within this definition, a
few key characteristics distinguish it from most traditional forms of pay for performance. First,
PBB provides performance rewards almost exclusively at the organizational level. This
contrasts with private sector pay for performance programs that have the potential to impact the
individual pay of healthcare professionals. For example, the State of Georgia uses PBB to make
decisions about funding particular department activities, which are then broken down into
specific programs. Most of the performance measures used for these budget decisions relate to
workload efficiency measures, such as number of clients served, number of cases completed, or
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proportion of various tasks accomplished (Lauth, 1985). These productivity data are submitted
with budget requests and used for the purpose of allocating money in the budgeting process.
Thus, the reward for strong performance is greater program funding, which occurs at the
program or department level.
Another distinguishing feature of PBB is that the incentives are typically disbursed by a
single government agency or organization. This enables managers to focus organizational
attention on the metrics that are most important to the agency controlling the bulk of its
financing. For the purposes of the current study, PBB is defined as a specific form of pay for
performance that (a) applies to state or federally funded healthcare organizations and (b)
incentivizes performance at the organization level through budget mechanisms.
In 2006, the U.S. Army implemented a PBB program in all of its healthcare facilities
due to rising concerns over costs and quality in its facilities. The U.S. Army’s PBB program
tied hospital-level funding decisions to performance on key cost and quality-related metrics.
Initial results from a pilot study demonstrated significant hospital-level improvements in
productivity and quality performance measures (West & Cronk, 2011). However, PBB in U.S.
Army healthcare facilities has not been systematically studied over time to determine if the
initial effects have been sustained.
Research Questions
The purpose of this study is to investigate the effects of PBB on performance
improvement in U.S. military healthcare facilities. The study’s purpose is met through two
research aims, both of which focus on the performance improvement in healthcare quality
metrics. The first aim is to determine the impact of PBB on quality improvement in U.S. Army
healthcare facilities. The second seeks to determine if quality improvements tied to PBB are
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sustained over time in those same facilities. Although the U.S. Army Medical Command’s
(MEDCOM’s) PBB programs have targeted administrative, efficiency, and quality metrics, this
study focuses solely on quality metrics due to the consistency with which these metrics have
been measured and incentivized over the study period.
Research Question 1 draws upon observations from a wide body of research on pay for
performance in order to examine whether similar patterns of results are observed for PBB
programs. As mentioned, pay for performance programs have generated mixed results
(Eijkenaar et al., 2013; Emmert et al., 2012; Kondo et al., 2018; Werner et al., 2011), varying
from no effect to strongly beneficial (Damberg et al., 2014; Eijkenaar et al., 2013; Huang et al.,
2013; Van Herck et al., 2010). Mixed results have largely been blamed on the heterogeneity of
healthcare organizations and pay for performance incentive structures, (K. K. Kondo et al.,
2018), but some of the variation can also be attributed to methodological differences across
studies.
For example, the evidence for quality improvement in pay for performance programs
tends to be weaker for studies with strong methodological designs in comparison to studies with
weaker designs (Damberg et al., 2014; Eijkenaar et al., 2013). A few programs have
demonstrated quality improvement in select measured areas (Lee et al., 2012; Weyer, Bobiak, &
Stange, 2008), but some researchers have found that these improvements are not statistically
better than results achieved through intensive quality improvement efforts without performance
incentives (Glickman et al., 2007). Aside from methodological concerns, variations in findings
of pay for performance studies are likely the result of design choices, context (Van Herck et al.,
2010), patient characteristics, and provider characteristics (Chee et al., 2016). In light of these
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mixed findings in pay for performance studies, Research Question 1 examines whether PBB
might demonstrate more promising effects in military hospitals.

Research Question 1: What is the impact of performance-based budgeting on quality
improvement in U.S. Army healthcare facilities?

Some researchers have questioned the long-term sustainability of performance
improvement attributable to pay for performance incentives (Mendelson et al., 2017). Several
studies have noted that initial performance improvements tend to attenuate or diminish over
time (Bonfrer et al., 2014; Jha, Joynt, Orav, & Epstein, 2012; Van Herck et al., 2010; R. Werner
et al., 2011). Specifically, the long-term effects of pay for performance can be impacted by
factors such as an organization’s baseline performance (K. K. Kondo et al., 2018; Lin et al.,
2016; Markovitz & Ryan, 2017) and ceiling effects (Ryan, Blustein, Doran, Michelow, &
Casalino, 2012). In light of these observations in pay for performance studies, Research
Question 2 examines whether similar effects are observed in PBB programs.

Research Question 2: Are quality improvements tied to performance-based budgeting
sustained over time in U.S. Army hospitals?

Theoretical Framework
The current study employs the theoretical framework of Resource Dependence Theory
(RDT; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) to examine the impact of PBB on quality metrics in U.S.
Army medical facilities. The RDT framework has been used extensively in healthcare research
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related to financial incentives (Yeager, Menachemi, et al., 2014) and can therefore be useful in
guiding this study on the effects of PBB incentives.
According to RDT, organizations depend on critical resources from the external
environment to function and survive. Organizations must develop strategies to manage or
reduce dependencies on those external resources critical to survival (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978;
Yeager, Menachemi, et al., 2014). RDT posits that external forces in the environment can
influence the strategies that organizations adopt in order to manage access to critical resources
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).
Three environmental factors that affect organizations’ access to critical resources are
munificence, complexity, and dynamism. Munificence refers to the overall supply and
accessibility of resources in the environment (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Yeager, Menachemi, et
al., 2014). Environmental complexity and dynamism are both related to the overall degree of
uncertainty in the market (Yeager, Menachemi, et al., 2014). Complexity refers to factors that
make strategic decision-making and actions more difficult (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).
Dynamism refers to the level of change internal and external to the organization (Pfeffer &
Salancik, 1978). The current study explores how these constructs can be applied within the
context of the Military Health System (MHS) to explain and predict how PBB impacts quality
performance in military healthcare facilities.
Analytic Approach
This study employs a quasi-experimental, post-hoc analysis of performance data in
military healthcare facilities. Quality performance in facilities exposed to PBB programs are
compared facilities not exposed to PBB programs, both before and after program
implementation.
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The data for this study are retrieved from two data repositories operated by the Defense
Health Agency (DHA). The Military Health System Data Repository (MDR) is a centralized
data repository that receives, archives, and validates DHA corporate healthcare data from
military healthcare facilities worldwide (DHA, 2019f). The MDR uses standardized data
processing methods to ensure that health data are collected and managed in a consistent manner
across all U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) healthcare organizations (DHA, 2019f). The
Carepoint Information Portal is also operated by the DHA and contains facility-level
performance data for a wide range of quality measures (DHA, 2019b). It is the primary
platform used by clinical leaders in MHS facilities to monitor and track performance trends for
improvement initiatives.
The measures under analysis are commonly used in healthcare performance evaluation
in the private sector. Measures include the Healthcare Effectiveness Data and Information Set
(HEDIS; National Committee for Quality Assurance [NCQA], 2019) and the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) National Healthcare Safety Network (NHSN) Program.
The study sample consists of 428 U.S. Military Treatment Facilities (MTFs) that are
operated by the U.S. MHS. The MHS is a comprehensive, integrated health system that
combines both direct and purchased care components to provide health services to eligible
beneficiaries worldwide (Defense Health Agency: 2017 Stakeholder Report, 2017; DOD, 2014).
All facilities in the sample are primarily operated by the medical departments of one of the three
major service components (i.e., Army, Navy, or Air Force).
For Research Question 1, a difference-in-difference (DID) approach is used to study the
effects of PBB on quality indicators in U.S. Army hospitals over a 16-year period from FY 2004
to FY 2019. During that period, U.S. Army hospitals implemented two successive PBB
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programs and incentivized various performance metrics at different points in time. Navy and
Air Force healthcare facilities tracked performance on many of the same metrics but did not
participate in PBB programs that tied their quality performance to hospital funding. Thus,
performance trends in U.S. Army facilities (n =187) participating in PBB are compared to
performance trends in a comparison sample of Navy (n = 153) and Air Force (n = 88) and
combined-service facilities not participating in PBB programs. To assess performance trends
on metrics prior to the implementation of the Army’s PBB programs, performance data for each
metric is examined for 2 years prior to incentivization. Additionally, data are examined for all
metrics for 2 to 5 years after incentives are offered, depending on data availability. The overall
effects of the PBB programs are assessed by comparing performance between the intervention
and comparison groups in both the pre- and postincentive periods.
Research Question 2 addresses the sustainment of performance gains attributable to PBB
programs. Performance trends are analyzed for two distinct postimplementation time periods:
the first 2-1/2 years after incentivization, and the second 2-1/2 years postincentivization. This
analysis is used to determine if performance trends are sustained for at least 5 years after the
implementation of incentives and if there is an overall change in the pattern of performance over
time (i.e., did performance decline, stay the same, or improve in the two postincentive time
periods).
Significance
This study is significant due to its policy and research implications. From a policy
perspective, improving the value of healthcare is a priority for the U.S. military. The scale of
healthcare spending in this domain is enormous: the MHS is the second-largest healthcare
system in the United States, operating at an annual cost of $50-$52 billion in service of 9.5
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million military beneficiaries (DHA, 2019e; Kellermann, 2017; Mendez, 2018a). Over the past
20 years, healthcare spending in the U.S. military has risen sharply, consuming approximately
8-10% of the total annual defense budget (Mendez, 2018a), and raising concerns over long-term
budget sustainability.
Healthcare quality is a particular concern within the MHS because active duty
servicemembers must maintain peak health (i.e., medical readiness) in order to maintain
military effectiveness and perform military duties in demanding environments (Hosek &
Cecchine, 2001). This implies that the quality of healthcare that ill or injured soldiers receive
potentially affects their availability to perform their military duties. It also generates an
operational need for focused attention on population health and preventive care measures such
as health screenings, tobacco cessation, weight management, vaccinations, and disease
surveillance, since this can affect the overall readiness of the U.S. military force; therefore, the
quality of military healthcare has been identified as a national defense priority (Pellerin, 2017).
Despite this priority, performance-stimulating mechanisms such as PBB have not received
much empirical attention. The current study addresses that gap by conducting a retrospective
assessment of PBB in U.S. military healthcare organizations to determine its long-term effects.
The current study is also significant due to organizational changes that are occurring
within the MHS. Over the next few years, the DHA will merge three separate healthcare
systems (Army, Navy, and Air Force) into a single governance structure that will assume
operational control over all U.S. military healthcare facilities (National Defense Authorization
Act [NDAA], 2017). Since the DHA will have significant latitude to allocate resources among
healthcare facilities across all three services, it is imperative for key decision-makers to have
empirical evidence regarding the effects of PBB in military facilities. The mission of the DHA
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is guided by the MHS’s Quadruple Aim of increased medical readiness (pertaining to the
military force): better health, better care and lower cost (DHA, 2019c; Martin, Nelson, Lloyd, &
Nolan, 2007). Therefore, it is important for leaders to know if PBB is an effective mechanism
for quality improvement in U.S. Army healthcare facilities. If so, then leaders may consider
expanding this policy to include all U.S. military facilities.
The current study is also important from a research perspective. In contrast to typical
forms of pay for performance, there is little research on PBB and its effects in the healthcare
field. The majority of the literature on PBB is derived from the political science domain and is
not specific to healthcare organizations. There are very few experimental or quasi-experimental
studies, so the effectiveness of PBB in comparison to other mechanisms has yet to be
established. This study addresses that gap by providing a quasi-experimental approach to
studying PBB in the healthcare domain.
The current study is also significant because it examines the impact of financial
incentives in the underresearched context of military healthcare facilities. As Christianson et al.
(2008) noted, the context in which pay for performance incentives are disbursed is a critical
component to evaluating its effects. Contextual factors such as the size of the incentive (K. K.
Kondo et al., 2018; Rosenthal & Dudley, 2007), the target of the incentive (individual, group, or
organization; K. K. Kondo et al., 2018; Markovitz & Ryan, 2017; Petersen et al., 2013;
Rosenthal & Dudley, 2011; Van Herck et al., 2010), and hospital characteristics (Damberg et
al., 2014; Markovitz & Ryan, 2017; R. Werner et al., 2011) have all been shown to moderate
the effects of pay for performance. It is important to expand the pay for performance research
to include a wider variety of study settings to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the
contextual factors that are associated with stronger (or weaker) pay for performance effects.
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Additionally, there is considerable research on federally sponsored pay for performance
programs from the perspective federal purchasers (such as Medicare and Medicaid); there are
very few studies that address the effects of pay for performance from the perspective of
federally funded healthcare providers. This study addresses those gaps by examining the effects
of pay for performance in a military healthcare setting.
The current study also contributes to the pay for performance literature by examining the
effects of performance-based incentives over an extended period of time. The initial results
from a pilot study of the Army’s PBB program demonstrated significant improvement in
productivity and HEDIS performance measures (West, Cronk, Goodman, & Waymire, 2010).
This study builds upon that evaluation to examine whether initial performance gains are
sustained over a longer period of time. This is the first study of its kind to address the
longitudinal impact of PBB in federally funded healthcare environments to determine if
performance trends are similar to those observed in the private sector.
Summary of Remaining Chapters
This dissertation is organized into six chapters. This introductory chapter briefly
outlined the thematic focus of the study, defined the research problem and research questions,
introduced the conceptual approach and analytic approaches, and briefly explained the study’s
significance. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the relevant literature on pay for performance
and PBB. It then transitions into an overview of the study setting, providing an explanation of
the MHS and performance monitoring in military hospitals. Chapter 2 concludes with a
description of the evolution of the Army’s PBB programs. Chapter 3 discusses the conceptual
model for this study, with an emphasis on RDT and its application in a military healthcare
setting. The theoretical foundations of RDT are applied to derive two testable hypotheses.
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Chapter 4 discusses the study’s data, methodology, research design, and analytic approach. The
results of the analysis are provided in Chapter 5, including the descriptive analyses, regression
models, sensitivity analysis, and major study findings. Chapter 6 reflects on the results of the
study, providing a discussion of its implications and limitations.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review

This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section provides a broad overview of
pay for performance, summarizing its history, uses and research findings. Section one also
discusses the heterogeneity of research results in the pay for performance literature. The second
section defines PBB and discusses its relevance to the pay for performance literature. The third
section provides background information relevant to the context of this study in the MHS. The
fourth section describes the evolution of the Army’s PBB programs and the state of research
into these programs. The chapter ends with a summary.
Overview of Pay for Performance
In broad terms, pay for performance is a financial arrangement in which payment is
contingent upon performance. Within the healthcare domain, pay for performance is applied in
an effort to improve clinical quality, increase efficiency, improve health outcomes, and enhance
the patient experience (Damberg et al., 2014). The IOM (2007) described pay for performance
as “the systematic and deliberate use of payment incentives that recognize and reward high
levels of quality and quality improvement . . . and a powerful stimulus to drive institutional and
provider behavior toward better quality” (p. 5). Thus, pay for performance is one part of an
overall nationwide strategy to enhance the value of medical care in the United States.
Pay for performance initiatives have become increasingly popular in U.S. healthcare
organizations over the last 20 years. This increase in popularity is partially attributable to two
seminal reports published by the IOM: To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System (2000)
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and Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century (2001). These two
reports highlighted the fact that the U.S. healthcare system is not structured to provide safe,
timely, and necessary care in support of the best possible health outcomes for patients. These
reports asserted that under some circumstances, poorly delivered healthcare services can result
in preventable patient harm or even death.
As a result, healthcare leaders have devoted the last 20 years to engaging a wide range of
strategies aimed at reducing preventable harm and improving healthcare quality. Incentive
programs have been directed toward a multitude of healthcare applications, including diabetes
management (Gupta & Ayles, 2019; Huang et al., 2013), immunizations (Chaix-Couturier,
Durand-Zaleski, Jolly, & Durieux, 2000; Kouides et al., 1998), hypertension (Petersen et al.,
2013), ophthalmology (Herbst & Emmert, 2017), prenatal care (Rosenthal, Li, Robertson, &
Milstein, 2009), reduction of hospital-acquired conditions (HACs; Bastian, Kang, Nembhard,
Bloschichak, & Griffin, 2016; Calikoglu et al., 2012; Vokes, Bearman, & Bazzoli, 2018; Waters
et al., 2017), cardiovascular conditions (Glickman et al., 2007), and chronic liver disease
(Natarajan & Kanwal, 2015).
Pay for performance is just one of many strategies used to encourage healthcare
providers to focus on quality improvement and reduction in preventable harm. Under pay for
performance, payers adjust fee-for-service reimbursement rates on the basis of performance.
Providers can either be rewarded (i.e., receive bonuses) or penalized (i.e., have payments
reduced) for performance on pre-established targets for quality or efficiency (Damberg et al.,
2014). For the purposes of the current study, this specific arrangement is distinguished from
other types of performance-related risk-sharing agreements, such as capitated payments to
accountable care organizations or bundled payments; however, it is important to note that there
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is a considerable amount of overlap in the research literature on all of these strategies (Damberg
et al., 2014).
History and Evidence for Pay for Performance in the United States
The use of financial incentives to influence provider behavior and costs of care in the
private sector dates back to the early 1990s (Damberg et al., 2014; Winslow, 1994) when
private insurers sought alternatives to the traditional fee-for-service arrangements that rewarded
providers based on the complexity and quantity of the services provided. Early programs in the
United States started with small-scale efforts among a limited number of commercial insurers
(Doran, Maurer, & Ryan, 2017; Rosenthal, Fernandopulle, Song, & Landon, 2004). These early
programs were mostly implemented in managed care settings, in which providers were paid
either through capitation or lump-sum arrangements for a given set of services (James, 2012).
These payment arrangements motivated providers to control costs because they were sharing the
financial risks of healthcare delivery with payers.
Pay for performance started to proliferate more widely in the United States in the early
2000s. Following the release of the two IOM (2000, 2001) reports highlighting safety errors
and preventable harm in U.S. healthcare facilities, leaders and policymakers started seeking
programs aimed at improving quality performance (James, 2012). Pay for performance
emerged within this context as a method for incentivizing providers to improve quality and
safety. The advent of the pay for performance was a major change for the U.S. healthcare
industry (Dietrich, 2013; Rosenthal & Dudley, 2007). By 2006, over half of all health
maintenance organizations (HMOs) in the United States included pay for performance in
provider contracts (Rosenthal, Landon, Normand, Frank, & Epstein, 2006).
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Pay for performance emerged in federal programs starting in 2003 with Medicare’s
flagship demonstration project, the Premier Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration (Premier
HQID). The initial phase of this voluntary demonstration project rewarded hospitals in the top
two performance deciles for quality-related metrics pertaining to three medical conditions (acute
myocardial infarction, congestive heart failure, and pneumonia) and two surgical procedures
(coronary artery bypass grafting and total hip/knee replacement). Demonstration hospitals had
the opportunity to earn a 1-2% bonus for high quality performance or (after 2006) be penalized
for poor performance (Chee et al., 2016). Because the initial incentive structure did little to
motivate low-performing hospitals to improve quality, the program was changed at the end of
2006 to reward quality improvement as well as performance relative to peers (Shih, Nicholas,
Thumma, Birkmeyer, & Dimick, 2014).
Evidence for the effectiveness of the Premier HQID project is very limited. For
example, Shih et al. (2014) found that the Premier HQID failed to improve surgical outcomes in
participating hospitals. Similarly, numerous studies have found no greater reductions in
mortality among demonstration hospitals in comparison to non-demonstration hospitals
(Damberg et al., 2014; Glickman et al., 2007; Ryan, 2009). Lindenauer et al. (2007) found
some limited evidence that pay for performance led to small improvements in process of care
and appropriate care metrics in demonstration hospitals; however, they noted that much of this
improvement could also be attributed to the effects of public reporting.
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010 served as a catalyst for further expansion of
pay for performance in the United States. Numerous provisions in the ACA were designed to
lower costs and improve the quality of healthcare delivery in the United States. Despite limited
evidence to support their use, several programs were adopted to shift payments from volume-
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based reimbursement to value-based reimbursement predicated on quality performance (Doran
et al., 2017). For example, Medicare’s Hospital Value-Based Purchasing (HVBP) program
incentivized quality performance by adjusting payments to hospitals based on how well they
performed on either quality metrics relative to other hospitals or quality improvement over
baseline (CMS, 2019b). Designed to be budget-neutral, the HVBP worked by withholding a
portion of Medicare reimbursements to hospitals and then redistributing these funds among
hospitals based on relative quality scores (Chee et al., 2016; Figueroa, Tsugawa, Jie Zheng,
Orav, & Jha, 2016). The HVBP is modeled after the Premier HQID demonstration project,
except participation in the HVBP was broader in scope and mandatory for all Medicare
hospitals (Figueroa et al., 2016).
Early evaluations of the HVBP program did not demonstrate any more positive
outcomes than the HQID demonstration project (Doran et al., 2017). For example, Ryan,
Burgess, Pesko, Borden, and Dimick (2015) compared HVBP hospitals to critical access
hospitals and hospitals in Maryland that were exempt from the program. They concluded that
the HVBP hospitals demonstrated no greater improvement on process of care metrics or patient
experience than exempt (non-HVBP) hospitals. Similar null effects were also observed for
mortality associated with acute myocardial infarction, heart failure, and pneumonia (Figueroa et
al., 2016).
The Hospital Readmission Reduction Program and the HAC Reduction Program are two
additional programs sponsored by the CMS. These programs target quality improvement by
reducing or eliminating payments to hospitals for adverse events or preventable hospital
readmissions. For example, the HAC Reduction Program policy decrements reimbursements by
1% for the worst-performing quartile of hospitals nation-wide (CMS, 2019a; Vokes et al.,
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2018). The impact of this policy with respect to reducing HACs remains unclear (Vokes et al.,
2018). Waters et al. (2017) found that the policy was associated with an 11% reduction in the
rate of change in central line-associated bloodstream infections (CLABSI) and a 10% reduction
in the rate of change in catheter-associated urinary tract infections. However, a similar study on
infection rates following major urologic surgery did not find the rate of HACs to be affected by
the policy (Rude et al., 2017).
The ACA also stimulated the adoption of pay for performance in outpatient care. For
example, CMS initiated the Physician Quality Reporting System (PQRS) in 2011, rewarding
physicians for reporting on a select set of quality metrics. This broadly scoped program
included all physicians and allied health providers who billed Medicare for outpatient services
(Natarajan & Kanwal, 2015). In 2015, CMS initiated the Physician Value-Based Modifier
Program (PVBMP), which was closely linked to the PQRS. The PVBMP utilized the same
basic reporting infrastructure as the PQRS, except that it applied penalties for not reporting
quality data. It also expanded the scope of incentives to include performance-based penalties
and bonuses (CMS, 2018; Chee et al., 2016).
In 2015, additional legislation set the conditions for the creation of the largest valuebased purchasing program in the United States (Doran et al., 2017). The Medicare Access and
Children’s Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act (MACRA) rescinded the sustainable
growth formula previously used to establish physician payment rates. MACRA consolidated
several quality programs into a single program known as the Quality Payment Program (QPP).
The intent of this program was to change the physician payment scheme to better reward
quality, value, and outcomes in healthcare services (CMS, 2015, 2020). The QPP rewarded
quality using one of two methods: the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System or Advanced
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Alternative Payment Models. Rigorous studies of performance change under QPP and
MACRA are not yet available, so it is unclear what effect this legislation will have on
healthcare quality in the United States.
International Pay for Performance Programs
In addition to the United States, pay for performance has become increasingly popular
internationally, particularly among the developed countries that are members of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD; Feng et al., 2019; Milstein
& Schreyoegg, 2016). Unlike the United States, most OECD countries have some form of
universal healthcare coverage for its citizens (Dietrich, 2013). This factor is important because
pay for performance programs can be more broadly implemented in single-payer systems in
comparison to systems like the United States in which healthcare organizations cater to a
diverse set of payers. No study has specifically compared the effects of pay for performance in
countries with and without universal healthcare coverage, so it is unclear if this and other
contextual factors may have the potential to alter the effects of pay for performance; however,
due to differences in universal healthcare coverage, the effects of any international studies on
pay for performance should be interpreted with caution when compared with studies in the
United States. Despite this difference, international studies add to the overall depth of what is
known to researchers about the effects of pay for performance in healthcare.
A significant portion of international research on pay for performance is derived from
studies conducted in the United Kingdom and Taiwan, both of which provide universal
healthcare coverage to their citizens. The Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) is one of
the most widely researched programs, having been initiated in 2004 by England’s National
Health Service (NHS) in primary care settings. It was originally designed to boost recruitment

28

in primary care by providing physicians with a substantial increase in pay (Roland & Campbell,
2014). In an effort to enhance performance on quality metrics, physician pay increases were
made contingent upon performance in clinical indicators (i.e., condition-based care),
organizational indicators (i.e., records, data, education and training, and practice management)
and patient experience indicators (i.e., patient engagement surveys). Over the next 10 years,
several changes were made to the performance indicators, including the addition of several
more clinical indicators; the removal of organizational indicators; and the addition of public
health indicators related to smoking, obesity, and sexual health (Roland & Campbell, 2014).
The majority of studies on the QOF found positive performance effects, mostly on process of
care metrics (Mendelson et al., 2017).
One of the most widely researched programs in Taiwan is the Diabetes Mellitus Pay for
Performance Program initiated in 2001. Program enrollment was optional, and physicians were
given the latitude to choose which patients to enroll (Chang, Lin, & Aron, 2012; Mendelson et
al., 2017). This program started by incentivizing performance on process-of-care metrics but
later transitioned to intermediate health outcome measures in 2006. Evidence from studies in
this program is mixed, but most studies have documented positive effects on both process of
care and intermediate health outcome measures (Mendelson et al., 2017).
International studies have generally reported positive effects of pay for performance in
hospitals, though with decelerating trends in improvement over time (Kondo et al., 2015).
International studies, particularly those in the United Kingdom and Taiwan, were more likely to
show positive effects than studies within the United States (Mendelson et al., 2017); the reasons
for these differences have not been established empirically.
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Heterogeneity of Evidence on Pay for Performance
Overall, the evidence for pay for performance in the United States and abroad is
contradictory and mixed. Some scholars have proposed that the lack of consensus may be the
result of heterogeneity in patient and catchment area factors, organizational and structural
capabilities, and program characteristics (Markovitz & Ryan, 2017). This heterogeneity is
particularly visible in systematic review studies, which often incorporate findings from both
single and multipayer systems, in various physician settings, and across multiple performance
domains (Benabbas, Shan, Akindutire, Mehta, & Sinert, 2019). Due to these variations, it has
been difficult for scholars to make broad generalizations about the overall success or failure of
pay for performance (Allen, Mason, & Whittaker, 2014). Despite this, some context-specific
trends have emerged in the research literature. Studies have shown that the effects of pay for
performance may be sensitive to contextual influences such as care setting, patient factors,
program design elements, and selection of quality metrics (Allen et al., 2014; Benabbas et al.,
2019; Chen et al., 2017; Chien et al., 2012; Gupta & Ayles, 2019; Markovitz & Ryan, 2017).
The following sections explore the impact of these factors in greater detail.
Care setting. Some of the heterogeneity observed in pay for performance studies may
be attributable to differences in the care setting. There is considerable evidence that the effects
of pay for performance are contingent upon the context in which incentives are introduced
(Allen et al., 2014; Gupta & Ayles, 2019). Generally speaking, studies in ambulatory care
settings have reported more positive results than studies in hospital settings, though the
evidence in both settings has been mixed.
Some studies of hospital pay for performance have reported positive effects (Calikoglu
et al., 2012), and others have reported negligible or no effects at all (Damberg et al., 2014;
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Glickman et al., 2007; Shih et al., 2014). Hospital-based studies focused primarily on outcome
metrics such as mortality, surgical outcomes, and HACs. Damberg et al. (2014) found that most
mortality-focused studies offered no evidence that pay for performance reduced in-hospital
mortality. Similarly, two studies on Medicare’s Premier HQID project found no appreciable
differences in quality improvement among pay for performance hospitals and comparison (nonpay for performance) hospitals.
Shih et al. (2014) studied mortality rates and surgical complications following cardiac
and orthopedic procedures. They did not find an appreciable difference in mortality or
complication rates following surgical procedures between demonstration and non-demonstration
hospitals. Glickman et al. (2007) studied the effects of pay for performance on quality of care
and outcomes for acute myocardial infarction. They compared 54 hospitals in the CMS Premier
HQID project to 446 control hospitals that were not participating. They concluded that
improvement in pay for performance hospitals was not incrementally better than improvement
in comparison hospitals for quality of care or outcome measures.
In contrast to these studies, a study of two Maryland-based hospital pay for performance
programs documented positive results. Calikoglu et al. (2012) found that all clinical process of
care measures improved in the 4-year period following the implementation of value-based
purchasing. They also found that HACs declined by more than 15% after implementation of a
risk-adjusted pay for performance program.
Similar to hospital-based studies, evidence on pay for performance in ambulatory care
settings is mixed (Allen et al., 2014). Findings varied based on the types of measures
investigated and the quality of the studies. For example, there has been some limited evidence
of success in diabetes care and disease management in primary care settings (Gupta & Ayles,
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2019; Lin et al., 2016). Similarly, a systematic review on vaccinations found that eight out of
nine studies in primary care settings noted a significant increase in vaccination rates following
implementation of pay for performance incentives (Benabbas et al., 2019). In contrast to these
findings, provider incentives were not found to have a large impact on other metrics, including
well-baby care targeting low income patients (Felt-Lisk, Gimm, & Peterson, 2007).
According to two systematic reviews, variation in the results may be attributable to the
quality of the study. For example, a systematic review by Scott et al. (2011) found modest,
positive results in six out of seven studies, but the authors noted that many of these studies were
low quality and subject to significant selection bias. Similarly, another systematic review that
included a different set of ambulatory care studies concluded that higher quality studies tended
to find either very small positive effects or no effects at all (Damberg et al., 2014).
Patient factors. Another source of heterogeneity in pay for performance results is the
patient population. There is evidence that socioeconomic factors and medical risk in the patient
population can impact facility performance. For example, in a study on Medicare’s PVBMP,
Chen et al. (2017) investigated facility-level performance on cost and quality indicators for
physician practices serving medically and socially high-risk patients. Chen et al. found that
physician practices serving more patients with high social risk factors had lower quality and
lower costs, while practices serving a greater proportion of medically high-risk patients had
lower quality and higher costs. Similarly, Chien et al. (2012) suggested that physician practices
operating in economically depressed areas perform more poorly on pay for performance
measures related to clinical quality, patient experience, and health technology usage.
Program design elements. Another factor that may explain the lack of consistency in
pay for performance results is a variation in program design features. Pay for performance
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programs vary widely in the United States with incentive structures and program design features
differing across payers and healthcare organizations. The most common form of pay for
performance is a bonus or penalty adjustment that is attached to fee-for-service reimbursement
rates. These rate adjustments are made on the basis of performance on various cost and quality
indicators. For example, in FY 2013, CMS introduced a reimbursement model in which a small
percentage of revenues were withheld from hospitals and had to be earned back through
improvement on quality outcome measures and consistent patient satisfaction (Petrullo et al.,
2012). Regardless of structure, the primary goal of pay for performance is consistent across
programs: increase the value of healthcare purchasing by adding incentives for quality to
complement payments for volume and complexity of services.
Though few studies have addressed these effects directly, there is evidence that program
design features such as benchmarking, incentive target, incentive size, measure type, and
provider engagement may play a role in obtaining the desired effects from pay for performance
programs (Eijkenaar et al., 2013; Van Herck et al., 2010). The following sections explore these
factors in greater detail.
Incentive size. Scholars have hypothesized that in order to impact quality performance,
the size of the incentive must, at a minimum, be large enough for facilities to cover the costs
associated with performance improvement efforts (Felt-Lisk et al., 2007; Werner & Dudley,
2012). Ideally, extrinsic rewards such as financial incentives should be large enough to
motivate participation but not large enough to encourage undesirable behaviors such as
exclusion of vulnerable or high-risk patients (Kondo et al., 2018).
A few studies have documented a relationship between incentive size and impact on
performance (Damberg et al., 2014; Mullen, Frank, & Rosenthal, 2010; Werner et al., 2011).
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Studies on England’s QOF have also provided evidence regarding the effects of large incentives
on quality performance. The QOF offered substantial quality bonuses to providers with
physician practices having the opportunity to earn up to 1,000 quality points. Each quality point
was worth £76- £130 (U.S. $133-$204), which provided a significant opportunity for physicians
to boost their income. In 2009-2010, the average practice earned 937 points (range 878-972),
resulting in approximately a 25% increase in individual physician income (Doran et al., 2006;
Gillam, Niroshan Siriwardena, & Steel, 2012).
There is evidence that these large incentives worked. In a longitudinal study, Doran,
Kontopantelis, and Valderas (2011) found significant increases in the rate of quality
improvement for 22 of 23 quality indicators for the first year of implementation. Although the
rate of improvement plateaued after the initial implementation period, the quality of care
remained higher than pre-incentive levels for the remaining 2 years of the study. Improvements
were also noted for staffing, documentation, and adoption of information technology (Roland &
Campbell, 2014).
Some U.S.-based studies have also documented a relationship between incentive size
and improvement. In a literature review, Damberg et al. (2014) found that larger incentives
were positively associated with larger performance gains. Qualitative interview data from a
VHA study suggested that the most effective way to impact clinically meaningful performance
among physicians was to apply bigger, higher frequency incentives to performance measures
that are within physician control (Kondo et al., 2018). Additionally, evidence from the Premier
HQID demonstration project found that performance improvements were largest in facilities
eligible for the largest bonuses (Werner et al., 2011).
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Though economic theory predicts that the size of the reward impacts the degree to which
organizations respond to incentives, the overall empirical evidence is inconclusive. Scholars
have proposed a few explanations for the inconsistency in results (Markovitz & Ryan, 2017). In
the United States, payer fragmentation may dilute financial incentives and reduce the impact of
pay for performance programs (Van Herck et al., 2010). In multipayer systems, payer mix and
number of patients for each payer impact the total financial incentive available to each
healthcare provider. In some cases, the incentive may be very small. A study on Medicare’s
HBVP program found that performance incentives only changed payments by a fraction of 1%
for two thirds of Medicare’s participating hospitals, leading researchers to question whether
such small incentives can significantly alter facility performance (Werner & Dudley, 2012).
Another study on well-baby care in Medicaid highlighted the fact that incentives may not work
if they insufficiently compensate providers for the effort required to access them (Felt-Lisk et
al., 2007).
Though a few studies have suggested that larger incentives are more effective at
changing behavior (Kondo et al., 2018; Van Herck et al., 2010; Werner et al., 2011), some
healthcare leaders have criticized the use of large incentives on professional grounds. Their
arguments are rooted in behavior theory, which proposes that extrinsic rewards such as
monetary incentives may undermine the intrinsic motivation of healthcare providers (Deci,
Koestner, & Ryan, 1999). This has the potential to degrade the altruism, compassion, and trust
that are fundamental to health professions (Doran, 2014; Doran et al., 2017). Despite the
perception from providers that pay for performance limits autonomy and professionalism, there
is not yet conclusive evidence to support the assertion that pay for performance negatively
impacts intrinsic motivation (Allen et al., 2014).
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Selection of performance metrics. A key consideration for evaluating pay for
performance programs is defining a common conception of clinical quality. The IOM (1990)
defined clinical quality as “the degree to which health services for individuals and populations
increase the likelihood of desired health outcomes and are consistent with current professional
knowledge” (p. 21). A multitude of different performance measures have emerged in the
healthcare literature under this broad definition. This wide range of metrics presents a challenge
for healthcare leaders attempting to design pay for performance programs that provide the
maximum benefit to patients. As Jha (2017) noted, healthcare professionals often have
difficulty achieving consensus regarding which metrics should be prioritized and by what
degree. Inclusion of too many performance metrics in pay for performance programs may make
it more difficult for organizations to prioritize their efforts on the measures that are most
clinically beneficial to patients (Jha, 2017). This has the potential to dampen the effects of pay
for performance programs and may be one factor explaining null effects in some pay for
performance studies.
There are many domains of performance included in pay for performance programs.
Early programs primarily focused on quality measures, but programs have recently expanded to
include measures for both cost and quality. According to a RAND review of pay for
performance (Damberg et al., 2014), categories of measurement typically include clinical
processes, intermediate outcomes, patient safety measures, utilization, patient experience,
outcomes, and structural elements. Though the healthcare quality literature contains many
operationalizations of clinical quality, two of the most commonly used categories in the
research literature are processes of care and outcomes of care (Hearld, Alexander, Fraser, &
Jiang, 2008). Process of care metrics measure the degree to which healthcare providers follow
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established protocols in their treatment of patients. Outcome metrics indicate the impact the
treatments and interventions have on the health status of patients (Agency for Healthcare
Research and Quality [AHRQ], 2015). These two categories are consistent with the
Donabedian classification paradigm for comparing healthcare quality on the basis of structure,
process, and outcomes (AHRQ, 2015; Donabedian, 1980).
A great deal of literature has highlighted the difference in pay for performance effects
between process metrics and outcome metrics (Damberg et al., 2014; Flodgren et al., 2011).
For example, in a systematic review, Flodgren et al. (2011) found that financial incentives can
be an effective means for changing physician behaviors in areas such as admissions, referrals,
prescribing patterns, and processes of care; however, there is little evidence that these incentives
improve patient outcomes (Allen et al., 2014; Flodgren et al., 2011). In a later systematic
review, Damberg et al. (2014) compared process metrics and intermediate outcome measures
and found mixed evidence for both. In general, higher quality studies have been less likely to
identify performance improvement effects. Taken as a whole, most review studies have found
evidence that process indicators yield higher performance gains than outcome measures in pay
for performance programs (Damberg et al., 2014; Eijkenaar et al., 2013; Van Herck et al.,
2010); however, effect sizes were small and results were mixed for both measure types.
Incentive thresholds. Performance thresholds for earning incentives can vary
substantially among pay for performance programs. Some programs use absolute performance
thresholds in which organizations must meet a fixed benchmark in order to obtain a bonus.
Other programs rely on relative thresholds in which providers are assessed for performance
relative to peers (Damberg et al., 2014). These two forms of benchmarking raise concerns that
hospitals serving vulnerable and socioeconomically disadvantaged patients may be
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disproportionately penalized due to higher readmission rates, lower patient experience scores,
and lower performance on process measures (Markovitz & Ryan, 2017).
Because physician organizations in socially disadvantaged areas score more poorly on
pay for performance measures, some scholars have raised concerns that pay for performance
may inadvertently increase resource gaps between organizations serving serve high- and lowincome patients, thereby increasing health disparities (Chien et al., 2012). To address this
concern, some programs have incorporated performance improvement incentives to help
stimulate improvement efforts in low-performing facilities. Research evidence supporting the
use of performance improvement incentives is limited. Within the Premier HQID program,
performance improvement incentives were not shown to improve performance more rapidly
among low-performing hospitals (Ryan, Blustein, & Casalino, 2012). A second study on Phase
2 of the Premier HQID program by Shih et al. (2014) yielded similar results. Expanding
incentive opportunities for performance improvement was not shown to significantly impact
surgical outcomes for cardiac and orthopedic procedures in demonstration hospitals. Despite
limited evidence to support the use of performance improvement incentives, a study of a large
insurer in Hawaii found that lower performing providers did respond well to small increases in
the absolute performance thresholds (Bond, 2018). This study suggests that small increases in
absolute performance thresholds may stimulate performance improvement in low-performing
providers without raising costs.
Diminishing performance improvement effects. One consistent theme among pay for
performance studies is that performance gains tend to diminish over time (Bonfrer et al., 2014;
Kondo et al., 2018; Lin et al., 2016; Markovitz & Ryan, 2017; Mendelson et al., 2017; Ryan,
Bluestein, & Casolino, 2012; Van Herck et al., 2010; R. Werner et al., 2011). One example is
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with the Quality Incentive Program in the United States. The early results of this program were
positive: during the first year of incentives for end stage renal disease measures, 55-96% of
facilities showed significant improvements on clinical process measures relative to baseline
performance 2 years earlier (VanLare & Conway, 2012). However, many of the positive results
captured in the initial program evaluations did not hold up in longer term studies. A 5-year
study of the Premier HQID program found that more demonstration hospitals achieved high
performance scores in the first few years after the implementation of pay for performance than
in comparison hospitals not participating in pay for performance. However, the effect
diminished over time, and differences disappeared after 5 years (Werner et al., 2011).
Similarly, another 6-year study on long-term effects of pay for performance in inpatient settings
found no evidence for a long-term effect on 30-day mortality (Jha et al., 2012). Comparable
results were also observed for long-term studies of screening and preventive care in primary
care settings (Kondo et al., 2018).
Despite a general lack of research consensus regarding the effects of pay for
performance on outcome measures, one noteworthy study did find positive effects. A study on
a hospital-based program in Pennsylvania found that participation in pay for performance was
associated with a 27% reduction in the rate of CLABSIs (Bastian et al., 2016). Researchers also
noted significant effects based on the length of time the hospitals participated in the program.
For example, long-participating hospitals had an average of 3.13 fewer CLABSIs per year in
comparison to those participating for fewer than 4 years (Bastian et al., 2016). This study is
noteworthy because it suggests that length of program participation may be an important
consideration for researchers evaluating the effects of pay for performance on outcome
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measures. Evaluation periods that are too short my run a risk of failing to fully capture
significant effects.
A long-term study within the VHA provided a notable exception to the pattern of
diminishing performance effects observed in most pay for performance studies. This study
found significant and sustained improvements on process measures for six out of seven
indicators within VHA facilities participating in pay for performance (Benzer et al., 2014;
Kondo et al., 2018). This unique finding lends itself to additional research, particularly
regarding the long-term effects of pay for performance in federal healthcare facilities. It raises
questions about the potential influence of contextual factors such as hospital type (e.g., federal
versus privately operated hospitals) on the effects of pay for performance.
PBB: A Special Case
The management concepts of pay for performance can also be applied in government
programs. This special form of pay for performance is known as performance-based budgeting
(PBB). Though there are many forms of PBB discussed in the following sections, the basic
mechanism for all forms of PBB is to provide a financial motivation for public programs and
government-funded organizations to improve and maintain performance. This is achieved by
establishing performance criteria and using data on these criteria to assess performance and
allocate budget resources. Robinson and Brumby (2005) defined PBB as “procedures or
mechanisms intended to strengthen the links between funds provided to public sector entities
and their outcomes and/or outputs through the use of formal performance information in
resource allocation decision-making” (p. 15). PBB is a policy mechanism that enables decisionmakers to systematically account for the results achieved with public funds (Dunning, 2014).
The goal of PBB is to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of public expenditure by
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connecting organizational funding to specific results (Dunning, 2014). Because the theoretical
basis of PBB is closely linked to pay for performance, the following sections discuss its
definitions, history, and similarities to pay for performance. Key distinctions from pay for
performance are also discussed, as well as its application in healthcare settings.
Definitions
The academic literature on PBB introduces a range of definitions and applications. PBB
has been described as a budgeting system in which input costs are related to performance
(DeVries & Nemec, 2019, p. 5) and funding allocation is related to measurable results (OECD,
2003). It has also been described as a process involving the use of performance information for
budgetary purposes (Mauro, Cinquini, & Grossi, 2017; OECD, 2007). Jordan and Hackbart
(1999) distinguished between performance budgeting and performance funding, defining the
former as “preparing a budget document that includes performance information” and the latter
as “the allocation or distribution of a percentage of appropriated funds contingent upon the
assessment of the performance measures identified in the budget” (p. 69). Using these
distinctions, performance funding is a more regimented form of PBB because it allocates money
on the basis of performance thresholds rather than just using performance information while
making budget decisions.
The academic literature delineates two separate dimensions for measuring performance
in PBB programs (DeVries & Nemec, 2019; Robinson & Brumby, 2005). The first dimension,
outputs, focuses on the organizational activities involved with delivering a product or service
(Kong, 2005, p. 97). Output-based performance measurement is intended to achieve allocative
efficiency. In the economic literature, allocative efficiency refers to an optimal distribution of
goods and services in which the output of production is as close as possible to the marginal cost
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(Agarwal, 2019). In the PBB literature, allocative efficiency refers to funding programs that
provide the maximum benefit for public expenditure (Robinson & Brumby, 2005). This is
accomplished by linking funding to quantifiable activity measures such as relative value units
(RVUs), the number of patients seen, or the quantity of healthcare services delivered.
Performance is defined in terms of outputs as a function of budget inputs.
The second dimension of PBB gauges performance through the use of outcome
measures. Outcome-based measures address the question of whether or not a program achieves
its intended goals (Kong, 2005, p. 97). Outcome measures are used to assess the quality or
effectiveness of programs and services and are therefore the most useful to policymakers in
budget decisions (Kong, 2005). In contrast to output measures that focus on what is bought
through resource expenditures, outcome measures focus on what is actually achieved through
resource expenditure (M. S. DeVries & Nemec, 2019).
History
PBB is purported to have originated in the U.S. Congress in the late 1940s, though some
scholars have argued that it has existed in concept since the rule of Chinese Emperor K’ang-shi
in the 1700s (DeVries & Nemec, 2019). The U.S. experience with PBB started under President
Truman in the late 1940s. The Hoover Commission, a body charged with recommending
administrative changes to the executive branch of government, proposed changes to the federal
budgeting processes. The proposed changes shifted budgeting from its traditional line-item
expenditure format to a new performance budget that emphasized functions, costs, activities,
and accomplishments of federal expenditures (U.S. Government Accountability Office [GAO],
1997). In 1949, the National Security Act Amendment prompted the implementation of
performance budgeting in the U.S. Military (Jordan & Hackbart, 1999). Shortly after, Congress
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passed the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950, which modernized federal
accounting procedures by requiring the president to submit “functions and activities” of the
government with the budget request; this new format shifted focus from inputs (expenditures) to
outputs of the federal government, such as programs, weapons. and training (McGill, 2001, pp.
377-378). The Hoover Commission reforms were critical to the development of PBB in the
United States because they established the philosophical underpinnings of a new performanceoriented approach to budgeting that would evolve over the next 70 years (Jordan & Hackbart,
1999, p. 68; GAO, 1997).
The Hoover Commission reforms were followed by a series of legislative actions that
incrementally transformed budgeting and managerial practices in public sector agencies in the
United States. The first evolution occurred in 1965 with the initiation of President Johnson’s
Planning, Programming, Budgeting System (PPBS). The PPBS established a framework for
executive branch decision-making that incorporated an analysis of long-term policy objectives
in the budget formulation process (GAO, 1997). Similar to the Hoover Commission’s budget
legacy, under the PPBS, performance was mostly measured in terms of government outputs
(GAO, 1997). A critical aspect of PPBS was its use of sophisticated analytical tools to link
government outputs to long-term policy objectives. This complexity of analysis, combined with
its inability to account nonquantifiable political factors, ultimately led to the replacement of the
PPBS form of budgeting (McGill, 2001, p. 378).
The next evolution in U.S. PBB occurred with the introduction of President Nixon’s
Management by Objectives (MBO), which was intended to hold managers accountable for the
outputs of their organizations by linking the stated objectives of agencies to their budget
requests (McGill, 2001). Like previous programs, performance under MBO was mostly
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measured in terms of outputs and efficiency measures; however, it also included some early
efforts at assessing program results and outcomes (McGill, 2001). Both PPBS and MBO were
important points of evolution in PBB because they championed the use of sophisticated
performance measurements and analysis in spending decisions (GAO, 1997).
Zero-Based Budgeting (ZBB) was introduced into the executive budgeting process in
1977 by President Carter. ZBB required government agencies to rank order priorities based on
alternative spending levels without the use of a budget base from previous fiscal periods (GAO,
1997). This structure required agencies to re-analyze and re-prioritize expenditures with each
fiscal cycle. ZBB was an important step in the PBB evolution in the United States because it
was the first to pursue a specific connection between budget resources and program results
(GAO, 1997), effectively forcing agencies to make hard choices between priorities at alternative
spending levels (McGill, 2001).
The most recent evolution in PBB is the Government Performance and Results Act
(GPRA/Results Act) of 1993, which was designed to strengthen federal decision-making and
accountability while helping Congress gain better visibility of program results in relation to
government expenditures (GAO, 1999). The Results Act shifted the focus of accountability
from processes to results, requiring federal agencies to submit 5-year strategic plans outlining
the outcomes they hoped to achieve with government resources (“Linking Program Funding to
Performance Results,” 2002). It also required agencies to submit annual performance plans
detailing performance goals and plans for achieving them. The Results Act was a significant
advancement to progress in PBB in the United States because it explicitly required each agency
to incorporate performance goals and program activities to their budget requests (GAO, 1999).

44

It was also significant because it relied on the use of objective information to determine the
relative effectiveness and efficiency of government programs.
By 2002, several analyses indicated that federal policymakers had largely failed to
adequately establish a link between performance results and their funding decisions (“Linking
Program Funding to Performance Results,” 2002; GAO, 1999) as intended by the Results Act.
In response to this issue, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) developed the Program
Assessment and Rating Tool (PART) in 2002. The PART was designed to help agencies assess
programs more objectively. It also aided agencies in developing reasonable goals and
measures, feasible strategies to achieve their goals, and credible performance information
(“Linking Program Funding to Performance Results,” 2002, p. 7). The PART assessment
included four basic questions, including the following:
1. Does the program have a clear definition of success, and is it designed to achieve it?
2. Are the program goals sufficiently outcome-oriented and aggressive?
3. Is the program well managed?
4. Does the program achieve its goals? (“Performance-Based Budgeting,” 2005, p. 5)

Programs were awarded points based on the answers to each of these questions. After adding
all of the points, each program was rated according to five categories: effective, moderately
effective, adequate, ineffective, and results not demonstrated. In addition to making the ratings
public, Congress started to use ratings in budget deliberations. As of 2004, 29 programs were
terminated or reduced due to receiving a rating of Results Not Demonstrated (“PerformanceBased Budgeting,” 2005, p.6).
The PART was used by Congress until 2008 when it was replaced by performance
initiatives crafted by the Obama Administration. In 2010, the Obama Administration enacted
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legislation that updated the GPRA of 1993. The GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (Pub. L.
111-352) placed emphasis on incorporating performance into federal program management.
This legislation not only encouraged the use of performance information in budgeting, it also
encouraged federal managers to incorporate objective performance information into the overall
management of federal programs.
In aggregate, the evolution of PBB in the United States since the 1940s demonstrates a
persistent effort to broaden the use of performance information in the budgeting and
management of federal programs. While there is a consensus among scholars that these
programs have often failed to achieve the goals of their design (McGill, 2001; GAO, 1997,
2018b), each transformation moved the practice of PBB forward in a visible way (Kong, 2005).
PBB started in the late 1940s with the Hoover Commission’s recommendation to emphasize the
outputs of government funds rather than the expenditures alone. By the 1990s, PBB evolved to
emphasize the goals of measuring performance in terms of outcomes rather than outputs. By
2003, the GAO (2018b) found that government leaders had greater access to performance
information than they had in the late 1990s. Despite this forward progress, several recent
government reports still call for PBB programs to more concretely link performance to budget
decisions (OMB, 2011; “Linking Program Funding to Performance Results,” 2002;
“Performance-Based Budgeting,” 2005; GAO, 2018b). Thus, PBB programs continue to
undergo evaluation and change. Though PBB research continues to evolve, the following
section provides an overview of what is currently known about the effectiveness of PBB in
government programs.
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Key Findings About PBB
Because budgeting is a fundamentally political action, the academic literature on PBB is
mostly situated in the political science domain. Budgeting is a political action because it forces
policymakers to exercise political choice in allocating resources among a range of alternatives
(GAO, 1999). PBB infuses performance data into this inherently political process. Most of the
research literature on PBB is supported through case studies, government reports, literature
reviews, and international comparisons. Unlike the management and healthcare literature, there
are very few experimental or quasi-experimental designs in the PBB literature.
Though there have been a few documented successes, many PBB program attempts have
failed (Jordan & Hackbart, 1999; McGill, 2001; McNab & Melese, 2003; GAO, 1997).
According to a review by McNab and Melese (2003), these failures are attributable to
“administrative complexities, lack of investment in managerial, accounting and information
systems, and the lack of institutional incentives to promote gains in economic efficiency” (p.
73).
One consistent problem is the failure to use available performance information in the
budgeting process. Numerous reviews of PBB programs in the United States have indicated
that even when performance information is available, most programs fail to explicitly
incorporate that information into budget decisions (Coplin, Merget, & Bourdeaux, 2002; Kong,
2005; “Linking Program Funding to Performance Results,” 2002; GAO, 2018b). A GAO
(2018b) survey found that while state government officials reported greater availability of
performance information since 1997, there had been little to no change in the use of that
information for various management activities (p. 6). Similarly, another GAO survey found that
government-wide use of performance information did not improve after the enactment of the
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2010 GPRMA Modernization Act. Though managers had access to more performance
information, they did not use that performance information in program management any more
often in 2017 than in 2013 (GAO, 2018b). This trend was also noted by Representative Stephen
Horn, who opened a 2002 Congressional hearing on performance budgeting by stating that
“policymakers have failed to establish a connection between performance results and their
funding decisions . . . and the effectiveness of funding decisions [is] largely untested” (“Linking
Program Funding to Performance Results,” 2002).
Though performance information is more widely available to policymakers now than in
the 1980s and 1990s, many leaders have still cited difficulty obtaining and communicating
credible performance information. According to a GAO survey conducted in 2002, only five of
the government’s 24 largest agencies could attest to the completeness and reliability of the
information used in budget decisions (“Linking Program Funding to Performance Results,”
2002). One factor is that highly useful information is often costly or difficult to obtain (Schick,
2003, p.74). The costs associated with implementing a sophisticated performance monitoring
system can be high in terms of manpower, additional documentation requirements, and
information technology for data mining. This contributes to the pervasive view that the
administrative costs outweigh its benefits (Kong, 2005, p. 93). Despite the high cost, when
resources are allocated to data collection, it impacts the degree to which performance
information is used in budgeting. For example, Jordan and Hackbart (1999) found a positive
association with the number of analysts in a budget office and the state’s use of performance
information in funding processes.
Another complication for PBB is that institutional, functional, policy, and political
constraints are fundamental to the American decision-making system (Radin, 2000, p. 133).
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This means that performance is not the only information considered in budgeting decisions,
even when sophisticated PBB programs exist. Dongsung Kong (2005) noted,
Public budgeting at all levels of government is intrinsically political. Performance
measures, or any rational ideas, will not supersede political priorities in any near future.
PBB can be appropriate and applicable to managerial and less political decisions, but not
highly political decisions. (p. 103)
This means that even when highly developed analytical tools are used to review performance
data during budget deliberations, political forces can eclipse objective analyses.
For example, in the early 2000s, Congress used the PART to affect change in the budget
process for the Community Development Block Grant Program. Despite its intended analytical
approach, Representative Michael Conaway testified that Congress “did not get it done in the
budgetary process. The political backlash, the whole ownership of those particular programs
overran the analysis piece of what was going on” (“Performance-Based Budgeting,” 2005). As
some other members of Congress have noted, performance information in PBB programs do not
fully account for all of the factors that must be considered in budget deliberations. For example,
according to testimony by Clay Johnson of the OMB, high priority activities (such as certain
defense programs) must sometimes be funded regardless of performance (“Performance-Based
Budgeting,” 2005).
Deciding upon an appropriate measurement system can also be politically problematic.
According to congressional testimony from James Nussle, Chairman of the House Budget
Committee, one of the key challenges with implementing the PART was determining how
performance would be measured and who would decide which performance measurements
would be used (“Performance-Based Budgeting,” 2005). When PBB applies to politically
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sensitive programs, there may also be political interest in defining a particular measurement
approach.
Interpreting performance information is another factor that complicates the
implementation of PBB programs. Though outcomes-based performance measures are widely
accepted as the most desirable for PBB programs (Schick, 2003, p. 74), these data can often be
difficult to interpret for budgeting purposes. For example, it is sometimes complex to
disentangle the effects of multiple programs on a particular outcome (Kong, 2005). When
multiple programs contribute to a particular outcome, it can be difficult to make an allocation
decision. Williams and Melhuish (1999) noted, “with no means to measure an individual’s
contribution, a system of ‘sticks and carrots’ is arbitrary and of little impact” (p. 25).
For all of the reasons mentioned, PBB programs have evolved over time in the United
States. PBB programs have been redesigned through multiple legislative iterations, suggesting
that certain aspects of these programs may not have worked smoothly in the intervening years
(Schick, 2003). Like pay for performance, the effects of PBB programs are often moderated by
factors outside of the program itself. PBB programs are difficult to implement if they are overly
complex, include performance measures that are outside of managerial control, or fail to
explicitly link performance to financial incentives. In contrast to pay for performance, PBB
programs have the additional complication of being influenced by political forces that threaten
to undermine their analytic approach. The following section provides a more detailed
comparison of PBB and pay for performance within the domain of healthcare.
Comparison of PBB and Pay for Performance in Healthcare
PBB programs in federal healthcare facilities are very similar to traditional forms of pay
for performance. PBB incorporates many of the same basic mechanisms as pay for performance
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but applies them to government-sponsored programs rather than private sector organizations.
Christianson et al. (2008) defined pay for performance as “any payment arrangement that
specifically rewards quality” (p. 6S). Under this broad definition, PBB can be categorized as a
pay for performance program, though three key distinctions exist. First, government
organizations are not subject to the same market forces as private sector organizations (Williams
& Melhuish, 1999; Zemrani, 2019). In the private sector, market forces are the catalyst for
performance improvement. Businesses must address quality and satisfaction concerns of
patients and customers to remain viable (Zemrani, 2019, p. 36). Similarly, hospitals and
healthcare organizations compete with each other in terms of the quality of their healthcare
services and patient amenities in order to attract business and remain financially viable. In the
public sector, these market forces are less pronounced or absent. The ultimate measure of
success for government programs is the service that is delivered through public expenditure not
its profit margin (Williams & Melhuish, 1999, p. 23). When publicly funded organizations have
stable funding that is not tied to performance, they have less incentive to improve performance
and address satisfaction concerns. By linking performance to the level of resourcing, PBB
provides a potential mechanism for policymakers to hold organizations accountable for service
quality and costs.
A second distinction between PBB and pay for performance is pay for performance
programs have the potential to impact individual pay, whereas most PBB programs usually do
not. Many U.S. pay for performance programs employ quality-based bonus payments that
supplement capitation rates or fee-for-service reimbursements (Christianson et al., 2008).
Payment arrangements and performance thresholds are usually stipulated in contracts between
purchasers and healthcare organizations, but organizations can also incentivize individual
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physicians by offering performance bonuses (Rosenthal & Dudley, 2007). U.S. physicians and
physician groups can earn up to 10% of their annual income in pay for performance bonuses,
although the amount is typically less (Christianson et al., 2008; Rosenthal & Dudley, 2007;
Sherry, 2016). In VHA facilities, pay for performance bonuses are disbursed at the organization
level through a central VA office, and facility-level senior managers then have the ability to
distribute bonuses to individual providers and employees (Benzer et al., 2014). In contrast to
pay for performance, PBB incentives usually remain at the organizational level. Incentives are
disbursed through budget mechanisms (increased or decreased program funding) and have less
potential to directly impact individual pay.
A third difference for PBB in the healthcare domain is that incentives are typically
controlled by a single government agency rather than a collection of individual payers. Since
federal hospitals are almost exclusively financed through public expenditure, organizations are
usually dependent upon a single agency for the majority of their operational resources.
Obtaining critical resources through a single agency reduces the complexity associated with
tailoring performance improvement initiatives to suit the requirements of multiple payers. With
fewer competing demands, organizational decision-makers may be more able to focus
organizational attention on the performance metrics that are most important to the agency
controlling the bulk of its funding and financial resources (Ocasio, 1997).
In contrast to publicly funded programs, commercial healthcare organizations must
manage performance targets from a conglomerate of healthcare purchasers. For example, an
analysis of 48 state and regional health measure sets identified 509 distinct metrics with only
20% overlap of metrics between programs (Bazinsky & Bailit, 2013). If performance measures
do not overlap across multiple insurers, organizations must expend additional resources on
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measuring and reporting across many different metrics. As Cassel et al. (2012) noted, this can
lead to measurement fatigue without a corresponding change in results.
As mentioned, having too many metrics makes it difficult for managers to focus
organizational attention on the metrics that matter the most to patient outcomes (Cassel et al.,
2012; Ocasio, 1997). As a result, it is possible for organizational efforts to focus on minimally
beneficial metrics rather than measures that may have a greater impact on patient outcomes.
This is a factor that may account for the relative lack of success in many U.S.-based pay for
performance programs in comparison to programs in single-payer countries such as the United
Kingdom (Mendelson et al., 2017). Also, incentives from single payers are potentially larger
because they are applicable to the entire population of patients rather than being segmented
among patients based on patient insurance coverage.
Due to the aforementioned distinctions in market forces, incentive source (government
funding versus insurance payments), and incentive impact (organizations versus individuals),
PBB should be considered a special case of healthcare pay for performance that is specific to
government-financed healthcare organizations. For the purposes of this dissertation, PBB is
defined as a specific form of pay for performance that (a) applies to state or federally funded
healthcare organizations and (b) incentivizes performance at the organization level through
budget mechanisms.
Overview of the MHS and Links to PBB
One U.S. government organization to use PBB is MEDCOM, which is one component
of the U.S. MHS. MEDCOM experimentation with PBB started around 2004 with a small pilot
program conducted in a handful of U.S. Army medical facilities in the southeast region of the
United States. As of 2019, the DHA is in the process of expanding PBB to all other service
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components within the MHS. The following two sections discuss that program and the broader
context of the MHS, which set the conditions for its inception.
The MHS is one of the largest health systems in the world, delivering medical and dental
care to military beneficiaries in almost 700 hospitals and clinics worldwide (Smith, Bono, &
Slinger, 2017). The MHS is a comprehensive, integrated health system that combines both
direct and purchased care components to provide health services to eligible military
beneficiaries (Defense Health Agency: 2017 Stakeholder Report, 2017; DOD, 2014). As of
2018, the MHS employs a total of over 240,000 medical staff, split between active duty (48%)
and reserve (30%) personnel, federal civilians (18%), and contractors (4%) (GAO, 2018a). The
scope and scale of MHS healthcare services are substantial. The MHS provides services to 9.51
million eligible patients, including 1.4 million active duty servicemembers and 8.1 million
reservists, retirees, and family members and survivors (DHA, 2019e; DOD, 2014; Weil, 2019).
In 2018, MHS hospitals documented over 204,000 inpatient admissions, 39 million outpatient
encounters and 1.17 million emergency department visits (Adirim, 2019).
Patient care is provided in the MHS through two integrated components (Childress,
2013, p. 7). The direct care component is comprised of health facilities directly operated by
agencies within the DOD. The direct care system in the MHS is analogous to a staff-model
HMO that directly employs salaried providers (Bond & Schwab, 2019, p. 1328). The purchased
care component is comprised of a network of contracted civilian healthcare providers who offer
a critical supplement to the healthcare services delivered within the MHS direct care system.
These supplemental contract services allow the MHS to provide access to beneficiaries when
MTFs are over capacity or beneficiaries live outside of the catchment area of military healthcare
facilities. They also provide a referral option when the scope of services required exceed the
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services available through local military hospitals (Tanielian & Farmer, 2019). Sixty percent of
DOD health services are delivered through these contracted providers (Adirim, 2019, p. 1269).
TRICARE is the health plan that integrates the direct care and purchased care
components. Chapter 55 of Title 10 U.S. Code authorizes the entitlement of TRICARE health
benefits as a component of the compensation package afforded to active duty military
personnel, their families, and retirees. Eligible beneficiaries can participate in three main
benefit plans. TRICARE Prime is a HMO option with very little cost sharing. TRICARE
Select operates like a preferred provider organization, in which beneficiaries are offered more
choices for civilian healthcare providers but often pay higher cost shares. TRICARE for Life is
a Medicare wrap-around plan that is offered to Medicare-eligible retirees. The TRICARE
program also includes pharmacy benefits and optional vision and dental plans (Mendez, 2018a,
p. 10 ). TRICARE benefits and available plans vary slightly with respect to priority of access to
military facilities and degree of cost sharing. This is largely based on the beneficiary category
(i.e., active duty, dependent, retiree, retiree dependent, reserve, national guard). For example,
active duty beneficiaries have no out-of-pocket costs, while family members of active duty
incur cost-sharing expenses only when using out-of-network care without a referral (Tanielian
& Farmer, 2019).
10 U.S. C. §1074 defines priorities for access to care in MTFs. Active duty
servicemembers are the only beneficiary group entitled to care in MTFs (10 U.S. C. §1074).
Space available priority for access to MTF care is then provided (in order) for active duty
family members enrolled in TRICARE Prime, retirees, and their family members enrolled in
TRICARE prime; active duty family members not enrolled in TRICARE Prime; and all other
eligible persons (32 C.F.R. §199.17(d) - TRICARE program, n.d.; DOD, 2011).
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Coverage and benefits have expanded in the TRICARE program over the last 20 years
due to their necessity in attracting and maintaining an all-volunteer military force during a
period of extended military conflict. Cost-sharing has remained very low relative to civilian
insurance programs (Dolfini-Reed & Jebo, 2000; Military Compensation and Retirement
Modernization Commission, 2015; Tanielian & Farmer, 2019). Because these benefits
constitute a substantial investment of federal funds, members of Congress work closely with
key leaders in the DOD and MHS to ensure that the medical needs of military members, retirees
and military families are met through the MHS and TRICARE infrastructure. This is evidenced
by the fact that Congress has updated military healthcare benefits in every FY since 1976
(Dolfini-Reed & Jebo, 2000). Though Congress maintains responsibility for defining eligibility
criteria and scope of benefits under the TRICARE program, the MHS establishes the contracts,
policy, budget, oversight, and civilian provider networks necessary to deliver this care (Hutter et
al., 2019; Tanielian & Farmer, 2019).
Mission of the MHS
The mission of the MHS is to
ensure America’s 1.4 million active duty and 331,000 reserve-component personnel are
healthy so they can complete their national security missions; to ensure that all active
and reserve medical personnel in uniform are trained and ready to provide medical care
in support of operational forces around the world; and to provide a medical benefit
commensurate with the service and sacrifice of more than 9.4 million active duty
personnel, military retirees and their families. (DHA, 2019a)
Commensurate with this mission, the MHS has two critical objectives—often referred to as the
readiness mission and the benefits mission (Tanielian & Farmer, 2019). The primary objective
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of the MHS is the readiness mission. The readiness mission involves maintaining the health of
military personnel so they can carry out their military duties and deliver healthcare services
during military operations (Mendez, 2018a; DOD, 2014). In support of this readiness task, the
MHS provides preventive and restorative health services to military personnel so that they can
be medically prepared to deploy at a moment’s notice. U.S. military forces are deployed
worldwide in support of diverse missions such as combat operations, responses to natural
disasters, humanitarian intervention, training, deterrence, and diplomacy (Hutter et al., 2019).
These missions require servicemembers to be at peak health to withstand the physical and
mental strains associated with working in austere and demanding operational environments.
As part of its readiness mission, the MHS is also charged with maintaining a ready
medical force of military healthcare providers who are trained and equipped to provide medical
care in a complex operational environment (Hutter et al., 2019). Most of this preparation is
accomplished through the operation of hospitals and care facilities throughout the United States.
Medical staff work and train in these hospitals, which allows them to maintain and improve
medical skills during peacetime operations. For example, the DOD operates a certified Level 1
trauma center in San Antonio, Texas. This facility is authorized to provide trauma services for
non-military patients in order to provide a platform for uniformed medical providers to maintain
critical trauma skills (Sanchez, 2018).
The secondary purpose of the MHS is its benefits mission, which more closely resembles
the missions of civilian healthcare systems. The peacetime mission of the MHS is to provide
medical services to eligible beneficiaries, including retirees and family members of active and
retired servicemembers. Services are provided to non-uniformed beneficiaries (e.g., family
members, retirees) in military facilities on a space-available basis. This allows military
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providers to maintain their training and readiness for a diverse patient population in the military
hospitals, medical centers, ambulatory care facilities, and dental clinics in the direct care system
(Adirim, 2019).
Performance objectives in the MHS are guided by the four tenets of the MHS Quadruple
Aim. The MHS Quadruple Aim is similar to the Institute for Healthcare Improvement’s triple
aim of improving the experience of care, improving the health of populations, and reducing per
capita costs of healthcare (Berwick, Nolan, & Whittington, 2008). The key distinction for the
MHS is the addition of a fourth aim—readiness. The MHS readiness aim encompasses
accountability for “ensuring that the total military force is medically ready to deploy and that
the medical force is ready to deliver healthcare anytime, anywhere in support of the full range of
military operations, including humanitarian missions” (DHA, 2013).
Governance
The MHS executes its mission through five major DOD organizations: Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, DHA, MEDCOM, Navy Bureau of Medicine
and Surgery, and Air Force Medical Services (Mendez, 2018b). Leadership is comprised of a
combination of uniformed personnel and civilian government employees (DHA, 2019d). Each
organization executes distinct responsibilities, but they cooperate through a federated
governance structure that enables collaboration, resource sharing, and streamlining of
administrative functions (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1. Governance structure of the MHS through October 1, 2021. This organization chart
depicts the organization structure of the MHS prior to the transfer of management authority of
all MTFs to the DHA. Adapted from “Military Medical Care: Frequently Asked Questions,
Report No 45399, Version 4,” by Bryce Mendez, 2018, Congressional Research Service, p. 3.
Prior to 2013, the operational aspects of the MHS were divided among the medical
departments of the three uniformed services (Army; Navy, to include the Marine Corps; and Air
Force) with each service independently operating its own clinics, hospitals, and medical centers
(Bono, 2017; DOD, 2014). In September 2013, U.S. Department of Defense Directive 5136.13
established the DHA, which effectively unified these three subcomponents (DOD, 2013).
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The role of the DHA is to manage the TRICARE Program; manage and execute the
Defense Health Program (DHP) appropriation; support the coordinated management of multiservice markets (MSM);1 and exercise management responsibility for shared services, functions,
and activities of the MHS (Mendez, 2018a, p. 5). The DHA was created in order to reduce costs
by consolidating services, providing better coordination of resources, promoting more rapid
flow of information, and achieving more informed decision-making (Basu, 2012; Bono, 2017;
Cain, 2013; Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS] 2015). The DHA established common business
practices and integrated functions among the three uniformed services. These integrated
functions include purchasing medical supplies, management of the TRICARE health plan,
pharmacy services, health information technology, education and training, contracting, facility
planning, resource management, and research and development (Collins, 2015; Hutter et al.,
2019; DOD, 2013). The DHA also increased interoperability among the services, especially
with respect to technology and the management of access to care through the TRICARE health
plan. As a result of cost-saving initiatives and efficiencies gained by creating the DHA, the rate
of healthcare spending growth slowed throughout the MHS.
In 2017, Congress further expanded the role of the DHA with the passage of the FY
2017 NDAA. The NDAA is a series of federal laws that are passed each year to specify the
budget and expenditures of the DOD. Aside from authorizing the annual budget, the NDAA
also specifies how certain funds or activities within the DOD will be managed. The 2017
NDAA directs the MHS to consolidate the management of all DOD MTFs under the DHA. The
purpose of this transformation is to eliminate duplicative activities, achieve efficiencies in
management functions, and to reduce headquarters-level personnel requirements (GAO, 2018c).

1

Multi-service markets are healthcare markets in which the clinics or hospitals from two or more uniformed
services have overlapping service areas (DHA, 2019h; TRICARE, 2019).
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As part of this centralization process, the DHA will assume responsibility for hospital budgets
and common performance standards pertaining to readiness, quality, access, outcomes, and
safety (Smith et al., 2017).
Transformation efforts commenced in 2018 and will continue through 2021. Congress
requires the DOD to transfer 457 MTFs to the administration of the DHA by October 1, 2021
(NDAA, 2019). Figure 2 depicts the governance structure of the MHS once this change has
been fully implemented.

Figure 2. Governance structure of the MHS after October 1, 2021. This organization chart
depicts the organization of the MHS after the DHA assumes management of MTFs after
October 1, 2021. Adapted from “The U.S. Military Health System: Promoting Readiness and
Providing Health Care, by Terri Tanielian and Carrie Farmer, 2019, Health Affairs, 38(8), p.
1260.
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Funding
The MHS is funded through congressional appropriations in the Unified Medical
Budget, which is managed by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs. This
budget includes resourcing for medical personnel, military construction projects, operational
costs of military medical facilities, and non-war-related health services (Mendez, 2018b).
Funding for the delivery of health services is covered by the DHP, which typically constitutes
approximately 67% of the total unified health budget (Mendez, 2018b). The unified budget
request of $50.6 billion for FY 2019 includes $33.7 billion for the DHP, $8.9 billion for military
personnel, $0.4 billion for military construction, and $7.5 billion for healthcare accrual (GAO,
2018a). This outlay encompasses approximately 9% of the total defense budget (DHA, 2018a,
2019e; Mendez, 2018b).
Once Congress appropriates funds to the Unified Medical Budget and DHP, they are
disbursed to each of the three services (Army, Navy, and Air Force). The medical departments
of each service in turn allocate funding to each MTF (see Figure 3). Almost all of each
facility’s funding comes from this budget process, though there are a few secondary funding
sources. For example, 10 U.S.C. §1097(b) authorizes MTFs to undertake third-party collections
to other insurance payers for beneficiary care that is delivered in treatment facilities if enrollees
carry such extra insurance (Mendez, 2018b). Additionally, a standing authorization exists for
transfers between the Medicare Eligible Retiree Health Care Fund and TRICARE that
reimburses MTFs for the cost of healthcare delivered to Medicare-eligible military retirees in
military facilities. Supplementary funding is also provided to MTFs through other reimbursable
special programs and transfer authorities (Mendez, 2018b).
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Figure 3. MHS funding process. Adapted from “Performance-Based Adjustment Model
Overview” presentation by Robert Griffith on March 26, 2013 at the HFMA 2013 Texas State
Conference.
Facilities
As of 2019, the direct care system is comprised of 51 inpatient hospitals and medical
centers, and 672 ambulatory care, occupational health, and dental clinics (Adirim, 2019, p.
1269). These facilities, collectively referred to as MTFs, are typically located on military
installations or in areas densely populated by military personnel and their families. They are
operated in a federated manner by the medical departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force,
and overseen by the DHA (Adirim, 2019; Tanielian & Farmer, 2019).
MTFs are divided into three facility types. Health clinics are defined as ambulatory care
medical facilities that do not provide inpatient services. Health clinics typically offer primary
care services and a limited number of specialty care services (DHA, 2019g). Hospitals are
defined as facilities that offer both inpatient and outpatient services and a variety of specialty
care services. Medical Centers are defined as large hospitals that offer both inpatient and
outpatient care, as well as a combination of specialty and subspecialty care services. Medical
Centers typically operate Level 1 Trauma Centers that are authorized to provide emergency care
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for non-military patients in their respective communities. Due to the diversity of specialty care
provided, Medical Centers also host Graduate Medical Education (GME) programs and medical
research (DHA, 2019g).
Key Distinctions Between the MHS and the Private Sector
Several characteristics of the MHS distinguish it from other health systems in the United
States. Terry Adirim (2019) noted, the MHS “is more akin to a single payer than to the
fragmented civilian sector system [in the United States]” (p. 1270). Due to this distinction, the
MHS is not bound by the same market forces that drive strategy in civilian healthcare
organizations. Instead of attempting to gain market share and increase revenues, military
organizations survive by seeking efficiencies that drive down costs to the federal government
and increase value to taxpayers (Adirim, 2019). This is one of the drivers for consolidation
efforts, including the creation of the DHA (GAO, 2018; Smith et al., 2017).
In addition to lowering costs, MHS organizations are also driven to avoid low-value
healthcare services. Since MHS providers are not paid through fee-for-service arrangements,
there is less incentive to order unnecessary diagnostic tests, conduct nonessential follow-up
visits, or prescribe clinically inappropriate care such as antibiotics for viral infections. There is
evidence that patterns of low-value care differ between the MHS and private sector
counterparts. For example, a comparative study between MHS providers and purchased care
(civilian) providers found that private sector providers prescribe expensive, low-value care more
often than MHS providers (Koehlmoos et al., 2019). Another study on defensive medicine also
found that patients in military healthcare facilities receive less intensive medical services with
no measurable adverse impact on outcomes (Frakes & Gruber, 2019).

64

As discussed, the primary mission of the MHS also differs markedly from commercial
counterparts. While most civilian healthcare organizations (e.g., for-profit and not-for profit
community hospitals) provide healthcare services to general patient populations or to specific
types of patients, such as children, veterans, women, or cancer patients (Bolon, 2005), military
healthcare organizations have the added role of providing medical support for military
operations. To support these unique requirements, MHS organizations often adopt strategies
that would not be tenable in typical civilian healthcare facilities. For example, the DOD
maintains hospitals in isolated areas with low populations. These are often located near some of
the largest defense training areas such as the National Training Center in Fort Irwin, California;
the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center in Twentynine Palms, California; and the Joint
Readiness Training Center in Fort Polk, Louisiana. Maintaining hospitals in such deeply rural
areas would not be financially viable for most civilian hospitals without a government or charity
funding source, yet the DOD maintains these facilities because they are required to support
high-risk training operations and to provide medical services to the remotely stationed
servicemembers and families.
Another key distinction for military healthcare is the maintenance of critical services
that are not available within the local healthcare markets. For example, many military hospitals
maintain inpatient services despite a very low daily inpatient census. The average daily inpatient
census across the MHS for FY 2016 was 37.4 with many facilities falling well below the
minimal census required to keep the doors open in a civilian facility (Bono, 2017).
Some scholars have believed that these additional support requirements elevate the costs
of military healthcare; however, these costs are difficult to quantify and have not historically
been measured (Adirim, 2019, p. 1270). Though it may be difficult to conduct straightforward
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comparisons between military and civilian healthcare costs (GAO, 2018a), there are some
requirements specific to military healthcare organizations that are easily measurable. For
example, DOD (2016) regulations require every servicemember to undergo an annual physical
assessment (DODI 6200.06), which drives up yearly healthcare utilization rates by minimum of
one encounter per servicemember per year. Additional health assessments are also required
before and after deployments, in addition to care provided for any deployment-related health
conditions. These assessments come with measurable costs that are unique to military
healthcare organizations.
Other financial impacts, such as the influence of military requirements on provider
turnover and discontinuity of care, are less easily quantified and measured. The financial
consequences of staff turnover in civilian healthcare organizations are well documented in the
existing literature (Gray, Phillips, & Normand, 1996; C. B. Jones, 2005; Waldman, Kelly,
Arora, & Smith, 2010). These effects may be exacerbated in MHS facilities because militaryspecific requirements for active duty medical staff (e.g., training, deployments and permanent
reassignments) add to the organizational stressors associated with the typical drivers of
turnover. Deployed staff are usually replaced by temporary backfills from the U.S. Reserves or
contracted civilian providers, although it is common for facilities to experience periods of
underlap during these transitions (GAO, 2018a).
In addition to deployments, military facilities are also impacted by the frequent
reassignment of military servicemembers. On average, military servicemembers are reassigned
to a different geographic location at least once every 36 months, although moves can be more
frequent due to requirements for professional development, training, and deployments (Vergun,
2013). Frequent moves by active duty military members can also have a direct impact on non-
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military (civilian) employees in healthcare facilities. Many government service employees are
family members of active duty personnel and move just as frequently as their military spouses.
Research has shown that these military-specific disruptions impact healthcare delivery in
MHS facilities. For example, a study of military physicians preparing for deployment found
that their patients experienced a 15-30% increase in specialist visits and a 15-18% increase in
emergency room visits during the deployment and pre-deployment periods (Schwab, 2018).
These changes were attributable to discontinuity of care as their physicians prepared for an
extended departure. Another study of military hospitals from 2001 to 2006 found that hospital
productivity was negatively impacted by support requirements for the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan (Childress, 2013). These studies highlight the fact that readiness mission of the
MHS is linked to financial and performance consequences for hospitals that add to the
complexity of comparisons to civilian healthcare organizations.
Cost, Quality, and Access in the MHS
Like many civilian healthcare organizations, cost, quality, and access are three of the
biggest strategic concerns in the MHS. Cost has become increasingly important to
Congressional, DOD, and MHS leaders over the last 20 years due to ballooning defense
expenditures on healthcare. From 2001-2017, the MHS experienced a 217% increase in costs,
prompting a call for intervention from the GAO (2017). From 2001 to 2010, spending on
healthcare rose across the DOD by an average of 11.6% annually, which was significantly
higher than the average 6.4% increase in healthcare spending across the United States for the
same time period (Adirim, 2019; CMS, 2019c). Throughout the last 20 years, healthcare costs
have consumed an average of 8-10% of the total annual DOD budget (Mendez, 2018a).
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These increases are attributable to several factors. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan
created an increased demand for healthcare services among servicemembers. Additionally, the
costs associated with resourcing an agile medical force to support combat operations also places
a strain on healthcare funding. Another factor is the expansion of healthcare benefits in the
TRICARE program. Starting in 2001, Congress initiated the TRICARE for Life program that
provided secondary insurance coverage for over 2 million Medicare-eligible military retirees
and their dependents (DHA, 2018b). A generous new pharmacy benefit also expanded
prescription drug coverage for this same population of Medicare-eligible military retirees
(Adirim, 2019; DHA, 2018b). Though these new benefits are resourced through allocations of
money set aside for retiree healthcare, they are often included in estimates of military healthcare
spending.
Healthcare quality in the MHS is another critical concern for Congress, DOD, and MHS
leaders. As noted, active duty servicemembers are required to maintain a high level of physical
health (i.e., medical readiness) in order to perform military duties in demanding environments.
The healthcare services that ill or injured soldiers receive have the potential to impact the
amount of time they are available to perform their military duties. Since poor quality healthcare
can impact the overall readiness of the U.S. military force, the quality of military healthcare has
been identified as a national defense priority (Pellerin, 2017).
Congress has closely monitored healthcare quality in the MHS over the last 20 years.
Media attention regarding conditions at the Walter Reed Hospital (NPR.org, 2011; Priest &
Hull, 2007), allegations of medical errors (LaFraniere & Lehran, 2014a, 2014b), complaints
about access to care (Kime, 2014), and organizational changes across the MHS prompted the
Secretary of Defense to order a 90-day review of quality, access, and safety across the MHS in
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2014. This comprehensive study, known as the MHS Review, provides the basis for a
considerable amount of literature that has been published on military healthcare in the last 5
years. The MHS Review commissioned a panel of military and non-DOD healthcare experts
who compared the performance of the MHS to civilian counterparts using nationally recognized
performance benchmarks. Overall, the MHS Review found that the MHS provides high quality,
safe, and timely care that is comparable to the civilian sector. However, the review also noted
wide performance variability, with the MHS performing better than national benchmarks in
some areas and below national benchmarks in others (DOD, 2014). This was one of many
factors that laid the foundation for ongoing quality improvement efforts across the MHS. These
efforts emphasize reducing variation and transitioning into high reliability organizations with
respect to safety and quality.
Access to care is another major concern for MHS leaders. The IOM (1993) defined
access to care as “the timely use of personal healthcare services to achieve the best health
outcomes” (p. 4). Although no universal definition of timely access to care has been established
nationally, the access standards for the MHS are codified by law (32 C.F.R. §199.17(p)(5) TRICARE program, n.d.). Access standards for military beneficiaries include (32 C.F.R.
§199.17(p)(5) - TRICARE program, n.d.; DOD, 2014):
1. No more than 30-minute drive time for primary care
2. Specialty care appointments available within 4 weeks
3. Routine medical appointments available within 1 week
4. Wait time for urgent care appointments will not exceed 24 hours
5. Emergency room access available 24 hours per day/7 days per week
6. No more than 60-minute drive time for specialty care appointments
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7. Office wait times not to exceed 30 minutes unless emergency care is being rendered
to another patient
These access standards are met through a combination of healthcare services provided in
the direct and purchased care systems. The purchased care component serves as a safety net
when access to care standards cannot be met through the direct care system or when military
facilities are over capacity (32 C.F.R. §199.17(p)(5) - TRICARE program, n.d.; DOD, 2014).
Access to care is monitored and managed at each MTF through designated Group Practice
Managers (Air Force) or Access to Care managers (DHA, Army, and Navy; DOD, 2014). The
role of these access managers is to monitor access, communicate with clinic leaders, and
coordinate care through the purchased care system when access standards cannot be met in
military facilities.
The 2014 MHS Review found that, on average, the MHS meets or exceeds its own
access to care benchmarks (DOD, 2014). According to this review, the average wait time for
specialty care appointments in the direct care system is 12.4 days, while the average wait for
urgent (non-emergency) appointments is less than 24 hours in most facilities. However, the
MHS Review panel also noted that there is high variability among MTFs regarding compliance
with access-to-care mandates (DOD, 2014). The cause of this variability has not been studied
empirically, but operational requirements for military medical staff may be one factor. Shortterm deployments of military providers often disproportionately affect hospitals located in close
proximity to deploying combat units and are often difficult for MTF leaders to program into
long-term manpower planning. According to the GAO (2018a), MTFs often struggle to fill
positions vacated by deployed medical staff due to the length of the federal and civilian hiring
process, uncompetitive wages for federal civilians and contractors, and federal hiring freezes.
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When MTFs are unable to meet access to care requirements in the direct care system,
they rely on the purchased care system to supplement access. Since participation in the
TRICARE program is voluntary for contracted civilian providers, this safety net does not
always guarantee that there will be enough participation among local providers to meet access
to care standards with purchased care. Studies have shown that the acceptance rate for
TRICARE insurance among primary care providers (67%) is less than acceptance rate for
private insurance (95%) and Medicare (86%) and is comparable to Medicaid (65%; BenShalom, Schone, & Bannick, 2019; Boukus, Cassil, & O’Malley, 2009). These low acceptance
rates have caused TRICARE beneficiaries to report problems with access to care in select
markets (Ben-Shalom et al., 2019; GAO, 2006, 2011, 2013).
In addition to monitoring access to care using objective metrics such as the average wait
time for appointments, the MHS also monitors access to care using subjective measures such as
satisfaction surveys. Assessment of these two types of measures often produce conflicting
findings in relation to access. For example, the MHS Review noted a discrepancy between
documented MTF compliance with access-to-care standards and patients’ reported satisfaction
with timely access to care (DOD, 2014). Another study found that TRICARE-insured family
members report access to care that is similar to uninsured or publicly insured populations
(Seshadri, Strane, Matone, Ruedisueli, & Rubin, 2019). The cause of these discrepancies
between self-reported access and objective measures of access has not yet been empirically
determined, although low reimbursement rates and low acceptance rates for TRICARE
insurance in the purchased care component may be one factor (Ben-Shalom et al., 2019; GAO,
2006, 2011, 2013).
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Since Congress and MHS leaders are accountable to the American public for the value
of military healthcare services delivered through taxpayer funding, matters related to cost and
quality have generated congressional attention over the last 20 years. Many of these concerns
prompted lawmakers and military leaders to seek policies aimed at reducing costs and
increasing healthcare quality. This provided the impetus for the PBB programs that the
MEDCOM has experimented with over the past 15 years. Though the Army’s PBB programs
included performance measures for cost, quality and access, this study focuses specifically on
the quality measures.
Summary
The unique demands of the MHS required a tailored approach for addressing
performance that differed from the traditional pay for performance approaches that were
popular among civilian hospitals in the 2000s and beyond. Because the MHS operates with a
federated governance structure and funding resources are shared between facilities, traditional
pay for performance approaches are less appropriate in this context. MHS healthcare facilities
do not have financial relationships with multiple insurers, nor do they operate with a traditional
business model in which more money can be earned through greater efficiency, productivity,
marketing, or patient volume. Instead, PBB is a better approach because healthcare facilities are
resourced through a finite federal budget that is allocated through a top-down approach.
Performance improvement can be encouraged in this context by including performance
thresholds in the budgeting process for each facility, such that higher performing facilities are
rewarded with greater funding. Though this study does not provide a direct comparison to pay
for performance, it examines PBB to determine if it has similar impacts on quality performance
that are observed with traditional pay for performance programs.
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Evolution of PBB in U.S. Army Healthcare Facilities
In 2004, a select group of Army hospitals in the southeast region of the United States
were chosen to participate in pilot program testing PBB. There were several drivers for this
transition, but the main catalyst for the early program was cost control. As described above,
mounting fiscal pressures from increased healthcare costs and the impacts of the dual wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan prompted Army leaders to seek alternatives to the traditional method of
building treatment facility budgets. In light of these fiscal pressures, MEDCOM initiated
sweeping changes to its funding model for all of its facilities starting in 2006. This program,
known as the Performance-Based Adjustment Model (PBAM), was a mandatory Army-wide
program intended to address concerns over unsustainable healthcare costs, improve
accountability, and improve the quality of healthcare services (Griffith, 2013; West et al., 2010)
by making a portion of MTF funding contingent upon performance (i.e., PBB).
Prior to 2006, Army hospitals were funded in the traditional manner: Congress
appropriated funds to the DHP, which were then disbursed to each of the three services and
allocated to the MTFs through the services’ medical departments. Under this arrangement,
Army MTFs typically received “last year’s budget plus inflation” (West & Cronk, 2011, p. 32)
at the beginning of each FY. This allocation method is associated with some undesirable effects
(Balakrishnan, Soderstrom, & West, 2007; West et al., 2010). Many scholars have argued that
the annual U.S. fiscal cycle does little to support performance and long-term investment.
Budget lapsing refers to a typical feature of government programs in which unspent funds do
not carry over from one budget cycle to the next (Balakrishnan et al., 2007; Zimmerman, 2003).
The threat of having unspent funds removed from future budgets or transferred to other
organizations creates a disincentive for public managers to improve efficiency or implement
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cost-saving techniques (McNab & Melese, 2003). As a result, managers often engage in a
counterproductive method of saving and dissaving throughout the FY.
Balakrishnan et al. (2007) documented this spending pattern in a 5-year study of 31
Army hospitals. They found evidence that administrators were managing uncertainty by
maintaining a reserve of funds throughout the year, only to be expended in a large outflow at the
end of the FY. Not only was this funding method and its resultant spending patterns inefficient,
it did little to incentivize more constructive pursuits, such as investment in quality improvement
or enhanced productivity. West et al. (2010) argued that the traditional funding model did little
to hold administrators accountable for the output of their organizations. When administrators
and managers expect their funding levels to remain relatively stable regardless of their
performance or productivity, there is little incentive to increase output or improve quality.
Because the primary performance indicator for administrators and managers is staying within
budget, there is little fiscal incentive to increase output or improve quality under the traditional
funding model.
The PBAM was designed to address these concerns by “aligning hospital- and
department-level managers’ incentives with both funding and MEDCOM’s strategic goals”
(West et al., 2010, p. 53). PBAM reversed the existing incentive structure by rewarding
managers for efficiency, productivity, and quality improvement rather than penalizing
departments for returning unused funds. Even though MEDCOM could not change the way that
funds were disbursed from Congress and the DOD, PBAM allowed high-level leaders to adjust
how the funds were disbursed across the system (West et al., 2010, p. 53). This enabled
MEDCOM to implement a new incentive structure that incorporated performance information
in budget decisions across Army hospitals.
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Based on the outputs versus outcomes paradigm of PBB that was previously described
(M. S. DeVries & Nemec, 2019), the PBAM program can be categorized as a hybrid of both of
these goals. It was designed to resource hospitals based on a combination of productivity
measures (outputs) and quality measures (outcomes; see Figure 4).

Figure 4. Performance-based resourcing of U.S. Army hospitals under PBAM and IRIS
programs. Adapted from “Performance-Based Adjustment Model Overview” presentation by
Robert Griffith on March 26, 2013 at the HFMA 2013 Texas State Conference.
Under the PBAM program, MEDCOM resourced MTFs at the beginning of the FY
based on productivity data that was determined by workload and efficiency measures (Rheney,
2007). Throughout the year, adjustments (decrements and bonuses) were applied to facilitylevel funding based on performance in three areas: capacity (workload and efficiency),
administrative performance (i.e., coding accuracy, cost accounting, staffing management) and
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quality (i.e., evidence-based practice, patient satisfaction). Though performance adjustments
were calculated and reported monthly, actual budget adjustments typically occurred three to
four times per year (Griffith, 2013, 2019). This encouraged administrators to closely monitor
performance on a monthly basis in order to forecast funding levels throughout the year.
PBAM performance adjustments represented a small portion of the overall MTF budget;
no more than 5% of the total budget was at risk for adjustment. On average, actual bonuses
(and penalties) typically added up to approximately 3% of the budget (Griffith, 2019). Despite
the small size of the incentive, there was initial evidence suggesting a link to increased
performance. A pilot study conducted with six Army healthcare facilities in the southeast
region of the United States provided an initial proof of concept. This model was then endorsed
by the Army Surgeon General and rolled out to the rest of the Army in 2006. After
implementing PBAM, Army facilities across MEDCOM realized a 13.9% increase in total
output, a 3.3% gain in provider efficiency, and a 15% gain in coding accuracy (West et al.,
2010). Initial gains were also documented for quality measures such as patient satisfaction and
population health screening (Griffith, 2013; Waymire & West, 2010). For example, prior to
2006, Army facilities significantly underperformed on measures in the HEDIS relative to Air
Force and Navy peers. By 2009, this trend reversed and Army outperformed Navy and Air
Force facilities on the same measures (Griffith, 2013).
In 2014, the U.S. Army transitioned from PBAM to another PBB program known as the
Integrated Resource and Incentive System (IRIS). The purpose of IRIS was to “align funding &
incentives in order to enhance MTF value production” (Dunning, 2014, Slide 6). This program
was very similar to PBAM, except that it integrated the workload-based resourcing system with
the performance-based incentive system (Griffith, 2019). The key distinction between the IRIS
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and PBAM programs was the introduction of a subcapitation model for primary care at each
facility.
Under the new IRIS model, Army hospitals were funded based a per member per month
capitated rate that was directly linked to the number of patients enrolled to their facilities.
Funding levels at each facility were projected at the beginning of each FY based on the
anticipated enrollment of patients at that facility. Each facility had the opportunity for base
funding levels to increase or decrease throughout the year based on enrollment changes and
performance on pre-established metrics. The IRIS program promoted even greater involvement
of administrators and managers at each facility because leaders were required to submit a
performance plan at the beginning of each FY. These changes also required leaders to focus on
enrollment rather than RVU production alone in order to increase base funding levels (Dunning,
2014). This new structure emphasized high-value healthcare services that were intended to
keep patients healthier and reduce the need for future preventable healthcare services. This
strategy also reduced the incentive to deliver low-value healthcare services that were not
evidence-based.
The incentive structure for quality was essentially the same for both the PBAM and IRIS
programs. Although the incentive size and the number of performance measures shifted from
year to year, both programs rewarded quality by incorporating small, organization-level budget
adjustments (bonuses or penalties) based on performance over a rolling 12-month period.
Under both programs, a small portion of each facility’s overall budget was placed “at risk”
contingent upon quality performance. From 2006-2018, quality metrics were added, dropped
and revised annually for both the IRIS and PBAM programs (see Table 1 for the yearly
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evolution of metrics from 2006-2018), giving Army leaders the ability to align incentives with
changing strategic priorities (Griffith, 2013, 2019).
Table 1
Incentivized Quality Measures Under PBAM and IRIS, 2004-2019
Measure
Breast cancer
screening

Year
2004/2006*

Measure source
NCQA/HEDIS

Cervical
cancer
screening

2004/2006*

NCQA/HEDIS

Diabetes-A1C
Screening

2004/2006*

NCQA/HEDIS

Diabetes-A1C
Control

2004/2006*

NCQA/HEDIS

Diabetes-LDL
Control

2004/2006*

NCQA/HEDIS

Asthma Care

2004/2006*

NCQA/HEDIS

Colorectal
cancer
screening

2006

NCQA/HEDIS

Chlamydia
screening

2009

NCQA/HEDIS

Pneumonia
vaccination
status

2009

Patient
satisfaction
(APLSS)

2009

Managed Care
Organization
Accreditation
Benchmarks and
Thresholds
Army
MEDCOM

Inpatient
professional
service rounds

2009

Army
MEDCOM

Definition
Percent of eligible enrollees (age 42-69) with
screening mammography within the last 24
months.
Percent of eligible enrollees (age 24-64) with
an appropriate cervical cancer screening in the
past 36 months.
Percentage of eligible patients with diabetes
who have had A1C testing within the past 12
months.
Percent of eligible patients with diabetes with
HbA1C levels at nine or below within the last
year.
Percent of eligible patients diagnosed with
diabetes who have an LDL level below
100mg/dl within the last year.
Percent of eligible enrollees (age 5-56) with
persistent asthma who are prescribed
medications considered acceptable as a primary
therapy for the long-term control of asthma.
Percent of eligible enrollees, age 50-80, who
have had appropriate colorectal cancer
screening. Screening intervals vary according
to the method of screening.
Percent of enrolled active duty women, age 1625, who have received a chlamydia screening
within past 12 months.
Percent of eligible enrollees 65 years older who
have received one or more pneumococcal
vaccinations.
Percent of patient satisfaction surveys returned
with a rating of 4 or 5 (out of 5) on Question
21, the “overall satisfaction” item.
Number of physician-associated inpatient
episodes of care meeting documentation
standards (based on E & M codes).
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Measure
Antibiotics
w/in 1 hour of
surgery

Year
2010

Measure source
Joint
Commission/
ORYX

Definition
Number of surgical patients with prophylactic
antibiotics initiated within 1 hour prior to
surgical incision (2 hours if receiving
vancomycin).
Percentage of cases that have received the
appropriate treatment identified to provide the
best outcome for the patient.

Children’s
asthma care:
Home
management
plan of care
Patient
satisfaction
w/access

2010

Joint
Commission/
ORYX

2010

DHA

PCM
continuity

2011

DHA

Documented
Body Mass
Index in health
record
Well child
visits (6 in 15
mos.)

2011

DHA

2012

NCQA/HEDIS

HEDIS criteria for percent of eligible
population with six or more well child visits in
the first 15 months of life.

Inpatient
satisfaction
Preventable
admissions

2012

DHA

2014

AHRQ

Percentage of patients satisfied with MTF
provided care for TRISS Question 20.
Number of admissions meeting AHRQ
definitions for “potentially preventable.”

Readmissions

2014

CMS/
Partnership for
Patients

Tobacco use

2014

DHA

Healthy
weight

2014

DHA

Tobacco use

2015

DHA

Low back pain

2016

NCQA/HEDIS

Number of surveys returned with a 4 or 5 rating
(out of 5) on Questions 9, 11, and 13 of the
APLSS Survey (items pertaining to satisfaction
with access).
Number of primary care encounters in which
the patient saw his or her assigned Primary
Care Manager.
The percentage of enrollees with a calculable
BMI in medical record.

Penalty per Re-Admission for Three Focus
Areas: Acute myocardial infarction, heart
failure, and pneumonia. Date of readmission,
for the same diagnosis is within 30 days of
discharge date.
The number of enrollees without tobacco use in
the previous 12 months.
Number of enrollees 24 months and older that
had a Healthy Weight measured in a Primary
Care Clinic within the prior 12 months using
CDC standards.
Number of enrollees 18 years or older who
report that they do not use tobacco.
Percent of enrollees aged 18-50 with a primary
diagnosis of low back pain who did not have an
imaging study (plan x-ray, MRI, CT scan)
within 28 days of diagnosis.
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Measure
PTSD
depression
treatment
dosage

Year
2016

Measure source
DHA

PTSD
depression
treatment
outcome
Exclusive
breastfeeding

2016

DHA

2016

Joint
Commission

Body Mass
Index outcome

2016

DHA

All cases
morbidity
index

2017

CLABSI

2017

(NSQIP) /
American
College of
Surgeons
CDC NHSN

Behavioral
health
outcomes

2017

DHA

Behavioral
health provider
data input

2017

DHA

Medical
management
for high
utilizers
Foreign body
retention

2017

DHA

Number of high utilizing patients (10 or more
primary care encounters in 12 months)
receiving appropriate case management.

2017

DHA

Number of retained object events. A retained
object is defined as a surgical object that is
accidently left in the patient during a procedure.

Vaginal
delivery with
shoulder
dystocia rate
Postpartum
hemorrhage
rate

2017

National
Perinatal
Information
Center
National
Perinatal
Information
Center

Vaginal delivery with shoulder dystocia rate linked to inborn ≥ 2500g with birth trauma.

2017

Definition
Number of patients initially diagnosed with
PTSD or Major Depressive Disorder who met
the requirement of initial visit plus three or
more follow-up visits within the first 90 days
after diagnosis.
Number of PTSD and depression episodes of
care with either a clinical response or full
remission.
Overall rate of newborns that were exclusively
fed breast milk during the entire
hospitalization.
Number over enrollees with a BMI > 25 who
have at least three primary care visits and
achieve 1.0% BMI reduction per person.
Measures the quality of surgical care using a
case-mix adjusted, risk-adjusted, and outcomesbased odds ratio to compare actual performance
to expected performance.
Risk-adjusted rate ratio of CLABSI in MTF
ICUs compared to other participating ICUs in
the CDC NHSN Program.
Percent of patients with clinically significant
improvement in three areas: depression, PTSD,
anxiety disorder. Note: Extension of 2016
outcome metric.
Rate of provider input into the Behavioral
Health Data Portal.

Rate of women who experienced postpartum
hemorrhage ≥ 1,000 ml.
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Measure
Appropriate
testing for
children with
pharyngitis

Year
2017

Measure source
NCQA/HEDIS

Appropriate
treatment for
children with
upperrespiratory
infection
(URI)
Follow-up
after
hospitalization
for mental
illness

2017

NCQA/HEDIS

2017

NCQA/HEDIS

Definition
Assesses children 2-18 years of age who were
diagnosed with pharyngitis, dispensed an
antibiotic, and received a group A
streptococcus test for the episode. A higher rate
represents better performance (i.e., appropriate
testing).
Children 3 months to 18 years of age who were
given a diagnosis of URI and were not
dispensed an antibiotic prescription. A higher
rate indicates appropriate treatment of children
with URI (i.e., the proportion for whom
antibiotics were not prescribed).
Adult and children 6 years of age and older
who were hospitalized for treatment of selected
mental health disorders and received follow-up
within 7 days of discharge and within 30 days
of discharge.

Patient
2017
DHA
Patient satisfaction incentive transitioned from
SatisfactionAPLSS to JOES survey. Question 22, overall
Joint
satisfaction, was incentivized.
Outpatient
Experience
Survey
Note. LDL = low density lipoproteins. Information compiled from PBAM and IRIS Handbooks, years
2006-2017, with supplements from briefing slides 2004-2017.
1
Some Army facilities participated in a pilot study of PBAM and started to be incentivized in 2004.
Non-pilot sites started these incentives when PBAM was rolled out to all Army facilities in 2006.

The fee-for-service payments were intended to cover medical costs for patients not
enrolled to the facility (such as servicemembers on short-term training assignments or in
transition between permanent assignments). The supplemental funds covered the costs of
designated special programs. The proportion of each facility’s budget affected by supplemental
funds varied from year to year based on several factors, such as the strategic priorities of the
Army, and initiation of congressionally funded special projects. Due to the annual variation in
special programs, enrollment, and funding at each facility, a full economic analysis of PBB in
Army healthcare facilities is beyond the scope of this analysis.
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To date, researchers have not conducted any rigorous studies to evaluate the effects of
the Army’s PBB programs on quality improvement. Analysts have conducted a small number
of unpublished internal studies on performance improvement, but these were small in scope and
did not include a comparison group. One unpublished study on the PBAM program did include
a comparison to Navy and Air Force, but this study compared service-level performance and did
not provide analysis to determine if service-level pre/post differences in performance were
statistically significant. It remains unclear what effects the incentives in PBAM and IRIS had
on the quality improvement in Army hospitals, if any.
Summary
This chapter began with an overview of the history, definitions, and research on pay for
performance. This literature review demonstrates that the drive to improve the safety and
quality of healthcare services in the United States has increased over the past 20 years. Pay for
performance emerged over that period, but the research evidence supporting its use has yielded
mixed findings. Some researchers have hypothesized that this heterogeneity in results may be
due to patient factors, differences in care settings, and heterogeneity in program design features.
Research findings for each of these factors was discussed. Overall, the literature on pay for
performance suggests that it usually does not result in significant performance improvement.
When performance does improve in conjunction with pay for performance programs, it is
usually for process measures rather than patient outcomes, and those improvements tend to
diminish or disappear over time.
This chapter also provided an overview of PBB and presented arguments for why it
should be considered a special case of pay for performance that pertains to government
programs. Rigorous research on PBB is limited, but the existing literature suggests that
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programs often fail to achieve their intended results. The most commonly cited reason for the
failure of PBB programs is an inability to definitively link program performance to budget
decisions. Unlike private sector organizations whose performance is primarily driven by market
forces, public program resourcing is determined through political processes that may attenuate
the link between program performance and program funding.
After PBB and its links to pay for performance, this chapter transitioned into an
overview of the U.S. Army’s PBB program in its healthcare facilities. Background information
about the MHS was provided to establish the context for the emergence of the Army’s PBB
programs. Though PBB has been widely implemented in U.S. Army healthcare facilities, there
is no experimental or comparative research to determine if it works in the Army or in other
contexts.
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Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework

Introduction
In this chapter, the basic tenets of RDT are reviewed. RDT concepts are then discussed
in terms of their applicability to the MHS and the Army’s adoption of PBB programs. Next, a
conceptual model is presented that demonstrates how RDT can be used to predict the impact of
PBB on quality performance in Army hospitals. The final section of this chapter presents
hypotheses using the conceptual model and RDT as its basis.
Conceptual Framework
This study employs the conceptual framework of RDT (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) to
examine the impact of PBB on quality metrics in U.S. Army medical facilities. The RDT
framework has been used extensively in healthcare research related to financial incentives
(Yeager, Menachemi, et al., 2014) and can therefore be useful in guiding this study on the
effects of PBB incentives in military healthcare facilities.
According to RDT, organizations depend on critical resources from the external
environment to function and survive. Organizations must develop strategies to manage or
reduce dependencies on those external resources critical to survival (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).
According to RDT, external forces in the environment can influence the strategies that
organizations adopt in order to manage access to critical resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).
Three environmental factors affect organizations’ access to critical resources: munificence,
complexity, and dynamism. Munificence refers to the overall supply and accessibility of
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resources in the environment (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Environmental complexity and
dynamism are both related to the overall degree of uncertainty in the market (Pfeffer &
Salancik, 1978; Yeager, Savage, Ginter, & Beitsch, 2014). Complexity refers to factors that
make strategic decision-making and actions more difficult (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).
Dynamism refers to the level of change internal and external to the organization (Pfeffer &
Salancik, 1978).
Most health services research studies that used RDT have examined private sector
healthcare organizations such as hospitals, long-term care facilities (nursing homes and nursing
subacute facilities), and medical practices (Yeager, Savage, et al., 2014). Though DOD
healthcare organizations do not face the same environmental market pressures as private sector
healthcare organizations, they still rely on resources in their environment to survive. Due to this
dependency, the predicted relationships between organizations and their resource environment
are also applicable to DOD healthcare organizations. The following section discusses key
concepts in RDT and outlines how those concepts can be applied to the MHS resource
environment to predict changes in hospital performance.
Application of RDT Concepts to the MHS
Healthcare studies applying the RDT framework define critical resources in many ways,
although financial resources are the most common (Fareed & Mick, 2011). Other types of
resources include reputation, prestige, status, and knowledge (Fareed & Mick, 2011). For the
present study, the critical resource is financial. It is operationalized as the overall DHP budget
allocation for military healthcare facilities, which is comprised of the portion of the U.S.
National Defense budget that is set aside to cover the costs associated with delivering in-house
healthcare within military health facilities (Mendez, 2018a).
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Most healthcare studies investigate the impact of elements in the external resource
environment on a dependent variable related to performance or organizational strategy (Yeager,
Savage, et al., 2014). Examples of organizational strategies in the healthcare literature include
participation in managed care (Yeager, Savage, et al., 2014; Zinn, Proenca, & Rosko, 1997),
adoption of electronic medical records (Kazley & Ozcan, 2007; Yeager, Savage, et al., 2014),
admission of obese nursing home residents (Zhang, Li, & Temkin-Greener, 2013), participation
in the subacute care market (Weech-Maldonado, Qaseem, & Mkanta, 2009), adoption service or
quality innovations (Banaszak-Holl, Zinn, & Mor, 1996; Fareed & Mick, 2011; Zinn, Weech, &
Brannon, 1998), or some dimension of organizational performance (Hsieh, Clement, & Bazzoli,
2010; Yeager, Savage, et al., 2014; Zinn, 1994). For U.S. Army healthcare facilities that
participated in the PBAM (2006-2013) and IRIS (2014-present) PBB programs, the
organizational strategies refer to the performance improvement actions that Army healthcare
facilities undertake to obtain bonuses or avoid penalties.
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) described munificence in terms of the availability of critical
resources in the environment. Limitations on critical resources in the environment can create
uncertainty, which shapes the behavior of organizations in response to resource austerity
(Fareed & Mick, 2011; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). In the context of PBB, fiscal climate may
impact the degree to which performance measurement is used for resource decisions (Jordan &
Hackbart, 1999; Lauth, 1985; U.S. General Accounting Office, 1993). In periods of fiscal stress,
across-the-board cuts are more likely to be used regardless of program performance (Jordan &
Hackbart, 1999; U.S. General Accounting Office, 1993). This reduces the incentive for
organizations to improve performance and also reduces the availability of resources for
organizations to devote to performance improvement efforts. In the context of military
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healthcare, a significant determinant of environmental munificence is the size of the DHP
budget. The DHP budget impacts all military healthcare facilities and can fluctuate annually
based on Congressional allocation through the NDAA (Mendez, 2018a; U.S. Congress, House
Committee on Armed Services, 2017; DOD, 2018a). The DHP budget allocation shapes each
medical facility’s fiscal environment and affects the financial resources that are available for all
operations, including quality improvement activities. During periods of fiscal austerity,
facilities may have fewer resources available for performance improvement.
Any factor that makes a situation more intricate or complicated increases its level of
complexity. In health services research, complexity has been operationalized as market
competition among healthcare organizations (Banaszak-Holl et al., 1996; Hsieh et al., 2010;
Kazley & Ozcan, 2007; Weech-Maldonado et al., 2009; Zinn et al., 1997; Zinn et al., 1998)
because market competition increases the information uncertainty that decision-makers use to
select organizational strategy in response to environmental variables (Yeager, Menachemi, et
al., 2014, p. 52). The present study defines complexity in terms of patient demographic mix and
acuity because these variables have the potential to complicate quality performance efforts.
For example, a facility with a higher population of elderly patients may be at greater risk
for adverse health outcomes that can affect a facility’s quality performance (Green, Passman, &
Wintfield, 1991; Iezzoni, 2003). Patient age has also been found to be a predictor of
satisfaction on military-sponsored patient satisfaction surveys (Mangelsdorff & Finstuen, 2003).
Thus, facilities with a younger patient population may face more difficulty in achieving higher
patient satisfaction score relative to peers. Complexity of healthcare needs in the patient
population is another factor that may vary from facility to facility and impact organization-level
quality performance. For example, during the peak periods of combat operations in Iraq and
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Afghanistan, sick and wounded servicemembers were routed through four major facilities:
Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Bethesda Naval Medical Center, Brook Army Medical
Center, and Landstuhl Regional Medical Center (DHA, Wounded Warrior Care Center, n.d.;
U.S. Army, 2012; U.S. Army Medical Department, 2016). This concentration of complex
patients may make it more difficult for certain facilities to achieve higher quality performance
relative to peer facilities with less vulnerable patients. Since patient safety is at increased risk
during care transitions (Coleman, Parry, Chalmers, & Min, 2006; Forster, Murff, Peterson,
Gandhi, & Bates, 2003), facilities serving higher acuity patients may be more vulnerable to
adverse outcomes than facilities serving less complex patients requiring fewer care transitions.
Dynamism relates to the level of change in the resource environment. Factors that
create fluctuations in the resource environment increase uncertainty and make it more difficult
to predict the future and execute an organizational strategy (Yeager, Menachemi, et al., 2014, p.
52). The most common operationalization for dynamism in health services research is the
unemployment rate (Yeager, Menachemi, et al., 2014), but it has also been operationalized in
terms of number of managed care contracts (Menachemi, Mazurenko, Kazley, Diana, & Ford,
2012; Menachemi, Shin, Ford, & Yu, 2011) and proportion of Medicare and Medicaid inpatient
days (Hsieh et al., 2010).
In the context of the current study, there are two major sources of dynamism: staff
discontinuities and government shutdowns. Staff discontinuities in military facilities are
common due to the dynamics of military deployments, military training exercises, and
mandated movement of military servicemembers. When military staff members within
hospitals deploy, it can impact staffing levels and create a disruption in continuity of medical
services for patients (Schwab, 2018). Deployed staff are typically replaced by temporary
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backfills from the U.S. Reserves, but it is common for facilities to experience periods of
underlap during these transitions. In addition to deployments, military facilities are also
impacted by the frequent reassignment of military servicemembers. On average, military
servicemembers are reassigned to a different geographic location at least once every 36 months,
although moves can be more frequent due to requirements for professional development,
training, and deployments (Vergun, 2013). Frequent moves by active duty military members
can also have a direct impact on non-military (civilian) employees in healthcare facilities.
Many government service employees are family members of active duty personnel and move
just as frequently as their military spouses. High staff turnover and discontinuities can make it
more difficult for organizations to execute a consistent performance improvement initiative. It
can also cause disruptions in the patient-provider relationship, which can impact patient care
(Schwab, 2018) and potentially impact quality performance.
Government shutdowns are another source of dynamism in the military healthcare
environment. Government shutdowns contribute to dynamism in military facilities because they
can temporarily disrupt human and financial resources within a facility. Government
shutdowns impacting federal employee pay can sometimes require select civilian employees to
be furloughed or work without pay (Burwell, 2013). These furloughs can negatively impact
staffing levels, strain operations, and make facilities more vulnerable to poor outcomes. For
example, low nurse staffing levels have been associated with nurse burnout (Spence Laschinger
& Leiter, 2006) and poorer patient outcomes (Lang, Hodge, Olson, Romano, & Kravitz, 2004;
Spence Laschinger & Leiter, 2006). Shutdowns may also force organizations to prioritize the
essential tasks of care delivery over performance improvement efforts. Even when government
shutdowns are short-lived or are threatened but do not materialize, they can cause disruptions in
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resources. Organizations may conserve or curtail nonessential resource expenditures in order to
manage uncertainty about a future government shutdown. These resource disruptions can
potentially impact hospital performance, particularly if resources are shunted from performance
improvement activities to cover essential healthcare services during periods of shutdown or
threatened shutdown.
Conceptual Model
RDT predicts that when MTF funding is dependent upon quality performance, facilities
will have a motive to improve performance in order to access more financial resources for that
facility. Thus, facilities will enact performance improvement efforts to improve performance
and manage access to critical financial resources. The change in quality performance is also
impacted by characteristics of the resource environment, including munificence, dynamism, and
complexity. (see Figure 5 for a depiction of the RDT framework that is applicable to this
study).
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Figure 5. Conceptual framework using RDT as its basis.
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Hypotheses
When financial incentives are contingent upon performance, it creates a motive for
organizations to focus attention on performance improvement activities (Ocasio, 1997; Pfeffer
& Salancik, 1978). Through financial incentives, the entity responsible for establishing the
performance criteria and disbursing the financial rewards is able to influence the practices and
priorities of healthcare organizations (Ramanujan & Rousseau, 2006). In the private sector,
third-party payers motivate hospitals based on the revenue they provide to those organizations.
When payers institute pay for performance programs, it creates a motive for healthcare
providers to improve performance on the measures incentivized by those payers. Similarly,
within the MHS, the medical departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force exert influence
over MTFs in their commands through the resources they provide to those facilities. When
MEDCOM instituted its PBB programs (PBAM and IRIS), it sought to motivate Army MTFs to
improve performance on selected quality measures in order to obtain greater funding levels.
Because Army hospitals are dependent on DHP funds, RDT predicts that Army facilities will
adopt performance improvement strategies if funding is contingent upon quality performance.
In facilities with no PBB programs (e.g., Navy and Air Force MTFs), there is less
incentive to devote resources to quality improvement because funding levels are not tied to
performance. Thus, the following is hypothesized:
H1:

There will be greater performance improvement on incentivized quality metrics
in Army healthcare organizations that participated in PBB programs relative to
military healthcare organizations in other branches that did not participate in
PBB programs, ceteris paribus.
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The effects of the PBB programs (PBAM and IRIS) may not be limited to the immediate
postincentive period. Though the greatest performance change is expected to occur closest to
the time in which each specific performance measure became incentivized, the effects may last
well beyond that time period. As long as the incentives remains in place, RDT predicts that
PBB programs will maintain ongoing pressure for facilities to sustain performance. Facilities
are expected to maintain performance in order to obtain the highest possible funding levels.
Thus, the following is hypothesized:
H2:

Quality improvements attributable to PBB programs in PBB facilities will be
sustained throughout the post period after each metric is incentivized.

Summary
RDT predicts that organizations will adopt strategies to help manage access to critical
resources in the environment. This chapter established a theoretical framework by drawing on
RDT to predict the impact of PBB on quality performance in U.S. Army healthcare facilities.
Two testable hypotheses were proposed based on the theoretical framework. The next chapter
outlines this study’s methods and approach, including the research design, study sample, data
sources, operationalization of variables, analytic methods, and sensitivity analysis.
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Chapter 4: Methodology

This chapter outlines the research methods used to explore the effects of PBB on quality
metrics in military healthcare facilities. The first section describes the research design and the
rationale behind its use. The next two sections identify the data sources and study sample,
followed by a description of how all of the variables were measured and constructed from the
available data. The next two sections discuss the empirical methodology and analytic strategies
used to examine the study’s research questions. The final section describes the sensitivity
analyses used to assess the robustness of the empirical results.
Research Design
This study is a longitudinal post-hoc analysis of quality performance in military
healthcare facilities using a quality performance dataset that spans a 15-year time frame. This
study aims to assess the impact of PBB on quality performance (Research Question 1) and
determine how quality performance is sustained over time after the initiation of PBB (Research
Question 2).
To test the hypotheses outlined in the previous chapter, this study uses an organizationlevel (MTF) difference-in-differences (DID) analysis. The DID approach is used because it
enables a quasi-experimental post-hoc analysis of the U.S. Army’s two PBB programs. The
credibility of the DID design has been widely established in a variety of studies involving health
policy analysis (Angrist & Pischke, 2010; Ryan, Burgess, & Dimick, 2015). It is useful in this
context because it represents the best approach for estimating the potential effect of PBB on
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quality performance when examining observational data by comparing facilities exposed to
PBB programs to facilities not exposed to PBB programs before and after program
implementation.
The study encompasses two separate analyses for Research Questions 1 and 2, each
using a slightly different estimation approach. Research Question 1 (main analysis) examines
whether the Army’s PBB programs are linked to a change in quality performance, ceteris
paribus. This research design employs an approach similar to prior research by R. M. Werner,
Konetzka, and Polsky (2013) using a DID model to compare Army treatment facilities (subject
to PBB incentives) to a comparison group comprised of Navy and Air Force treatment facilities
(that did not employ PBB programs). For Research Question 1, quality performance is
compared for both groups in the 1- to 3-year period immediately prior to the implementation of
PBB incentives. Quality performance is also compared between both groups up to 5 years after
the implementation of the PBB programs. Since each quality measure became incentivized
through the Army’s PBB programs at different points in time, the pre- and postimplementation
periods will differ from measure to measure based on when PBB incentives were first offered
for each measure. For some performance measures, 5 years of postincentive performance data
are not yet available. For these measures, a shorter period of post-PBB performance data is
included in the analysis.
In order to assess how performance changed over time in postimplementation period
(Research Question 2), performance in both the treatment and comparison groups is also
analyzed for two different postimplementation time periods for those quality metrics with 5
years of postimplementation data. The first postimplementation period encompasses the first 10
quarters (2.5 years) after the PBB incentives were initially offered to the treatment group.
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Quality performance is also assessed in the second postimplementation period for quarters 1120 (2.5-5 years) after PBB incentives were offered to the treatment group.
Data Sources
Data for this study are retrieved and merged from a variety of sources to develop a
dataset that encompasses a wide range of administrative, demographic, and performance
information about each healthcare facility. The two primary data sources are the MDR and the
Carepoint Information Portal. The MDR is a centralized data repository that receives, archives,
and validates DHA corporate healthcare data from military healthcare facilities worldwide
(DHA, 2019f). It uses standardized data processing methods approved through the DHA
(2019f) to ensure that health data are collected and managed in a consistent manner across all
DOD healthcare organizations. The MDR captures individual, patient-level data about all
healthcare encounters that occur within the MHS.
For the current study, de-identified patient-level data was aggregated for each MTF to
obtain facility-level data on patient demographics, patient acuity, and provider continuity.
Individual-level data were aggregated using statistical software available on a secure virtual
server linked to the MDR through the Army’s Person-Data Environment, which is an Army and
DOD secure business intelligence platform that enables researchers to access unclassified
information on active duty, reserve, and retired servicemembers and their dependents using an
extensive transformation process that minimizes the risk of identifying individuals (Vie,
Griffith, Scheier, Lester, & Seligman, 2013; Vie et al., 2015). Specific information about the
construction of these variables is provided in a later section.
Facility-level performance data are obtained from the Carepoint Information Portal.
Carepoint is also operated by the DHA and contains facility-level performance data for a wide
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range of quality performance metrics (DHA, 2019b). It is the primary platform used by clinical
leaders at MHS facilities to monitor and track performance trends for improvement initiatives
and programs such as the Army’s PBAM and IRIS programs. The measures reported through
the Carepoint Information Portal are metrics commonly used in healthcare performance
evaluation in the private sector. Examples include the HEDIS (NCQA, 2019), ORYX National
Hospital Quality Measures (The Joint Commission, 2018), the National Perinatal Information
Center (2019) outcome measures, and the National Surgical Quality Improvement Program
(American College of Surgeons, 2019). Data in the Carepoint Information Portal are validated
through partnerships between the DHA and the healthcare quality agencies that develop the
measures and manage the data. For example, the MHS HEDIS data are managed and validated
through the NCQA and disseminated to clinical leaders at each facility through the Carepoint
portal.
Administrative data about the healthcare facilities, such as location, state, market regions
and bed sizes, are retrieved from the health.mil website. This website is updated monthly by the
DHA and is publicly available (DHA, 2020). Data are merged across all sources using the
unique Defense Medical Information System identifier (DMIS ID). The DMIS ID numbers are
four-digit codes attached to all military healthcare facilities. These codes are the controlling
standard for facility identification in cost, manpower, and healthcare applications across the
DOD (DHA, 2020), which makes it possible to accurately merge data across multiple
information systems.
Study Sample
Data for this study are drawn from direct care (i.e., military operated) healthcare
facilities in the MHS. As of 2019, the MHS is comprised of a total of 475 health facilities
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(DHA, 2019e), but 47 are excluded. Exclusion criteria are established to ensure the
homogeneity of the sample and reduce the likelihood of confounding influence from variables
unrelated to the research questions. Coast Guard clinics and facilities jointly operated by the
DOD and VHA are excluded from analysis due to significant differences in management
structure and funding, which would have made them an inappropriate for comparison to
hospitals affected by PBB. Navy Operational Force clinics and military Aid Stations are also
excluded from the sample due to the fact that these clinics are under minimal management by
the MHS and unlikely to be impacted by funding changes or policies enacted through the MHS.
Behavioral health clinics and occupational health clinics were excluded because they provide a
limited scope of services that were largely unrelated to the performance measures examined in
this study.
The majority of the 428 facilities in the study sample are located on or around military
installations in the United States (n = 334) and abroad. The facilities located outside of the
United States are spread across various countries in Europe (n = 53), Latin America (n = 3), and
the Pacific region (n = 38).
Sample healthcare facilities are collectively referred to as Military Treatment Facilities
or MTFs but are divided into three types: health clinics, hospitals, and medical centers. Health
clinics are defined as medical facilities that do not provide inpatient services. Health clinics
typically offer primary care and a limited number of specialty care services (DHA, 2019g).
Hospitals are defined as facilities that offer both inpatient and outpatient services and a variety
of specialty care services. Medical centers are defined as large hospitals that offer both
inpatient and outpatient care, as well as a combination of specialty and subspecialty care
services. Medical centers typically operate Level 1 Trauma Centers that are authorized to
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provide emergency care for non-military patients in their respective communities. Due to the
diversity of specialty care provided, medical centers also usually host GME programs and
medical research (DHA, 2019g).
The majority of the sample facilities are clinics (n = 377), many of which are
subordinate to larger healthcare organizations, or parent facilities. The remaining sample
facilities offer inpatient services (n = 51) and are comprised of a combination of hospitals (n =
34) and medical centers (n = 17). As of 2020, the number of inpatient beds in sample medical
centers ranges from 47 to 382 with an average of 155. The number of beds in sample hospitals
range from 12 to 132 with an average of 59.
All facilities in the sample are principally operated by one of the three major service
components (i.e., Army, Navy, or Air Force). As of 2018, all facilities are aligning under the
operational control of a single entity, the DHA, although they are still primarily staffed and
operated through their respective military branches. Within this study sample, there are 88 Air
Force facilities, 187 Army facilities, and 153 Navy facilities. There are also five facilities in the
sample that are jointly operated by two or more services (referred to as joint facilities) and 132
facilities operating in MSMs.
The sample is subdivided into two groups based on inclusion in PBB programs. The
intervention group (n = 187) is comprised of Army facilities that participated in PBB programs
during the study period (2006-2018). The comparison group (n = 241) is comprised of Navy,
Air Force, and combined-service facilities that were not included in PBB programs during the
study period.
The choice of these particular comparison groups helps to address the potential
confounding effects commonly arising from post-hoc secondary analyses that do not employ a
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randomized control design (Ryan, Burgess, & Dimick, 2015). The intervention group is
comprised of Army facilities that were exposed to PBB. Navy and Air Force hospitals were
chosen for the comparison group because they are part of the same health system, they serve
similar patient populations and they are financed through the same funding source (the DHP
budget). Facilities in both groups also support U.S. military missions, which means they face
similar organizational stressors that impact their resource environment (such as rapid
deployment of military staff and government shutdowns). Facilities in both groups also have
similar regulatory environments, since many of the governing regulations and policies are
implemented at the DOD level and apply to all three services. Finally, all facilities share a
common performance management platform, the Carepoint Information Portal (DHA, 2019b).
These similarities help to reduce validity threats that may arise due to pre-intervention
differences between the groups that are unrelated to PBB. Table 2 provides descriptive
information about the facilities in each group.
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Table 2
Description of Facilities in Study Sample
Variable

Facilities

Location
United States
East
West

208
126

Outside U.S.
Europe
Pacific
Latin America

53
38
3

Medical center
Hospital
Clinic

17
34
377
428

Medical center
Hospital

155
59

Facility type

Sample totals
Inpatient beds (2020 mean)

The demographics of the patient population reflect approximately 3.4 million patients
who received care at each facility during the study period and do not necessarily reflect the
demographics of the full population of 9.5 million patients eligible for care within the MHS.
For example, active duty patients and their dependent family members are overrepresented in
military facilities because they are given the highest priority for enrollment in the direct care
system, followed by retirees and their family members. Thus, the average age of patients
enrolled at each facility in the sample is 28 with demographics skewed toward the18-24 age
band (25.1%) and the 25-34 age band (28.3%), which heavily reflects the active duty population
and their family members. Additionally, facilities in this study are, on average, comprised of
65% male patients. This is likely due to the fact many clinics exclusively serve active duty
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servicemembers, and only 16.5% of the active duty U.S. military force are female (DOD,
2018b). Table 3 provides more detailed demographic information for study facilities.
Table 3
Patient Demographics for Study Facilities
Group
Variable

Sample

Population

Gender (%)
Male
Female

64.5
35.5

51.0
49.0

8.1
7.1
1.4
25.1
28.3
17.2
11.0
1.7
130.0

6.0
11.4
3.3
12.3
12.5
9.2
22.3
24.1
*

Age (%)

Acuity

<4
5-14
15-17
18-24
25-34
35-44
45-64
65+
RVUs per patient per year

Note. RVUs = relative value unit. Population refers to the total population of patients enrolled in the
TRICARE program during FY 2019. This includes patients who receive care at civilian (non-DOD)
healthcare facilities.
1
From Evaluation of the TRICARE Program: Fiscal Year 2019 Report to Congress.

It is important to note that the sample size fluctuates for each performance metric based
on the number of applicable facilities in existence during the relevant timeframe. This reflects
the fact that the number of MTFs in the MHS has fluctuated over the study period in response to
the operational needs of the U.S. military, coupled with the implementation of CommunityBased Medical Homes (Carabajal, 2012) and the closing/restructuring of inpatient healthcare
facilities. The sample size also fluctuates for some performance measures due to the scope of
services offered at the facilities and the number of patients eligible for those services. For
example, the CLABSI performance measure includes a significantly smaller sample size in
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comparison to the population-health measures because only 51 of the sample facilities have
inpatient capabilities. Additionally, facilities are excluded from the analysis of each
performance measure if there are fewer than 5 patients receiving care at that facility that were
eligible for the relevant services (e.g., mammographies).
Variable Measurement
The following section provides information about the construction of key variables,
including descriptions of dependent variables, model covariates, and the key independent
variable. The dependent variables and model covariates are presented first because they are the
same for both Research Questions 1 and 2. The key independent variable is presented in the
third section because it differs for each research question.
Variable Construction: Dependent Variables
Both research questions investigate whether participation in the Army’s PBB programs
is associated with a change in quality performance for incentivized metrics. Over 40 quality
measures were incentivized at various times in the PBAM and IRIS programs. These were
selected for inclusion in the PBB programs based on the Army’s strategic priorities and their
applicability to the MHS Quadruple Aim. The MHS Quadruple Aim encompasses four
domains of which three follow: improving population health, per capita cost, and experience of
care (Berwick et al., 2008). The fourth domain of the Quadruple Aim, readiness, is specific to
the U.S. military and is defined as “ensuring that the total military force is medically ready to
deploy and that the medical force is ready to deliver healthcare anytime, anywhere in support of
the full range of military operations, including humanitarian missions” (DHA, 2013).
Though quality, cost, efficiency, productivity, and experience of care measures were
included in both the PBAM and IRIS programs, the current study focuses specifically on quality
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measures. The specific measures under investigation are a subset of the total list of quality
measures that were incentivized over the life of the program. The dependent variable (quality
improvement) is constructed using 13 of the 40 quality metrics that were incentivized through
the Army’s PBB programs. Performance measures are selected with incentive start dates that
span the timeframe of the PBAM and IRIS programs. This facilitates examination of the
programs’ effects over time and helps to reduce threats to internal validity caused by historical
artifacts. Performance measures are also selected based on the availability of data. Measures
with less than four quarters of pre- or postintervention data are excluded. This exclusion
primarily pertains to measures that were first incentivized near the start of the PBAM program
in 2006 or very recently in the IRIS program. Measures are also excluded if data are not
available for both the intervention and comparison groups. This exclusion pertains to certain
measures that were specific to Army facilities.
For example, the healthy weight performance metric measures the proportion of patients
in each facility with a Body Mass Index value recorded during primary care medical encounters.
This metric is excluded from the study because data were collected within Army facilities but
not uniformly collected and reported in the comparison facilities. A third exclusion criterion is
applied to eliminate instrumentation threats to internal validity. Performance measures are
eliminated if they did not use the same measurement instrument for all facilities in both the
intervention group and the treatment group. For example, all patient satisfaction measures are
eliminated because the service branches did not start using a common satisfaction survey until
2014. Figure 6 presents a diagram of the selection process for performance measures selected
for study inclusion.
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Figure 6. Diagram depicting selection criteria for performance measures.
All performance metrics that comprise the dependent variable are evaluated
independently (i.e., a composite score is not used). They are measured at the facility level and
are expressed as facility rates or proportions of patients obtaining care at each facility. There
are two types of performance metrics: population health measures and one clinical safety
measure.
Population health. The well-being and population health domain pertains to all
outpatient facilities that offer primary care services. This variable indicates facility-level
performance on measures that assist in the management of chronic conditions and promote
105

well-being and healthy behaviors. The population health domain is comprised of 12 measures
derived from the HEDIS. The HEDIS dataset is a group of quality performance measures that
are validated, supported, and maintained through a partnership between the DHA and the
NCQA. HEDIS measures are used to analyze quality performance in managed care
organizations in domains such as managing chronic disease, delivering preventive care, and
managing acute illness (U.S. Army Medical Command, 2016).
Population health measures are investigated in this study because they are an important
part of promoting health system accountability in improving the overall health of communities.
The use of population health measures, particularly those measures pertaining to preventive
health, are intended to reduce costs by keeping patients healthier, reducing hospitalizations, and
reducing unnecessary utilization (Stoto, 2017). HEDIS measures are chosen in particular
because these measures are some of the most widely adopted healthcare performance
measurement tools in the United States (NCQA, 2019). Studies have indicated that HEDIS
population health measures are associated with better health outcomes, particularly among
populations of patients with chronic diseases such as diabetes (Harman et al., 2010). The use of
HEDIS measures can also promote cost-effective care by reducing future costs associated with
serious illness, although the measurement of such benefits varies widely (Neumann & Levine,
2002). Additionally, prior evidence suggests that pay for performance has had significant
effects in diabetes care and disease management in primary care settings (Gupta & Ayles, 2019;
Lin et al., 2016), though no studies are yet available to determine effects in conjunction with
PBB.
Three of the selected HEDIS population health measures specifically pertain to children.
Though these measures do not directly address healthcare quality pertaining to military
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servicemembers, they do reflect the comprehensive nature of the overall MHS mission. As
discussed previously, one of the two primary missions of the MHS is its purpose in providing
medical benefits to retirees and dependent family members of military servicemembers. The
three measures pertaining to children are selected because they help to assess each facility’s
performance in providing care that is specifically tied to the dependent family members as
opposed to the active force.
Clinical safety. The clinical safety domain pertains to all inpatient facilities in the study
sample. It is constructed using the rate of CLABSI, which is one type of HAI commonly
addressed in the quality literature. Although some researchers have noted inconsistent results in
pay for performance related to HAIs (Vokes et al., 2018), several studies have demonstrated
positive effects (Bastian et al., 2016; Calikoglu et al., 2012). This measure is selected for the
clinical safety domain in order to add to the body of research on pay for performance and HAIs.
The CLABSI measure is defined as the risk-adjusted rate of CLABSIs at each facility,
relative to predicted rates of CLABSI events based on data collected from hospitals
participating in the NHSN program sponsored by the CDC (2019; U.S. Army Medical
Command, 2017). A central line is defined by the CDC as “an intravascular catheter that
terminates at or close to the heart or in one of the great vessels which is used for infusion,
withdrawal of blood, or hemodynamic monitoring” (Powell, 2018). Further, a central line that
is eligible for inclusion in the CLABSI measure is defined as
a central line that has been in place for greater than two consecutive calendar days
following the first access of the central line, in an inpatient location, during the current
admission. Central lines are eligible for CLABSI events until the day after removal from
the body or patient discharge, whichever comes first. (Powell, 2018)

107

The MHS collects and reports its CLABSI data using the protocols developed and
validated by the CDC. The CLABSI measure incentivized through the Army’s IRIS program
corresponds to the CDC’s CLABSI standardized infection ratio (SIR), which “is calculated by
dividing the number of observed events by the number of predicted events. The number of
predicted events is calculated using probabilities estimated from negative binomial models
constructed from 2015 NHSN data, which represents the baseline population” (CDC, 2020, p.
4-28). Table 4 provides detailed information about the construction of the dependent variable
and the relevant time frames.
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Table 4
Dependent Variable Construction and Data Collection Periods

Measure

Incentive
start

Pre-

Post-

Variable
type

Definition

Aim 1: Population Health
Mammography

2006

2004 Q42006 Q3

2006 Q42011 Q4

Population
Health

% eligible patients seen at the facility with mammography within the last 24
months.

Cervical cancer screening

2006

2004 Q42006 Q3

2006 Q42011 Q4

Population
Health

% eligible patients seen at each facility with cervical cancer screening within the
past 36 months.

Diabetes-A1C screening

2006

2004 Q42006 Q3

2006 Q42011 Q4

Population
Health

% eligible patients seen at each facility, diagnosed with diabetes, who have had
A1C testing within the past 12 months.

Diabetes-A1C control

2006

2004 Q42006 Q3

2006 Q42011 Q4

Population
Health

% eligible patients seen at the facility, diagnosed with diabetes, with A1C levels
at nine or below.

Diabetes-LDL control

2006

2004 Q42006 Q3

2006 Q42011 Q4

Population
Health

% eligible patients seen at each facility, diagnosed with diabetes, who have an
LDL level below 100.

Asthma care

2006

2004 Q42006 Q3

2006 Q42011 Q4

Population
Health

% patients with persistent asthma who are prescribed medications considered
acceptable as a primary therapy for the long-term control of asthma.

Well child visits (6 in 15 mos.)

2012

2010 Q12011 Q3

2011 Q42016 Q4

Population
Health

HEDIS criteria for percent of eligible population with 6 or more well child visits
in the first 15 months of life.

Low back pain

2016

2013 Q42015 Q3

2015 Q42018 Q4

Population
Health

% eligible patients seen at each facility, aged 18-50, with a primary diagnosis of
low back pain who did not have an imaging study (plan x-ray, MRI, CT scan)
within 28 days of diagnosis.

Appropriate testing for children
with pharyngitis

2017

2015 Q12016 Q3

2016 Q42018 Q4

Population
Health

% children 2=18 years of age who were diagnosed with pharyngitis, dispensed
an antibiotic and received a group A streptococcus test for the episode. A higher
rate represents better performance (i.e., appropriate testing).
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Measure

Incentive
start

Pre-

Post-

Variable
type

Definition

Appropriate treatment for
children with URI

2017

2015 Q12016 Q3

2016 Q42018 Q4

Population
Health

% children 3 months to 18 years of age who were given a diagnosis of URI and
were not dispensed an antibiotic prescription. A higher rate indicates better
performance.

Follow-up after 7 days of
hospitalization for mental
illness

2017

2014 Q42016 Q3

2016 Q42018 Q4

Population
Health

% adult and children 6 years of age and older who were hospitalized for
treatment of selected mental health disorders and received follow-up within 7
days of discharge.

Follow-up after 30 days of
hospitalization for mental
illness

2017

2014 Q42016 Q3

2016 Q42018 Q4

Population
Health

% adult and children 6 years of age and older who were hospitalized for
treatment of selected mental health disorders and received follow-up within 30
days of discharge.

2017

2015 Q22017 Q3

2017 Q42018 Q4

Clinical
Safety

Risk-adjusted rate ratio of CLABIs in MTF ICUs compared to other
participating ICUs in the CDC NHSN Program.

Mammography

2006

2003 Q42006 Q3

2006 Q42011 Q4

Population
Health

% eligible patients seen at the facility with mammography within the last 24
months.

Cervical cancer screening

2006

2003 Q42006 Q3

2006 Q42011 Q4

Population
Health

% eligible patients seen at each facility with cervical cancer screening within the
past 36 months.

Diabetes-A1C screening

2006

2003 Q42006 Q3

2006 Q42011 Q4

Population
Health

% eligible patients seen at each facility, diagnosed with diabetes, who have had
A1C testing within the past 12 months.

Diabetes-A1C control

2006

2003 Q42006 Q3

2006 Q42011 Q4

Population
Health

% eligible patients seen at the facility, diagnosed with diabetes, with A1C levels
at nine or below.

Diabetes-LDL control

2006

2003 Q42006 Q3

2006 Q42011 Q4

Population
Health

% eligible patients seen at each facility, diagnosed with diabetes, who have an
LDL level below 100.

Asthma care

2006

2003 Q42006 Q3

2006 Q42011 Q4

Population
Health

% patients with persistent asthma who are prescribed medications considered
acceptable as a primary therapy for the long-term control of asthma.

Aim 1: Clinical Safety
CLABSI

Aim 2
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Variable Construction: Model Covariates
As discussed previously, there are several factors related to munificence, dynamism, and
complexity that can impact a facility’s performance and response to PBB incentives. Measures
for each of these factors are operationalized as follows, and are included as facility-level
covariates in multivariate regression analyses.
Complexity. The covariates associated with complexity are age, gender, and the acuity
level of the patients seen at each facility. These variables are based on patient-level variables
identified as risk adjusters in previous research (Iezzoni, 2003). Age and gender mix data for
each facility are constructed from patient-level data obtained from the MDR for each study
quarter. The individual-level data are aggregated to the facility level based on the medical
encounters that occurred at each facility during the specified quarter. The gender variable is
expressed as the proportion of patients seen at each facility who are female. The age variable is
expressed as the average age of patients seen at each facility during each study quarter.
The overall health status of patients, measured in various ways, is widely accepted as a
risk adjuster in health services research (Elixhauser, Steiner, & Harris, 1998; Iezzoni, 2003;
Kane & Radosevich, 2011) due to the impact that it can have on individual health outcomes
(Kane & Radosevich, 2011). For the current study, a proxy variable for the acuity level of
patients seen at each facility is constructed using the total RVUs added up for a patient’s care
across all medical facilities over a 12-month period. RVUs provide a standardized measure of
the resources that are used to provide patient services (National Health Policy Forum, 2015).
An assumption of this study is that the complexity and intensity of medical care required for
each patient is roughly proportional to the RVU value of the patient’s medical encounters.
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Thus, the total sum of a patient’s RVUs over a specified period of time can provide an
approximation of the patient’s medical acuity.
The acuity variable is constructed by adding each patient’s aggregate RVUs (work and
practice expense) for a full calendar year. In order to avoid endogeneity concerns, the acuity
variable is then lagged by 1 year for each patient, so that the patient’s acuity represents the total
RVU’s for the year prior. Specifically, each patient’s individual acuity is expressed as the sum
total of all RVUs generated by that patient across all medical facilities in the year prior. The
facility-aggregated acuity variable represents each facility’s average acuity for all patients seen
in a particular quarter.
Dynamism. Covariates related to dynamism are government shutdowns and provider
discontinuities. Government shutdowns are indicated with a dummy variable equaling 1 during
periods with an active government shutdown and 0 otherwise. Data regarding periods of
government shutdowns are collected from publicly available historical records.
The variable for provider discontinuities is constructed using a methodology similar to
previous research on provider continuity in U.S. military medical facilities (Schwab, 2018).
Staff discontinuity is operationally defined for this study as any period of 60 days or greater in
which a medical provider (staff member with a National Provider Identifier) records zero
medical encounters. This variable is constructed using encounter data from the MDR. The first
step is to count the number of medical encounters recorded for each National Physician
Identifier code at each facility for each month. Physician discontinuities are identified if a
provider records zero patient encounters in a particular month after having recorded at least one
encounter in the same facility during the preceding month (i.e., discontinuity = 1 for each month
a provider records zero encounters). Discontinuities are recorded for the first 60 consecutive
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days in which a provider records zero patient encounters in a facility in which he or she had
previously seen patients. To avoid biasing the discontinuity estimates, a provider is no longer
counted as a discontinuity after 60 consecutive days of recording zero medical encounters. The
rationale for this exclusion is that if the provider has no medical encounters after the 60-day
window, this is an indication that he or she no longer works at a particular facility rather than
indicating a disruption in providing care for a short period of time.
Provider discontinuities are aggregated to the facility level by calculating the ratio of
provider discontinuities divided by the total number of active providers in each facility in each
time period. Providers are considered to be active in a facility if the National Physician
Identifier code is associated with at least one medical encounter occurring in that facility. As
mentioned, providers are dropped from the facility’s count of active providers after 60
consecutive days of recording zero medical encounters in that facility.
Munificence. Munificence is operationalized according to the yearly inflation-adjusted
DHP budget for all facilities. Data for the DHP budget is obtained from the public archives of
the NDAA for each FY (DOD, 2019). The DHP budget is then adjusted for annual inflation
using the general Consumer Price Index for each period and transformed to a logarithmic value.
Table 5 provides detailed information regarding the construction of model covariates and
variables of interest, along with data sources for each variable.
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Table 5
Overview of Key Variables and Model Covariates
Variable
Variables of Interest (IV)
PBB

Data source

Construction
Coded as 1 if the facility is subject to PBB
incentives through the PBAM or IRIS programs,
0 otherwise.

Aim 1
Post

Coded as 1 if the observation occurs during the
postintervention period, 0 otherwise.

First

Coded as 1 if the observation occurs in quarters
1-10 of the postintervention period.

Second

Coded as 1 if the observation occurs in quarters
11-20 of the postintervention period.

Aim 2

Facility-level covariates
Complexity
Age (Average)
Age (Band)

MDR (2004-2018)
MDR (2004-2018)

Band 1 (Reference)
Band 2
Band 3
Band 4
Band 5
Band 6
Band 7
Band 8
Gender
MDR (2004-2018)
%Female
Acuity (00s)
MDR (2004-2018)
Dynamism
Shutdown
Provider
Discontinuity

Average patient age for all patients seen at
facility j at time t.
Proportion of patients seen at facility j at time t in
each age band:
0-4 years
5-14 years
15-17 years
18-24 years
25-34 years
35-44 years
45-64 years
65+ years
Percent of patients who are female.
Average lagged total RVU's for each patient seen
at facility j at time t-1, in 100s.

Public Records
(2004-2018)

Coded as 1 if a government shutdown occurred
during the time period, 0 otherwise.

MDR (2004-2018)

Percent of active medical providers who recorded
0 patient encounters for a period >60 days.

NDAA
(2004-2018)

Natural log of the inflation-adjusted DHP budget
for each year.

Munificence
DHP budget
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Variable Construction: Key Independent Variable
The key phenomenon under investigation in this study is the exposure to PBB incentives
through the Army’s PBAM and IRIS programs. Exposure to PBB incentives is indicated by a
dichotomous variable (1 = PBB) for Army facilities involved with the program. For Research
Question 1, the key independent variable is an interaction between PBB = 1 (for Army facilities
participating in PBB) and Post = 1, which represents the years for which the PBB incentives
were active for each measure. The pre- and postintervention periods vary for each outcome
measure based on the timeframe in which the measure first became incentivized and data
availability. Table 4 provides specific information about the pre- and postintervention periods
for each measure and each research question. For Research Question 1, the postintervention
period is defined as up to 5 years after the measure was incentivized.
For Research Question 2, the postintervention period is divided into two separate
periods for the seven performance metrics in Table 4 that have 5 years of postimplementation
data. The first postintervention period is indicated by a dichotomous variable (1 = First) if the
observation occurs during the first 2.5 years (10 quarters) after the measure became
incentivized. The second postintervention period is indicated by a different dichotomous
variable (1 = Second) if the observation occurs 2.5-5 years (quarters 11-20) after the initiation
of the incentives. The key independent variable for Research Question 1 is an interaction
between PBB = 1 (for Army facilities participating in PBB) and First = 1 (first 10 quarters
postincentive), and PBB = 1 and Second = 1 (second 10 quarters postincentive).
The main analysis for Research Question 1 estimates the marginal effect of the PBB
incentives by comparing pre-/post-differences in the performance for facilities exposed to the
program (Army facilities) to those facilities in the comparison group that were not exposed to
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PBB incentives (Air Force and Navy facilities). The main analysis for Research Question 2
estimates the marginal effect of PBB incentives during two distinct time periods after the
initiation of the performance incentives (the first 10 quarters and the second 10 quarters). As
indicated previously, the purpose is to determine how performance changes over time in the
postintervention period.
Empirical Methodology
The research design for both the main analysis (Research Question 1) and the secondary
analysis (Research Question 2) is an organization-level (MTF) DID analysis. The DID
approach is used because it enables a quasi-experimental analysis of post-hoc data that were
collected to support the U.S. Army’s two PBB programs. This approach addresses the potential
validity concerns associated with post-hoc analysis by assessing performance trends before and
after program implementation using similar comparison groups.
Inferences about the effects of PBB are drawn using two key assumptions of the DID
analysis. First, the parallel trends assumption requires that the pattern of performance of both
groups must be similar prior to the program implementation. The assumption is that, in the
absence of treatment or intervention, any differences in performance between the two groups
would hold constant over time (Angrist & Pischke, 2008). To determine if this assumption is
reasonable, performance tends for the intervention and comparison groups are plotted over time
and visually inspected for parallel trends.
The second critical assumption of the DID is the stable unit treatment value assumption
(Rubin, 1977), which requires that there is only one form of the treatment (exposure to PBB or
no exposure to PBB) and that there is no interference between the groups (spillover effects).
The potential for spillover effects is assessed using a sensitivity analysis in which treatment and
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comparison facilities operating in close proximity to one another (in MSMs) will be eliminated
from the analysis.
The study uses a Poisson panel regression to conduct the analyses for Research
Questions 1 and 2. The nature of the data is most appropriate for a Poisson or negative
binomial regression model because the dependent variable is comprised of a discreet count of
the number of patients eligible for a particular type of treatment or service and a discreet count
of the number of patients that received the prescribed care. For the CLABSI variable, a
negative binomial regression may have been more appropriate given the large number of
observations that were zero (patients did not get an infection). However, the model did not
converge during preliminary analyses, indicating that the data were a poor fit for this model.
Research Question 1 tests whether the Army’s PBB programs are linked to a change in
quality performance, ceteris paribus, using a research design similar to prior research by R. M.
Werner et al. (2013). In this case, the DID model is applied to compare Army treatment
facilities (subject to PBB incentives) to a comparison group comprised of Navy and Air Force
treatment facilities (that did not employ PBB programs). The analysis for Research Question 2
is an extension of Research Question 1, examining two distinct postperiods for those indicators
with sufficient postintervention data. This second analysis addresses whether performance
improves, declines, or remains the same throughout the 5-year postintervention period, ceteris
paribus.
Preliminary Analyses
Several preliminary analyses are performed. First, the data are analyzed carefully to
identify any missing data. Large sections of missing data are investigated to determine if there
are indications of merge errors. A variable for merge errors is retained in the master dataset for
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each merge that is performed so missing data occurring through merge errors can be easily
identified and addressed. In most cases, missing data are attributable to clinics that either
activated or deactivated during the study period. This is identified through an “IA” code in the
facility name. Next, the data are carefully analyzed to identify and address extreme or
inappropriate values. Box plots, distribution tables, and other methods are used to examine the
spread of data, which are subsequently used to identify extreme values and outliers. Extreme
values are assessed individually and excluded from the study sample when appropriate. For
example, extreme values in the performance variable usually occur in clinics with very few
patients eligible for the relevant care. In most cases, this is due to the fact that the clinic was
activating or deactivating during the specified time period. Due to this concern, clinics with
fewer than 5 patients eligible for care (pertaining to the quality measure) are dropped from the
analysis to avoid biasing the results.
Since the majority of dependent variable measures are proportions (i.e., number of
patients receiving the appropriate care divided by the total number of patients eligible for the
care), data are also examined to determine if all values fall between the bounds of 0 and 1. The
ranges of these variables are analyzed to determine the most appropriate regression model. For
example, when the values in the dependent variable occur close to the bounds (less than .2 or
greater than .8), then a Poisson regression provides more valid statistical tests of coefficients
(Long, 1997).
Estimation Approaches
Aim 1
A facility-level, fixed-effect, Poisson regression model is used for Aim 1, except in the
cases indicated below. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the facility level to account
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for the fact that observations are repeated for each facility over time and nonindependent
(Huber, 1967; Ryan, Burgess, & Dimick, 2015; R. M. Werner et al., 2013; White, 1980).
The equations for study Aim 1 follow:
[Equation 1] 𝑌 = 𝑏 + 𝑏 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝑏 (𝑃𝐵𝐵 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ) + 𝑏 Χ + 𝑢 𝜀
All variables are indexed j for a given facility and t for each quarter. The 𝑃𝐵𝐵 indicator
variable is coded as a 1 if the facility was subject to PBB incentives during the observation
period and 0 otherwise. The 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 indicator variable is coded as a 1 if the observation occurred
in the years after the implementation of incentives for the specific quality metric under
investigation. Χ corresponds to a vector of time-variant, facility-level covariates, including
complexity (age, gender, and acuity composition of patients at each facility), facility-aggregated
dynamism indicators (percent staff discontinuity, government shutdown (0/1)), and munificence
indicators (size of DHP budget). Finally, 𝑢 represents other time-invariant facility
characteristics (fixed effects) and 𝜀 is the random error term.
For all Aim 1 analyses, if 𝑏 is significant and positive, it is concluded that PBB
incentives have a positive effect on quality improvement for the given quality measure. As an
exception, for areas of performance where a reduction is desirable, it is concluded that PBB
incentives have a positive effect on quality improvement if 𝑏 is significant and negative.
[Equation 1a] 𝑊𝑒𝑙𝑙 = 𝑏 + 𝑏 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝑏 (𝑃𝐵𝐵 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ) + 𝑏 Χ + 𝑢 𝜀
Equation 1a employs a Poisson regression and includes all HEDIS measures. It applies
to all outpatient facilities. 𝑊𝑒𝑙𝑙 indicates a cluster of performance metrics related to wellbeing and population health indicators among the patients receiving care at each facility. For
each of these measures, dependent variable is generically defined as a count of the number of
patients at each facility receiving the appropriate care. The exposure variable is defined as the
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count of total patients at each facility j who are eligible for the indicated care. For example, the
dependent variable in the HEDIS mammography measure is the total count of patients at facility
j who have had mammography services in the past 24 months. The exposure variable
(denominator) is the total number of patients at facility j who are eligible for mammography
services.
[Equation 1b] 𝐶𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑒 = 𝑏 + 𝑏 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝑏 (𝑃𝐵𝐵 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ) + 𝑏 Χ + 𝑢 𝜀
Equation 1b applies to all inpatient facilities and employs a Poisson regression. The
dependent variable is clinical safety and is measured using the count of the observed CLABSI at
each facility. The exposure variable is the number of predicted CLABSI events. Predicted
CLABSI events are modeled based on national data compiled by the CDC among
approximately 25,000 hospitals participating in the NHSN Program (CDC, 2019).
Aim 2
A facility-level, fixed-effect, Poisson regression model is used for all measures in Aim
2. Equation 2 mirrors the analysis of Equation 1, except the 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 variable is broken into two
increments: 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 for first half of the 5-year postperiod (quarters 1-10 after the incentive) and
𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 for second half of the 5-year postperiod (quarters 11-20 after the incentive). 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡
and 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 are be interacted with the 𝑃𝐵𝐵 indicator variable to denote Army facilities
targeted by PBB incentives in the first or second 10 quarters of the post implementation period.
Equation 2 is used to estimate the effects of the PBB incentives in two distinct periods after the
introduction of each incentive in order to determine if the response to incentives was confined
to a particular time period (e.g., immediately after the incentive started) or alternatively, if there
was a change in the response in the first and second periods after the implementation of PBB.
Equation 2 is only applied to the metrics for which 5 years of postincentive data are available.
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[Equation 2] 𝑌

= 𝑏 + 𝑏 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 + 𝑏 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 + 𝑏 (𝑃𝐵𝐵 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 ) +

𝑏 (𝑃𝐵𝐵 ∗ 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 ) + 𝑏 Χ + 𝑢 𝜀
All variables are indexed j for a given hospital and t for each quarter after the incentives
were initiated for the given measure. The 𝑃𝐵𝐵 indicator variable is coded as a 1 if the facility
was targeted by PBB incentives, and 0 otherwise. The 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 indicator variable is coded as a 1
if the observation occurs in quarters 10-20 after the implementation of incentives for the
specific quality metric under investigation. The 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 indicator variable is coded as a 1 if
the observation occurs in quarters 11-20 after the implementation of incentives for the specific
quality metric under investigation. Χ corresponds to a vector of facility-level covariates,
including complexity (age, gender, and acuity composition of patients at each facility), facilityaggregated dynamism indicators (percent provider discontinuity, government shutdown (0/1)),
and munificence indicators (size of DHP budget). Finally, 𝑢 represents other time-invariant
facility characteristics (fixed effects) and 𝜀 is the random error term.
For all Aim 2 analyses, statistical tests are conducted to assess the relative magnitudes of
estimated coefficients b3 and b4. Where an increase in the value of a quality metric is desirable,
if 𝑏 is significantly greater than 𝑏 , it is concluded that performance attributable to PBB
improved over the course of the postintervention period. Alternatively, if the two coefficients
are not significantly different, it is concluded that performance remained the same over the two
periods. Finally, if b4 is significantly less than b3, it is concluded that initial improvement in the
metric diminished. Similar assessments are made for metrics where a decline in value is
desirable (i.e., CLABSI) to determine whether performance improved, remained the same, or
diminished.
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Sensitivity Analyses
Several sensitivity analyses are conducted to determine the robustness of the empirical
results with respect to various changes in specification and context that may alter quality
performance. The first sensitivity analysis considers the possibility that quality performance
may be impacted during an anticipatory period immediately prior to the implementation of
incentives. Thus, two sensitivity analyses are performed to determine if facilities alter quality
performance in the anticipatory period before incentives are offered. The first sensitivity
analysis drops all observations that occur in the 6-month period immediately prior to the
effective date of performance incentives. The second sensitivity analysis in this group creates a
dichotomous variable indicating observations that occur during the 6-month “anticipatory
period” and tests for significance with respect to quality performance.
The second sensitivity analysis considers the possibility that the estimation model is
overspecified with the inclusion of the covariates for munificence, dynamism, and complexity.
Though the estimates are unbiased, if the model is overspecified, it may have an adverse effect
on the variances of the estimators (Wooldridge, 2013, p. 88). The second sensitivity analysis
drops all covariates from the model to determine the robustness of the effects of PBB on
performance.
A third sensitivity analysis is conducted to examine the impact of operating in a MSM.
As discussed previously, MSMs are geographic locations that include healthcare facilities
operated by two or more of the uniformed services. Under these MSM conditions, patients are
sometimes seen in more than one healthcare facility, often operated by different service
branches. This creates the potential for PBB to have spillover effects in local healthcare
facilities not directly participating in the program. This is particularly problematic for
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performance measures involving the management of chronic disease because patient outcomes
may be impacted by treatment from a variety of providers in different locations, making it more
difficult to isolate the performance effects of the program. To determine if this has an impact
on the robustness of the results, a third analysis performs all regressions with the exclusion of
facilities operating in MSMs.
As mentioned, observations are dropped for facilities in which fewer than 5 patients are
indicated for the care relevant to the performance measure (for example, cervical cancer
screenings). In many cases, small numbers are due to the fact that the clinic is activating or
deactivating during the specified time period, or the clinic serves a patient population that is
largely not applicable to the performance measure (such as a pediatric clinic). A fourth
sensitivity analysis examines the robustness of the empirical results using different exclusion
parameters for the minimum number of patients eligible for each type of care. Observations are
dropped for facilities with fewer than 10 and fewer than 20 patients eligible for care.
The fifth sensitivity analysis provides further examination of the effect that patient age
has on the performance results. The age variable used in all regressions in the primary analysis
indicates the average age of patients seen at each facility during each specified quarter.
Specifying the average patient age is much less precise than using age bands to identify specific
age groups that have a larger (or smaller) impact on performance results. It is possible that
important age-related effects on performance may be overlooked when patient ages are
averaged together rather than specified independently within age bands. Thus, the fifth
sensitivity analysis examines a subset of quality metrics for which PBB has demonstrated the
anticipated effect of improved performance to assess if replacing the average age variable with
variables that indicate patient age bands has an effect on these findings.
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Summary
This chapter described the empirical and analytic methods used to evaluate the impact of
PBB on quality performance in military healthcare facilities. This study uses a DID approach to
analyze post-hoc performance data for two comparable groups of military facilities that either
participated in PBB or did not participate in PBB during the specified time period. Data
elements from multiple DOD databases are merged with publicly available information to
construct the variables used in the facility-level, fixed-effect, Poisson regression models. A
variety of sensitivity analyses are also presented to determine the robustness of empirical
results.
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Chapter 5: Results

This chapter presents study findings based on the methodology described in Chapter 4.
It is divided into four sections. The first section provides descriptive statistics regarding the
study facilities and patients within those facilities. The following two sections provide the
results of the main analysis for Research Question 1 and the sensitivity analyses that were
undertaken to test the robustness of the results. The final section describes the results of the
main analysis for Research Question 2. A brief summary concludes the chapter.
Results of Descriptive Analysis
As discussed earlier, the study sample consists of a total of 428 healthcare facilities
across the DOD. Seventy-eight percent of the study facilities (n = 334) are located within the
continental United States, while 22% of facilities are located outside of the United States (n =
94). The majority of study facilities are clinics (n = 377; 88%), followed by hospitals (n = 34;
8%) and medical centers (n = 17; 4%). PBB facilities have slightly higher average bed counts
(2020 means) relative to comparison facilities for both community hospitals and medical
centers. Table 6 provides an overview of the PBB and comparison facilities with respect to
location, facility types, and average number of beds.
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Table 6
Descriptive Statistics for Sample Healthcare Facilities (2019-2020)
Group
Comparison
Location
United States
East
West
Outside U.S.
Europe
Pacific
Latin America
Facility type
Medical center
Hospital
Clinic
Inpatient beds (2020 mean)
Medical center
Hospital

PBB

Total

111
81

97
45

208
126

23
24
2

30
14
1

53
38
3

8
22
211

9
12
166

17
34
377

142
54

169
64

155
59

Study facilities experienced an average of 10.2% provider discontinuity for each month.
There were no significant differences observed between the PBB and comparison groups with
respect to provider discontinuity. On average, only 35.5% of patients seen at study facilities
were female. As discussed previously, the gender composition reflects the fact that active duty
servicemembers are overrepresented in the patient population of sample facilities, and the
majority of the U.S. servicemembers are male (DOD, 2018b). The average age for patients seen
at study facilities is 28.3 years with no statistically significant differences observed between the
PBB and comparison group. The age demographics for both groups are skewed toward the 1824 and 25-34 age bands, reflecting the overall demographics of the active U.S. military force.
Table 7 compares the means of the PBB and comparison groups across all model
covariates. There are statistically significant differences observed between the PBB and
comparison groups for some model covariates. For example, there is a statistically significant
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difference between the two groups across all age bands, but the magnitude of these differences
is small. Similarly, the PBB facilities provide care to a slightly higher percentage of women (M
= 35.6, SD = 14.0) in comparison to the comparison group (M = 35.4, SD = 11.6), but the
magnitude of the difference is also negligible, t(54390) = -2.06, p < .001. There is also a
statistically significant difference between the two groups for acuity, but it is important to note
that the standard deviation is very high, indicating a high degree of data spread with respect to
this variable.
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Table 7
Group Comparison of Means for Model Covariates
Group
Comparison
M
SD

PBB
M

SD

Difference

All study facilities
M
SD

Complexity
Gender (%)
Female
Male

35.4
64.6

11.6
--

35.6
64.4

14.0
--

**

35.5
64.5

12.6
--

< 4 (reference)
5-14
15-17
18-24
25-34
35-44
45-64
65+

8.2
6.9
1.3
25.4
28.5
16.8
11.2
1.7
28.3

5.8
4.8
1.1
17.1
8.2
6.3
8.1
3.0
4.2

7.9
7.5
1.6
24.2
28.4
17.9
10.9
1.7
28.3

6.6
6.2
1.8
15.0
9.0
6.8
9.0
3.2
4.8

***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***

8.1
7.1
1.4
25.0
28.5
17.2
11.0
1.7
28.3

6.1
5.4
1.4
16.3
8.6
6.5
8.5
3.1
4.4

149.2

202.5

110.2

123.8

***

134.2

177.524

10.2

9.0

10.3

9.2

10.2

9.1

Age (%)

Age (average)
Acuity
RVUs per patient
per year
Dynamism
Provider Discontinuity (% monthly)

Note. PBB = Performance-based budgeting. SD = Standard Deviation. RVU = Relative Value Unit. Means are aggregated across all study years.
Statistically significant differences between the PBB and comparison groups for each variable are indicated by *p < .1, **p < .05, and ***p < .01.
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Empirical Analysis: Research Question 1
Table 8 reports the average performance for all measures for both groups in the pre- and
postimplementation time periods. The performance for each of the population health measures
is measured as a percent of patients receiving the appropriate care, as a function of the total
number of patients eligible for the indicated care. For example, the mammography performance
measure is the total number of patients at facility j who received a mammogram within the
preceding 24 months, divided by the total number of patients at facility j who were eligible to
receive a mammography.
The clinical safety measure is the CLABSI SIR, which is calculated as the total number
of observed CLABSI events per time period divided by predicted number of CLABSI events,
based on nationwide data collected by the CDC from over 25,000 hospitals participating in the
NHSN. It is important to note that the sample size for the CLABSI SIR measure is substantially
smaller than the other measures. This is due to the inclusion criteria defined by the CDC, which
states that CLABSI rates can be reported “in any inpatient location where denominator data can
be collected, which can include critical/intensive care units (ICU), specialty care areas (SCA),
neonatal units including neonatal intensive care units (NICUs), step down units, wards, and long
term care units” (CDC, 2020, p.3).
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Table 8
Pre/Post Comparison of Quality Performance for All Dependent Variable Measures, 2004-2018
Group
Comparison
Sample size
Population health (% performance)a
Mammography
Cervical cancer screening
Diabetes-A1C screening
Diabetes-A1C control
Diabetes-LDL control
Asthma care
Well child visits
Low back pain
Pharyngitis-Appropriate testing
URI-Appropriate treatment
Mental health-7-day follow-up
Mental health-30-day follow-up

323
342
311
311
311
334
267
358
261
266
323
323

Pre
74.52
87.05
85.45
72.28
47.36
85.49
58.39
76.75
77.58
93.82
73.37
85.03

PBB

Post
71.90
86.29
86.23
73.15
48.75
96.61
77.86
81.63
82.92
94.85
73.77
85.90

Pre
59.00
83.00
79.28
65.08
39.80
84.20
66.07
69.33
73.56
91.23
76.63
87.28

Post
66.29
85.85
82.20
68.55
42.18
95.76
80.78
77.82
80.27
94.15
77.22
88.16

Clinical safetyb
CLABSI SIR
15
0.81
0.711
1.683
0.748
Note. CLABSI = central line-associated bloodstream infection; SIR = standardized infection ratio.
a
Population health performance measures are the percent of target patient population receiving the appropriate care.
b
Clinical safety performance measure is the CLABSI SIR, which is the number of observed infections divided by the number of predicted
infections, based on nationwide CDC data.
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Mammography
Figure 7 depicts mammography performance in the PBB facilities and comparison
facilities over time during the study period. This figure and ones like it for subsequent
performance indicators are used to visually inspect trends in the performance measure before
the implementation of PBB for the treatment and comparison groups given the assumption of
parallel trends in DID analysis (McKenzie, 2020). Generally, the trends for mammography in
both the comparison and treatment groups appear similar in the preperiod based on the data in
Figure 7.

Figure 7. Comparison of mammography performance trends over time (2004-2011).
Mammography performance is the percent of eligible patients seen at the facility with
mammography within the last 24 months.
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Table 9 presents the results generated from a fixed effect Poisson regression with
mammography as the dependent variable. Performance is defined as the percentage of eligible
patients at each facility who have received mammograms in the previous 24 months (NCQA,
2019).
In support of Hypothesis 1, the coefficient for PBB*Post was significant and positive.
These results indicate that the change in performance for the Mammography HEDIS measure
for the facilities participating in PBB in the postimplementation period was higher than the
comparison facilities (coefficient = 0.069, p < .001), controlling for other variables in the
model. The acuity and sex variables were not significantly associated with performance on the
mammography measure, whereas the age (coefficient = 0.007, p < .001), and DHP (coefficient
= 0.075, p < .05), variables were both significant.

Table 9
Results of Poisson Regression for Mammography Measure
Variable
Key independent variables
Post*PBB
Post
Control variables
DHP (logged)
Acuity (00s)
Age
Sex

Coefficient

Robust SE

0.069 ***
-0.063 ***

0.012
0.009

0.075 **
-0.001
0.007 ***
0.074

0.035
0.002
0.002
0.079

Note. PBB = performance-based budgeting. DHP = inflation-adjusted, logged value of DHP total
budget. SE= Standard Error. Post*PBB = facilities participating in PBB in the postimplementation
period. Post = all facilities (comparison and treatment group) in the postimplementation period.
Coefficient = parameter estimate for the continuous proportional change in performance for a oneunit increase in the variable, or relative to the base of comparison facilities in the preperiod.
Coefficient for the DHP variable is an elasticity.
*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.
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Cervical Cancer Screening
Figure 8 depicts cervical cancer screening performance in the PBB facilities and
comparison facilities over time during the study period. Performance on this measure is
indicated by the percentage of eligible enrollees at each facility with cervical cancer screening
within the previous 36 months (NCQA, 2019). The trends for performance in cervical cancer
screening appear to be similar for the treatment and comparison groups in the pre-intervention
period, which suggests that parallel trends are likely present.

Figure 8. Cervical cancer screening performance over time (2004-2011).
Table 10 presents the results generated from a fixed effect Poisson regression with
cervical cancer screening as the dependent variable. In support of Hypothesis 1, the coefficient
for the Post*PBB variable was significant and positive. This indicates that the change in
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performance for the HEDIS cervical cancer screening measure was higher for the facilities
participating in PBB in the postimplementation period, relative to comparison facilities, and
controlling for other variables in the model (coefficient = 0.0336, p < .001). The size of the
DHP budget (coefficient: 0.0563; p < .01) and acuity (coefficient: -0.002; p < .01) were also
significantly associated with performance, although the effect size for acuity was small. The
age and gender variables for this model were not significant.

Table 10
Results of Poisson Regression for Cervical Cancer Screening Measure
Variable
Key independent variables
Post*PBB
Post
Control variables
DHP (logged)
Acuity
Age
Sex

Coefficient

Robust SE

0.0336 ***
-0.0226 ***

0.0055
0.0031

0.0563 ***
-0.002 ***
-0.0012
-0.0404

0.0197
8.52E-04
0.0015
0.0384

Note. PBB = performance-based budgeting. DHP = inflation-adjusted, logged value of DHP total
budget. SE= Standard Error. Post*PBB = facilities participating in PBB in the postimplementation
period. Post = all facilities (comparison and treatment group) in the postimplementation period.
Coefficient = parameter estimate for the continuous proportional change in performance for a one-unit
increase in the variable or relative to the base of comparison facilities in the preperiod. Coefficient for
the DHP variable is an elasticity.
*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.

Diabetes A1C Screening
Figure 9 compares the performance of PBB facilities to the performance of comparison
facilities on the diabetes A1C screening measure over time. Performance is indicated by the
percentage of eligible patients at each facility with diabetes who have had A1C testing within
the previous 12 months (NCQA, 2019). The treatment and comparison groups show similar
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performance trends in the pre-implementation period with the slope of performance
improvement appearing to be higher for the PBB facilities after initiation of the PBAM program
in 2006.

Figure 9. Diabetes A1C screening performance over time (2004-2011).
Table 11 presents the results generated from a fixed effect Poisson regression with
diabetes A1C screening as the dependent variable. These results provide some support for
Hypothesis 1. Participation in PBB was associated with an increase in performance from the
pre-intervention period to the postintervention period in comparison to facilities that did not
participate in PBB (coefficient: 0.0175; p < .001). An increase in the DHP budget was also
associated with an increase in performance (coefficient: 0.1023; p < .001), whereas the age,
acuity, and gender variables were not significant in this model.
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Table 11
Results of Poisson Regression for Diabetes A1C Screening Measure
Variable
Key independent variables
Post*PBB
Post
Control variables
DHP (logged)
Acuity (00’s)
Age
Sex

Coefficient

Robust SE

0.0175 ***
-0.0178 ***

0.0053
0.0041

0.1023 ***
-0.0011
-4E-05
-0.0367

0.0220
0.0011
0.0013
0.0421

Note. PBB = performance-based budgeting. DHP = inflation-adjusted, logged value of DHP total
budget. SE= Standard Error. Post*PBB = facilities participating in PBB, in the postimplementation
period. Post = all facilities (comparison and treatment group) in the postimplementation period.
Coefficient = parameter estimate for the continuous proportional change in performance for a one-unit
increase in the variable or relative to the base of comparison facilities in the preperiod. Coefficient for
the DHP variable is an elasticity.
*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.

Diabetes A1C Control
Figure 10 presents a comparison of diabetes A1C control performance between the
treatment and comparison groups over time. Performance is indicated by the percentage of
eligible patients at each facility with diabetes with A1C performance levels at nine or below
(NCQA, 2019). Both groups demonstrated a similar pattern of increasing performance through
2005 with performance leveling off through most of 2006. The slope of performance
improvement appears to be slightly higher for the PBB facilities in the postimplementation
period.
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Figure 10. Diabetes A1C control performance over time (2004-2011).
Table 12 presents the results generated from a fixed effect Poisson regression with
diabetes A1C control as the dependent variable. The results of this regression provides some
support for Hypothesis 1. The coefficient for the Post*PBB variable was significant and
positive, indicating that participation in PBB programs in the postimplementation period was
associated with higher performance improvement on the diabetes A1C control measure relative
to comparison facilities (coefficient: 0.0194; p < .05). The size of the DHP budget (coefficient:
0.0933; p < .001) and patient population age (coefficient: 0.0038; p < .05) were also positively
associated with diabetes A1C performance, although the effect size for age was small. The
acuity and gender covariates were not significant in this model.
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Table 12
Results of Poisson Regression for Diabetes A1C Control Measure
Variable
Key independent variables
Post*PBB
Post
Control variables
DHP (logged)
Acuity
Age
Sex

Coefficient

Robust SE

0.0194 **
-0.0142 **

0.0099
0.0068

0.0933 ***
-0.0015
0.0038 **
-0.0087

0.0292
0.0017
0.0018
0.0609

Note. PBB = performance-based budgeting. DHP = inflation-adjusted, logged value of DHP total
budget. SE= Standard Error. Post*PBB = facilities participating in PBB in the postimplementation
period. Post = all facilities (comparison and treatment group) in the postimplementation period.
Coefficient = parameter estimate for the continuous proportional change in performance for a one-unit
increase in the variable or relative to the base of comparison facilities in the preperiod. Coefficient for
the DHP variable is an elasticity.
*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.

Diabetes LDL Control
Figure 11 displays performance trends over time for both groups on the diabetes LDL
control measure. Performance is indicated by the percentage of eligible patients diagnosed with
diabetes at each facility who have an LDL level below 100 (NCQA, 2019). The PBB facilities
and comparison facilities demonstrate a similar pattern of performance improvement in both the
pre- and postintervention time periods with the level of performance in PBB facilities remaining
below comparison facilities for the entire study period. Based on similarities in performance
trends between both groups in the pre-intervention period, Figure 11 suggests that the parallel
trends assumption is likely not violated, although there are no obvious performance
improvements for the PBB group in the postintervention period in these descriptive data.
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Figure 11. Diabetes LDL control performance over time (2004-2011).
Table 13 presents the results of a fixed effect Poisson regression with diabetes LDL
control as the dependent variable. The results fail to support Hypothesis 1. Participation in the
PBAM PBB program was not associated with significant performance improvement on the
diabetes LDL control measure in the postintervention period relative to comparison facilities.
The DHP budget (coefficient: 0.4195; p < .001) and age (coefficient: 0.0134; p < .001)
covariates were both significantly associated with diabetes LDL control performance in this
model. However, the effect size for age was small. Patient population acuity and gender were
not associated with any effects on performance for this measure.
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Table 13
Results of Poisson Regression for Diabetes LDL Control Measure
Variable

Coefficient

Key independent variables
Post*PBB
Post
Control variables
DHP (logged)
Acuity (00s)
Age
Sex

Robust SE

0.0243
-0.0749 ***

0.0258
0.0151

0.4195 ***
-0.0026
0.0134 ***
0.0028

0.0563
0.0054
0.0050
0.1837

Note. PBB = performance-based budgeting. DHP = inflation-adjusted, logged value of DHP total
budget. SE= Standard Error. Post*PBB = facilities participating in PBB in the postimplementation
period. Post = all facilities (comparison and treatment group) in the postimplementation period.
Coefficient = parameter estimate for the continuous proportional change in performance for a one-unit
increase in the variable or relative to the base of comparison facilities in the preperiod. Coefficient for
the DHP variable is an elasticity.
*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.

Asthma Care
Figure 12 displays performance trends over time for both groups on the asthma care
performance measure. Performance on this measure is defined as the percentage of eligible
enrollees at each facility with persistent asthma who are prescribed medications considered
acceptable as a primary therapy for the long-term control of asthma (NCQA, 2019). The PBB
and comparison facilities demonstrated similar patterns in performance throughout the study
period. Figure 12 highlights a significant and abrupt change in performance for both groups,
occurring between the second and third quarters of 2005. This abrupt change is suggestive of
confounding instrumentation effects, possibly related to a change in how performance was
measured and recorded.
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Figure 12. Asthma care performance over time (2004-2011).

Based on Figure 12, the abrupt change in performance occurring in 2005 appears to have
impacted both groups similarly. However, since the exact cause of the anomaly could not be
confirmed, observations prior to the third quarter of 2005 were dropped from the analysis.
Dropping these observations helped to provide a more consistent measurement of preimplementation performance trends, though the preperiod was shortened. The trend analysis
from this abbreviated observation period is presented in Figure 13. It appears that the
performance trends prior to the implementation of PBAM incentives were similar for both
groups, suggesting that the parallel trends assumption was likely not violated.
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Figure 13. Asthma care performance over time (third quarter 2005-2011).

Table 14 presents the results of a fixed effect Poisson regression with asthma care as the
dependent variable. The results do not support Hypothesis 1. The coefficient for the Post*PBB
variable was negative and significant, indicating that performance improvement for PBB
facilities in the postimplementation period was lower than comparison facilities, controlling for
all other model variables (coefficient: -0.0042; p < .10). However, it is important to note that
this effect size was small. The DHP control variable was significant and positive (coefficient:
0.0465; p < .001), while the other model covariates were not significant.
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Table 14
Results of Poisson Regression for Asthma Care Performance
Variable

Coefficient

Robust SE

Key independent variables
Post*PBB

-0.0042 *

0.0024

Post

0.0020

0.0021

DHP (logged)

0.0465 ***

0.0083

Acuity (00s)

0.0000

0.0004

Age

-0.0003

0.0006

Sex

-0.0016

0.0185

Control variables

Note. PBB = performance-based budgeting. DHP = inflation-adjusted, logged value of DHP total
budget. SE= Standard Error. Post*PBB = facilities participating in PBB in the postimplementation
period. Post = all facilities (comparison and treatment group) in the postimplementation period.
Coefficient = parameter estimate for the continuous proportional change in performance for a one-unit
increase in the variable or relative to the base of comparison facilities in the preperiod. Coefficient for
the DHP variable is an elasticity.
*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.

Well Child Visits
Figure 14 depicts performance on well child visits in the PBB facilities and comparison
facilities over time during the study period. Performance is defined by HEDIS criteria for the
percentage of eligible children at each facility with six or more well child visits in the first 15
months of life (NCQA, 2019). Both the PBB and comparison groups demonstrate a similar
pattern of increasing performance in the pre-implementation period. Based on similar
performance improvement trends in the pre-implementation period, the parallel trends
assumption seems reasonable for this model.
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Figure 14. Performance on well child visits over time (2010-2016).

Table 15 presents the results of a fixed effect Poisson regression with well child visits as
the dependent variable. The results do not support Hypothesis 1, as the coefficient for the
Post*PBB variable is significant and negative. Though both groups exhibited significant
performance improvement throughout the study period (coefficient: 0.1713; p < .001), the rate
of improvement in the pre- and postimplementation periods was slightly lower for the PBB
group relative to the comparison group (coefficient: -0.0663; p < .001).
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Table 15
Results of Poisson Regression for Well Child Performance Measure
Variable
Key independent variables
Post*PBB
Post
Control variables
DHP (logged)
Provider discontinuity
Government shutdown
Acuity
Age
Sex

Robust SE

Coefficient
-0.0663 ***
0.1713 ***

0.0294
0.0178

-0.9159
-0.0317
-0.0374
-0.0390
0.0135
0.1028

0.0841
0.0643
0.0044
0.0048
0.0059
0.1574

***
***
***
**

Note. PBB = performance-based budgeting. DHP = inflation-adjusted, logged value of DHP total
budget. SE= Standard Error. Post*PBB = facilities participating in PBB in the postimplementation
period. Post = all facilities (comparison and treatment group) in the postimplementation period.
Coefficient = parameter estimate for the continuous proportional change in performance for a one-unit
increase in the variable or relative to the base of comparison facilities in the preperiod. Coefficient for
the DHP variable is an elasticity.
*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.

Low Back Pain
Figure 15 depicts performance on the low back pain measure in the PBB facilities
relative to the comparison facilities over time. Performance is indicated by the percentage of
enrollees at each facility with a primary diagnosis of low back pain who did not have an
imaging study (plan x-ray, MRI, CT scan) within 28 days of diagnosis (NCQA, 2019). The
slopes of performance trends are similar for the PBB and comparison facilities in the preimplementation period, suggesting that the parallel trends are present.
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Figure 15. Performance on low back pain measure over time (2013-2018).
Table 16 presents the results of a fixed effect Poisson regression with the HEDIS low
back pain measure as the dependent variable. The results of this regression support Hypothesis
1. Both groups exhibited an overall trend of improvement in performance in the postperiod
(coefficient: 0.0308; p < .001). However, the coefficient for the Post*PBB variable was both
significant and positive, indicating that participation in the IRIS PBB program was associated
with a higher degree of performance increase in the postperiod relative to comparison facilities
(coefficient: 0.0533; p < .001). The DHP (coefficient: -0.7524; p < .001), government
shutdown (coefficient: 0.0281; p < .001), and acuity (coefficient: 0.0364; p < .001) covariates
also yielded statistically significant results, although the magnitude of the effect for acuity was
small. The provider discontinuity, age, and sex covariates did not yield statistically significant
results for this model.
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Table 16
Results of Poisson Regression for Low Back Pain Performance Measure

Variable
Key independent variables
Post*PBB
Post
Control variables
DHP (logged)
Provider discontinuity
Government shutdown
Acuity
Age
Sex

Coefficient

Robust SE

0.0533 ***
0.0308 ***

0.0086
0.0058

-0.7524 ***
0.0226
0.0281 ***
0.0364 ***
0.0020
-0.0439

0.1071
0.0327
0.0027
0.0094
0.0014
0.0818

Note. PBB = performance-based budgeting. DHP = inflation-adjusted, logged value of DHP total
budget. SE= Standard Error. Post*PBB = facilities participating in PBB in the postimplementation
period. Post = all facilities (comparison and treatment group) in the postimplementation period.
Coefficient = parameter estimate for the continuous proportional change in performance for a one-unit
increase in the variable or relative to the base of comparison facilities in the preperiod. Coefficient for
the DHP variable is an elasticity.
*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.

Appropriate Testing for Pharyngitis
Figure 16 presents a comparison of performance on the appropriate treatment of
pharyngitis measure between the treatment and comparison groups over time. Performance is
defined by NCQA as the percentage of children 2-18 years of age at each facility who were
“diagnosed with pharyngitis, dispensed an antibiotic and received a group A streptococcus test
for the episode. A higher rate represents better performance (i.e., appropriate testing)” (NCQA,
2019). The PBB group and comparison group exhibited similar patterns of performance in the
pre-implementation period. A visual inspection of performance over time suggests that the
parallel trends assumption is reasonable in this case. Though PBB facilities exhibited overall
lower levels of performance, it appears that performance rose more sharply for the PBB group
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after incentives were introduced through the IRIS program in 2017. By the end of 2018,
performance in PBB facilities exceeded performance in comparison facilities.

Figure 16. Performance on pharyngitis performance measure over time (2015-2018).

Table 17 presents the results of a fixed effect Poisson regression with the HEDIS
pharyngitis measure as the dependent variable. The coefficient for the Post*PBB variable is
significant and positive, which supports Hypothesis 1. Both groups exhibited an overall trend
of performance improvement in the postperiod (coefficient: 0.0370; p < .001), but PBB facilities
experienced a sharper increase in performance in the postimplementation period, relative to the
comparison facilities (coefficient: 0.0337; p < .10).
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Table 17
Regression Results for Performance Measure: Pharyngitis
Variable

Coefficient

Robust SE

Key independent variables
Post*PBB

0.0337 *

0.0180

Post

0.0370 ***

0.0119

DHP (logged)

-0.6383 ***

0.1627

Provider discontinuity

-0.0266

0.0426

Government shutdown

0.0009

0.0072

Acuity

0.0906 ***

0.0336

Age

0.0017

0.0024

Sex

0.1655

0.1616

Control variables

Note. PBB = performance-based budgeting. DHP = inflation-adjusted, logged value of DHP total
budget. SE= Standard Error. Post*PBB = facilities participating in PBB in the postimplementation
period. Post = all facilities (comparison and treatment group) in the postimplementation period.
Coefficient = parameter estimate for the continuous proportional change in performance for a one-unit
increase in the variable or relative to the base of comparison facilities in the preperiod. Coefficient for
the DHP variable is an elasticity.
*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.

Appropriate Treatment for URI
Figure 17 presents a comparison of performance over time between both groups on the
URI treatment measure. Performance is defined by the NCQA as the percentage of children at
each facility, “3 months–18 years of age who were given a diagnosis of URI and were not
dispensed an antibiotic prescription. A higher rate indicates appropriate treatment of children
with URI (i.e., the proportion for whom antibiotics were not prescribed)” (NCQA, 2019).
Figure 17 does not appear to show similarity in performance trends between the two groups in
the pre-implementation period. It appears that both groups trend improved performance in the
pre-implementation period, but performance appears to have risen more sharply in comparison
facilities relative to PBB facilities.
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Figure 17. Performance on the URI treatment performance measure over time (2015-2018).

Table 18 presents the results of a fixed effect Poisson regression with the HEDIS URI
measure as the dependent variable. The results from this regression support Hypothesis 1. The
coefficient for the Post*PBB variable was significant and positive (coefficient: 0.0239; p <
.001), controlling for other variables in the model. Additionally, the DHP (coefficient: -0.2132;
p < .001) and acuity (coefficient: 0.0320; p < .05) covariates were significant in this model,
although the magnitude of the effect for acuity was small. The provider discontinuity,
government shutdown, age, and gender covariates were not significant.
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Table 18
Results of Poisson Regression for URI Performance Measure
Variable
Key independent variables
Post*PBB
Post
Control variables
DHP (logged)
Provider discontinuity
Government shutdown
Acuity (00’s)
Age
Sex

Coefficient

Robust SE

0.0239 ***
0.0034

0.0060
0.0024

-0.2132 ***
0.0100
-0.0003
0.0320 **
0.0010
0.0778

0.0452
0.0184
0.0020
0.0144
0.0009
0.0533

Note. PBB = performance-based budgeting. DHP = inflation-adjusted, logged value of DHP total
budget. SE= Standard Error. Post*PBB = facilities participating in PBB in the postimplementation
period. Post = all facilities (comparison and treatment group) in the postimplementation period.
Coefficient = parameter estimate for the continuous proportional change in performance for a one-unit
increase in the variable or relative to the base of comparison facilities in the preperiod. Coefficient for
the DHP variable is an elasticity.
*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.

Seven-Day Follow-Up After Mental Health Hospitalizations
Figure 18 presents a comparison of performance between both groups over time for the
mental health hospitalization 7-day follow-up performance measure. Performance is defined as
the “percent of adults and children 6 years of age and older who were hospitalized for treatment
of selected mental health disorders and received a follow-up within 7 days of discharge”
(NCQA, 2019). Figure 18 shows similar trends of performance between both groups in the preand postimplementation periods.
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Figure 18. Mental health hospitalization 7-day follow-up measure performance over time
(2014-2018).
Table 19 provides the results of a fixed effect Poisson regression with the mental health
hospitalization 7-day follow-up measure as the dependent variable. The results of this
regression do not support Hypothesis 1. There were no statistically significant differences in
performance between the PBB and comparison facilities in the period after the IRIS incentives
were introduced for this measure. The size of the DHP budget (coefficient: -1.1526; p < .001),
provider discontinuity (coefficient: 0.0313; p < .10), presence of a government shutdown
(coefficient: -0.1195; p < .001), average patient age (coefficient: -0.0036; p < .10), and female
gender (coefficient: -0.2767; p < .05) all had significant effects on performance. The acuity
covariate was not significant in this model.
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Table 19
Results of Poisson Regression for Mental Health Hospitalization 7-Day Follow-Up
Variable
Key independent variables
Post*PBB
Post
Control variables
DHP (logged)
Provider discontinuity
Government shutdown
Acuity
Age
Sex

Coefficient

SE

-0.0001
0.0212 **

0.0122
0.0089

-1.1526
0.0313
-0.1195
-0.0050
-0.0036
-0.2767

0.1394
0.0411
0.0095
0.0244
0.0020
0.1390

***
*
***
*
**

Note. PBB = performance-based budgeting. DHP = inflation-adjusted, logged value of DHP total
budget. SE= Standard Error. Post*PBB = facilities participating in PBB in the postimplementation
period. Post = all facilities (comparison and treatment group) in the postimplementation period.
Coefficient = parameter estimate for the continuous proportional change in performance for a one-unit
increase in the variable or relative to the base of comparison facilities in the preperiod. Coefficient for
the DHP variable is an elasticity.
*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.

Thirty-Day Follow-Up After Mental Health Hospitalizations
Figure 19 presents a comparison of performance between the PBB and comparison
facilities over time for the mental health hospitalization 30-day follow-up performance measure.
Performance is defined as the “percent of adults and children 6 years of age and older who were
hospitalized for treatment of selected mental health disorders and received a follow-up within
30 days of discharge” (NCQA, 2019). Figure 19 shows similar trends in performance between
both groups throughout the entire study period.
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Figure 19. Mental health hospitalization 7-day follow-up measure performance over time (20142018).
Table 20 displays the results of a fixed effects Poisson regression with the performance
measure for follow-ups within 30 days for mental health hospitalization as the dependent
variable. The results do not support Hypothesis 1. The PBB incentives were not associated
with a significant change in performance for the PBB facilities relative to the comparison
facilities in the postimplementation period. Neither of the groups experienced any significant
change in performance between the pre- and postimplementation periods. The size of the DHP
budget (coefficient: -0.5109; p < .001), presence of a government shutdown (coefficient: 0.0349; p < .001), and average patient age (coefficient: -0.0025; p <.10) were all associated
with significant impacts on performance. The provider discontinuity, acuity, and gender
covariates were not significant for this model.
154

Table 20
Results of Poisson Regression for Mental Health Hospitalization 30-Day Follow-Up
Variable
Key independent variables
Post*PBB
Post
Control variables
DHP (logged)
Provider discontinuity
Government shutdown
Acuity (00’s)
Age
Sex

Coefficient

SE

-0.0034
0.0089

0.0074
0.0057

-0.5109 ***
0.0394
-0.0349 ***
0.0024
-0.0025 *
-0.1338

0.0858
0.0241
0.0053
0.0137
0.0013
0.0852

Note. PBB = performance-based budgeting. DHP = inflation-adjusted, logged value of DHP total
budget. SE= Standard Error. Post*PBB = facilities participating in PBB in the postimplementation
period. Post = all facilities (comparison and treatment group) in the postimplementation period.
Coefficient = parameter estimate for the continuous proportional change in performance for a one-unit
increase in the variable or relative to the base of comparison facilities in the preperiod. Coefficient for
the DHP variable is an elasticity.
*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.

CLABSI
Figure 20 depicts a trend analysis for clinical safety performance over time for both the
PBB and comparison facilities. Performance on clinical safety is defined as the risk-adjusted
rate ratio of CLABSIs in hospital ICUs, compared to other participating ICUs in the CDC
NHSN Program. The risk-adjusted rate ratio is calculated by dividing the number of observed
CLABSIs at each facility by the predicted number of CLABSIs, based on CDC NHSN data for
similar facilities (CDC, 2020).
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Figure 20. CLABSI performance over time (2014-2018). Standardized infection ratio =
observed number of CLABSIs/predicted number of CLABSIs based on CDC NHSN data.
The Y-Axis in Figure 20 displays the average CLABSI SIR, which is the observed count
of CLABSIs divided by the CDC-predicted number of CLABSIs. Performance above1
indicates that facilities have a higher rate of CLABSIs than predicted, whereas performance
below 1 indicates that facilities have a lower CLABSI rate than predicted. Performance trends
on the CLABSI measure were not similar between the PBB and comparison groups prior to the
initiation of incentives through the IRIS program. The figure illustrates much variability in
rates for both groups over the study period, most likely due to small sample sizes. It is
important to note that the sample size for the CLABSI measure (n = 15) was significantly lower
than the other measures in this study due to the measure-specific inclusion criteria defined by
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the CDC. The only facilities eligible to report CLABSI rates are inpatient settings that use
central lines (CDC, 2020).
Table 21 presents the results of a fixed effect Poisson regression with the CLABSI SIR
as the dependent variable. It is important to note that the patient-related variables (age, gender,
acuity) were dropped from this analysis because they apply to the outpatient population at each
facility. Additionally, this measure is already risk-adjusted using CDC methodology for
patient-level risk factors. The provider discontinuity variable was also dropped from this model
because it applies primarily to outpatient medical encounters.

Table 21
Results of Poisson Regression for CLABSI SIR Measure
Variable

Coefficient

Key independent variables
Post*PBB
Post
Control variables
Government shutdown
DHP (logged)

SE

0.9014 **
-1.2067 ***

0.4242
0.4394

-0.0630
-4.2230

0.1831
2.6873

Note. PBB = performance-based budgeting. DHP = inflation-adjusted, logged value of DHP total
budget. SE= Standard Error. Post*PBB = facilities participating in PBB in the postimplementation
period. Post = all facilities (comparison and treatment group) in the postimplementation period.
Coefficient = marginal effect of each variable on quality performance.
*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.

The regression results do not support Hypothesis 1. The coefficient for the post-variable
was significant and negative, indicating that CLABSI SIRs dropped for both groups in the
postintervention period (coefficient: -1.2067; p < .001). Contrary to Hypothesis 1, the
coefficient was significant and positive for the Post*PBB variable (coefficient: 0.9014; p < .05),
indicating that the CLABSI SIR did not drop more for PBB facilities in the postperiod relative
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to the comparison facilities. However, this result should be interpreted with caution due to
small sample sizes and the substantial variability in this measure as depicted in Figure 19.
Summary of Results for Research Question 1
Table 22 presents a summary of the results of all fixed effects Poisson regressions for all
performance measures included as dependent variables for Research Question 1. The far right
column displays the marginal effect on performance for each measure for which significant
effects were observed. In support of Hypothesis 1, PBB was associated with performance gains
for the majority of measures: mammography, cervical cancer screening, diabetes A1C
screening, diabetes A1C control, low back pain, appropriate testing with pharyngitis diagnosis
in children, and appropriate treatment for URI. In contrast to Hypothesis 1, PBB facilities
experienced less of an increase in performance in well child visits measure and CLABSI
measure in the postimplementation period and a potential decline in performance for the asthma
measure relative to comparison facilities. No significant marginal impacts on performance were
observed for PBB facilities in the postimplementation period for the diabetes LDL control,
follow-up on mental health hospitalization within 7 days, and follow-up on mental health
hospitalization within 30 days measures. It is important to note that the results for the CLABSI
and URI measures should be interpreted with caution due to the lack of parallel trends observed
in a visual inspection of the pre-implementation data.
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Table 22
Summary of the Marginal Effects of PBB on Quality Performance

Variable
Population health
Mammography
Cervical cancer screening
Diabetes-A1C screening
Diabetes-A1C control
Diabetes-LDL control
Asthma care
Well child visits
Low back pain
Pharyngitis-Appropriate testing
URI-Appropriate treatment
Mental health-7-day follow-up
Mental health-30-day follow-up
Clinical safety
CLABSI

Sample size (facilities)
323
342
311
311
311
322
267
358
261
266
323
323

Marginal effect of PBB on quality performance
PBB Marginal
Effecta
(% change in
Coefficient
SE
performance)
0.0687
0.0336
0.0175
0.0194
0.0243
-0.0042
-0.0663
0.0533
0.0337
0.0239
-0.0001
-0.0034

15

***
***
***
**
*
**
***
*
***

0.9014 **

0.0118
0.0055
0.0053
0.0099
0.0258
0.0024
0.0294
0.0086
0.0180
0.0060
0.0122
0.0074

7.1%
3.4%
1.8%
2.0%
--0.4%
-6.4%
5.5%
3.4%
2.4%
---

0.4242

Note. Coefficient is the interaction of PBB in the postimplementation period. It represents the continuous proportional change in performance for
each metric in the PBB facilities relative to the comparison facilities.
a
Only significant results listed. Marginal effect (% simple change in performance) is calculated as [exp(coeff)-1]*100.
*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.
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It is important to note that some of the control variables were omitted in the analysis for
some of the indicators. For the measures that contained observations prior to 2007, the provider
discontinuity variable was omitted due to data availability. The provider discontinuity variable
requires the use of the National Physician Identifier data, which was not reliably recorded in
encounter data until after 2007. Additionally, the analyses for some of the measures did not
contain the government shutdown variable. If no government shutdowns occurred during the
observation period for a given performance indicator, this covariate was omitted due to
collinearity.
Results of Sensitivity Analysis
Several sensitivity analyses were conducted in order to determine the robustness of the
results for Research Question 1. Table 23 presents the first group of sensitivity analyses, which
tested for anticipatory effects in the 6-month period immediately preceding the start of each set
of incentives. Sensitivity analysis 1a (center columns) demonstrates the effect of dropping all
observations occurring in the 6-month period prior to the start of incentives. Sensitivity analysis
1b creates a dichotomous variable indicating observations in the 6-month period immediately
prior to the start of incentives. The far right columns represent the interaction of PBB in the 6month anticipatory period. A significant, positive coefficient suggests that anticipatory effects
may be present. As an exception, a significant, negative coefficient suggests anticipatory
effects for measures in which a decrease is desirable (such as the CLABSI measure).
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Table 23
Sensitivity Analysis Testing for Anticipatory Effects

Variable

Sensitivity analysis 1a:
6-month anticipatory period
dropped
Coefficienta
Post*PBB
SE

Original results
Coefficienta
Post*PBB
SE

Sensitivity analysis 1b:
Test for significant
anticipatory effects
Coefficientb
Ant*PBB
SE

Performance measure
Mammography
0.0687 ***
0.0118
0.6814 *** 0.0125
-0.0002
0.0069
Cervical cancer screening
0.0336 ***
0.0055
0.0338 *** 0.0058
-0.0010
0.0028
Diabetes-A1C screening
0.0175 ***
0.0053
0.0178 *** 0.0060
0.0011
0.0069
Diabetes-A1C control
0.0194 **
0.0099
0.1791
0.0116
-0.0055
0.0104
Diabetes-LDL control
0.0243
0.0258
0.0204
0.0270
-0.0101
0.0125
Asthma care
-0.0042 *
0.0024
-0.0062 **
0.0028
-0.0049 ** 0.0022
Well child visits
-0.0663 **
0.0294
-0.0542 *
0.0314
0.0387 ** 0.0170
Low back pain
0.0533 ***
0.0086
0.0531 *** 0.0093
0.0002 ** 0.0076
Pharyngitis-Appropriate testing
0.0337 *
0.0180
0.0286
0.0201
-0.0149
0.0131
URI-Appropriate treatment
0.0239 ***
0.0060
0.0224 *** 0.0067
-0.0049
0.0041
Mental health-7-day follow-up
-0.0001
0.0122
-0.0016
0.0139
-0.0090
0.0118
Mental health-30-day follow-up
-0.0034
0.0074
-0.0062
0.0083
-0.0124
0.0076
CLABSI SIR
0.9014 **
0.4242
0.8501 **
0.4208
-0.1379
0.2336
Note. PBB = performance-based budgeting; CLABSI = central line-associated bloodstream infection; SIR= standardized infection ratio. SE=
Standard Error.
a
Coefficient is the interaction of PBB in the postimplementation period. It represents the continuous proportional change in performance for each
metric in the the PBB facilities relative to the comparison facilities.
b
Coefficient is the interaction of PBB in the anticipatory period. It represents the continuous proportional change in performance for each metric in
the PBB facilities relative to the comparison facilities.
*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.
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Excluding the observations in the 6-month period immediately preceding the start of the
incentives did not have a significant impact on the results of the main analysis. Dropping
observations in the 6-month anticipatory period produced only minor changes in statistical
significance for four measures: diabetes A1C control, asthma care, well child visits, and
appropriate testing for children diagnosed with pharyngitis. This minor change in statistical
significance may be attributable to a loss of statistical power associated with dropping
observations and not interpreted as a change in results. For the second sensitivity analysis (final
columns in Table 23), only three measures demonstrated a statistically significant change in
performance in the 6-month anticipatory period: well child visits, asthma, and low back pain.
For the asthma indicator, measurement issues that led to the elimination of some pre-PBB data
periods may be having some effect on subsequent periods given the graph in Figure 13. The
reasons for pre-implementation improvement in well child visits and low back pain require
further study to assess why these trends were observed.
Table 24 presents the results of the next group of sensitivity analyses, the first of which
evaluates the impact of dropping facility-level covariates from the model and the second of
which drops facilities from the analysis that operate in MSMs. Sensitivity analysis 2 considers
the possibility that the model may be overspecified while sensitivity analysis 3 accounts for the
possibility that facilities operating in MSMs may experience spillover effects from local
facilities that are not participating in PBB. The coefficients represent the interaction of PBB in
the postimplementation time period. In comparison to the original analysis, sensitivity analysis
2 did not produce any significant changes in results. The magnitude of the effect of PBB in the
postperiod was similar for both models across all measures, although two measures had a minor
change in statistical significance (diabetes A1C control and well child visits).
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Table 24
Results of Sensitivity Analyses Testing the Impact of Covariates and MSM

Variable
Performance measure
Mammography
Cervical Cancer Screening
Diabetes-A1C Screening
Diabetes-A1C Control
Diabetes-LDL Control
Asthma Care
Well Child Visits
Low Back Pain
Pharyngitis-Appropriate
testing
URI-Appropriate treatment
Mental Health-7-day followup
Mental Health-30-day followup
CLABSI SIR

Sensitivity analysis 2:
All covariates dropped from
analysis
Coefficienta
Post*PBB
SE

Original results
Coefficienta
Post*PBB
SE
0.0687
0.0336
0.0175
0.0194
0.0243
-0.0042
-0.0663
0.0533

***
***
***
**
*
**
***

0.0118
0.0055
0.0053
0.0099
0.0258
0.0024
0.0294
0.0086

0.0337 *
0.0239 ***

*
***
***

0.0121
0.0052
0.0050
0.0099
0.0274
0.0024
0.0273
0.0086

0.0180
0.0060

0.0335 *
0.0242 ***

0.0181
0.0062

-0.0001

0.0122

0.0006

0.0126

-0.0137

-0.0034

0.0074

-0.0042

0.0074

-0.0134

0.9014 **

0.0641
0.0357
0.0179
0.0172
0.0141
-0.0040
-0.0978
0.0551

0.4242

***
***
***
*

Sensitivity analysis 3:
All MSM facilities dropped
from analysis
Coefficienta
Post*PBB
SE

0.9471 **

0.4222

0.0811
0.0398
0.0192
0.0226
0.0435
-0.0026
-0.0369
0.0744

***

0.0151
0.0075
0.0079
0.0152
0.0351
0.0033
0.0327
0.0106

0.0352 *
0.0356 ***

0.0203
0.0082

0.9686

***
***
**

0.0151
0.0087
b

0.7554

Note. PBB = performance-based budgeting; CLABSI = central line-associated bloodstream infection; SIR= standardized infection ratio; MSM =
multi-service market. SE= Standard Error.
a
Coefficient is the interaction of PBB in the postimplementation period. It represents the continuous proportional change in performance for each
metric in the PBB facilities relative to the comparison facilities.
b
Sample size dropped to 7.
*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.
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Sensitivity analysis 3 produced some minor changes in the magnitude of the effect sizes
for PBB in the post period. In most cases, dropping MSM facilities from the analysis
strengthened the effect sizes for PBB, providing some evidence that facilities in these markets
may be experiencing some spillover effects. For some measures, such as the diabetes A1C
screening, diabetes A1C control, asthma, and the well child visits measures, dropping MSM
facilities produced a minor loss of statistical significance. This may be attributable to a loss of
statistical power resulting from dropping over 100 facilities from the analysis. Despite these
changes, the overall conclusions drawn from the original analysis remain the same. For most
performance measures, there was a significant, positive change in performance among PBB
facilities relative to comparison facilities after the start of incentives. The purpose of the fourth
sensitivity analysis was to determine if the results were potentially biased by facilities that had
very few patients eligible for each type of care or treatment (i.e., a low denominator for each
performance measure). The original analysis for Research Question 1 eliminated any
observations with fewer than 5 patients in the facility who were eligible for the care or
treatment. The same model was estimated for sensitivity analyses 4a and 4b, except facilities
were dropped if they had fewer than 10 or 20 patients eligible for the care, respectively. On
average, 20 facilities were dropped from the analysis for each measure when the minimum
number of eligible patients was changed from 5 to 10. Another 24 facilities were dropped, on
average, when the minimum number of eligible patients was changed from 10 to 20.
Table 25 presents the results of the fourth sensitivity analysis. There were no
appreciable changes to the coefficients, standard errors, or level of statistical significance for
any of the measures as a result of changing the threshold for the minimum number of patients
necessary for inclusion in the analysis from 5 to 20.
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Table 25
Results of Sensitivity Analyses Testing the Impact of Altering Minimum Patient Thresholds

Variable

Original results
Observations with < 5 eligible
patients dropped
Coefficientb
Post*PBB
SE

Sensitivity analysis 4a:
Observations with < 10
eligible patients dropped
Coefficientb
Post*PBB
SE

Sensitivity analysis 4b:
Observations with < 20
eligible patients dropped
Coefficient b
Post*PBB
SE

Performance measurea
Mammography
0.0687 ***
0.0118
0.0688 ***
0.0118
0.0689 ***
0.0118
Cervical cancer screening
0.0336 ***
0.0055
0.0336 ***
0.0055
0.0335 ***
0.0055
Diabetes-A1C screening
0.0175 ***
0.0053
0.0175 ***
0.0053
0.0179 ***
0.0053
Diabetes-A1C control
0.0194 **
0.0099
0.0194 **
0.0099
0.0197 **
0.0100
Diabetes-LDL control
0.0243
0.0258
0.0241
0.0259
0.0241
0.0260
Asthma care
-0.0042 *
0.0024
-0.0043 *
0.0024
-0.0044 *
0.0024
Well child visits
-0.0663 **
0.0294
-0.0659 **
0.0294
-0.0655 **
0.0296
Low back pain
0.0533 ***
0.0086
0.0534 ***
0.0086
0.0530 ***
0.0086
Pharyngitis-Appropriate testing
0.0337 *
0.0180
0.0338 *
0.0180
0.0351 *
0.0183
URI-Appropriate treatment
0.0239 ***
0.0060
0.0238 ***
0.0060
0.0238 ***
0.0060
Mental health-7-day follow-up
-0.0001
0.0122
-0.0043
0.0126
-0.0070
0.0133
Mental health-30-day follow-up
-0.0034
0.0074
-0.0057
0.0076
-0.0067
0.0079
Note. Eligible patients are defined as the number of patients eligible for each type of care or treatment for each performance measure. Analysis
were conducted with minimum thresholds of 5, 10, and 20. PBB = Performance-based budgeting. SE= Standard Error.
a
CLABSI measure omitted from this sensitivity analysis because “eligible patients” is not applicable to this measure.
b
Coefficient is the interaction of PBB in the postimplementation period. It represents the continuous proportional change in performance for each
metric in the PBB facilities relative to the comparison facilities.
*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.
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The fifth sensitivity analysis altered the age variable in the original model. The average
patient age variable was replaced by a comprehensive set of dummy variables representing 8
age bands. This enabled distinction between facilities on the age distribution of the patient
population, which may have otherwise been obscured by using the average age variable. This
new model did not produce any appreciable changes to the study results.
The final sensitivity analysis evaluates the impact of including a comprehensive set of
quarterly time dummy variables into the model. The purpose of this analysis is to account for
potential seasonal effects or trends in the outcomes. Since the DHP budget changes on a yearly
basis, it was dropped from this model due to collinearity with time.
Table 26 presents the results of the sixth sensitivity analysis. Changing the time variable
to a comprehensive set of quarterly dummy variables did not have an appreciable effect on the
results. For most measures, the effect size was slightly larger but the change was small. For
example, the marginal effect in mammography performance for PBB facilities relative to
comparison facilities in the postperiod changed from 7.1% improvement to 7.4% improvement.
The other measures demonstrated similarly small changes as a result of this change in
specification of the time variable.
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Table 26
Results of Sensitivity Analysis Changing the Specification of Time Variable

Original results
Variable

Coeff.a
Post*PBB

SE

Sensitivity analysis 6:
Accounting for seasonal
trends
Coeff.a,b
Post*PB
B
SE

Performance measure
Mammography
0.0687 ***
0.0118
0.0717 *** 0.0116
Cervical cancer screening
0.0336 ***
0.0055
0.0346 *** 0.0055
Diabetes-A1C screening
0.0175 ***
0.0053
0.0186 *** 0.0054
Diabetes-A1C control
0.0194 **
0.0099
0.0203 **
0.0101
Diabetes-LDL control
0.0243
0.0258
0.0225
0.0260
Asthma care
-0.0042 *
0.0024
-0.0034
0.0023
Well child visits
-0.0663 **
0.0294
-0.0799 *** 0.0294
Low back pain
0.0533 ***
0.0086
0.0546 *** 0.0085
Pharyngitis-Appropriate testing
0.0337 *
0.0180
0.0342 *
0.0181
URI-Appropriate treatment
0.0239 ***
0.0060
0.0239 *** 0.0060
Mental health-7-day follow-up
-0.0001
0.0122
0.0005
0.0120
Mental health-30-day follow-up
-0.0034
0.0074
-0.0030
0.0073
CLABSI SIR
0.9014 **
0.4242
0.8404 **
0.4190
Note. Sensitivity analysis includes a comprehensive set of quarterly time dummy variables to account for
seasonal trends in performance on each measure. PBB = performance-based budgeting; CLABSI =
central line-associated bloodstream infection; SIR = standardized infection ratio.
a
Coefficient is the interaction of PBB in the postimplementation period. It represents the continuous
proportional change in performance for each metric in the PBB facilities relative to the comparison
facilities.
b
DHP variable omitted from model due to collinearity.
*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.

Empirical Analysis: Research Question 2
Table 27 presents a summary of the results of all fixed effects Poisson regressions for
those performance measures with sufficient postimplementation data to be examined as a
dependent variable for Research Question 2. As discussed previously, Research Question 2
seeks to determine if trends in performance improvement attributable to PBB are sustained over
time in the postimplementation period. This is assessed by breaking the 5-year
postimplementation period into two parts, evaluating how the performance trends in the first 10
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quarters compare to performance in the second 10 quarters after the start of incentives. The two
left columns in Table 27 report the interaction of PBB in the first and second
postimplementation periods. The coefficients in each of these columns represent the continuous
proportional change in performance for PBB facilities in each period relative to comparison
facilities. The final column presents the results of postestimation tests evaluating the difference
between the coefficients in the first two columns. Values less than 0.10 indicate a significant
change in performance between the first 10 quarters and the second 10 quarters of the
postimplementation period, for PBB facilities.

Table 27
Summary of the Regression Results for Research Question 2
Postperiod 1
Quarters 1-10
after start of
incentives
Coefficienta

Postperiod 2
Quarters 11-20
after start of
incentives
Coefficienta

Significance of
performance change
postperiod 1 to
postperiod 1b
Prob > Chi2

Variable
Population health
Mammography
0.0442 ***
0.0966 ***
0.0000
Cervical cancer screening
0.0214 ***
0.0497 ***
0.0000
Diabetes-A1C screening
0.0047
0.3206 ***
0.0000
Diabetes-A1C control
0.0047
0.0360 ***
0.0001
Diabetes-LDL control
-0.0046
0.0529 *
0.0016
Asthma care
-0.0061
-0.0015
0.0383
Note. Measures with less than 20 quarters of post data are excluded.
a
Coefficient is the interaction of PBB in the postimplementation period(s). It represents the continuous
proportional change in performance for each metric in the PBB facilities relative to the comparison
facilities.
b
PBB facilities. Based on chi2 postestimation tests: PBB*Period1-PBB*Period2 = 0.
*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.

As depicted in Table 27, PBB facilities experienced increased performance relative to
comparison facilities from period 1 to period 2 for all measures. For the mammography and
cervical screening measures, the change in performance for PBB facilities in both periods is
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significantly higher than comparison facilities. These findings support Hypothesis 2 by
suggesting that performance improved for PBB facilities in the postimplementation periods
(relative to comparison facilities) and that performance gains continued throughout the 5-year
postimplementation period and in fact grew in the second postimplementation period when
compared to the first. For the diabetes A1C screening measure, the diabetes A1C control
measure, and the diabetes LDL control measure, performance gains for PBB facilities relative to
comparison facilities were not significant until the second 10 quarters of the postimplementation
period. This partially supports Hypothesis 2 in that no significant gains were present initially
but instead there appears to have been a delayed response that led to performance improvements
in quarters 11-20 after the incentives were introduced. The results for the asthma care measure
fail to support Hypothesis 2. The change in performance for PBB facilities relative to
comparison facilities did not reach statistical significance in either half of the
postimplementation period. Even though performance improved for PBB facilities from period
1 to period 2, there was never a statistically significant, positive change in performance for PBB
facilities relative to comparison facilities, suggesting that PBB did not have a significant
marginal effect for that measure.
Summary
This chapter provided the results of the descriptive analyses, main empirical analyses,
and sensitivity analyses that address the study’s two research questions. In reference to
Research Question 1, the study findings indicate that PBB was associated with increased quality
performance on seven out of 13 measures under investigation. PBB facilities had less quality
performance improvement relative to comparison facilities on three out of 13 of the measures
under investigation. Another three out of 13 measures demonstrated no significant change in
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performance for PBB facilities relative to comparison facilities. The study findings also suggest
that performance improvement attributable to PBB was either sustained or improved for at least
5 years for five out of six measures under investigation.
The next chapter summarizes and interprets the empirical results of this study. It also
provides an evaluation of the study’s limitations and discusses the practical and policy
implications of the research findings. The chapter concludes with a suggestion for relevant
future research on PBP in healthcare settings.
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Chapter 6: Discussion

PBB is a promising but underresearched approach for encouraging quality improvement
in government-funded healthcare facilities. The purpose of this research was to investigate the
effects of PBB on performance improvement in U.S. military healthcare facilities. This was
accomplished by addressing two research questions, both of which pertained to performance
improvement on healthcare quality metrics. The first research question sought to determine if
PBB was associated with performance improvement in military healthcare facilities that
implemented it versus military healthcare facilities that did not. The second research question
sought to determine if quality improvements tied to PBB were sustained over time in those
same facilities.
The extant research on PBB and its related approach, pay for performance, were
discussed in Chapter 2. Chapter 2 also presented reasons why PBB should be explored as a
special case of pay for performance and why PBB may produce similar effects on quality.
Chapter 2 concluded with an overview of the MHS and the conditions that gave rise to an
experimental program using PBB in Army healthcare facilities. Chapter 3 presented a
conceptual model that applied the concepts of RDT to explain why PBB might give rise to
performance improvement in military healthcare facilities. This conceptual model was applied
to generate the study’s two hypotheses that PBB would be associated with quality performance
improvement in healthcare facilities, and that performance improvement would be sustained for
at least 5 years in the presence of performance incentives.
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Chapter 4 outlined an empirical method for testing the study’s hypotheses and
conceptual model. A post-hoc DID approach was proposed to test the impact of PBB in Army
healthcare facilities by measuring performance on various quality metrics before and after
implementation of incentives, and comparing these performance trends to performance of
facilities that did not participate in PBB. Detailed results of that analysis were presented in
Chapter 5. Chapter 6 starts with a summary and interpretation of those findings, followed by a
discussion of the study’s limitations. This chapter concludes with a presentation of the study’s
implications and future research directions.
Summary of Research Findings
This study applied RDT to examine the relationship between PBB and quality
performance improvement in military healthcare facilities. Because military healthcare
facilities are dependent upon financial resources from the DHP, if access to those resources are
made contingent upon quality performance, RDT predicts that healthcare facilities will improve
performance on those metrics that are incentivized. Hypothesis 1 stated that there would be
greater performance improvement on incentivized quality metrics in Army healthcare
organizations that participated in PBB programs relative to military healthcare organizations in
other branches that did not participate in PBB programs, ceteris paribus. The study tested
Hypothesis 1 using a DID, Poisson regression analysis to compare performance on a variety of
quality measures between PBB and non-PBB facilities, both before and after implementation of
PBB incentives. Table 28 summarizes the findings for Research Question 1 and specifies
whether the hypothesis was supported for each measure examined.
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Table 28
Summary of Research Question 1 Findings Categorized by Performance Metric
Hypothesis
Research Question 1: What is the impact of performance-based budgeting on quality improvement in U.S. Army
healthcare facilities?
Hypothesis 1: There will be greater performance improvement on incentivized quality metrics in Army healthcare
organizations that participated in PBB programs relative to military healthcare organizations in other branches that did
not participate in PBB programs, ceteris paribus.
Measures
Population health
Mammography
Cervical cancer screening
Diabetes-A1C screening
Diabetes-A1C control
Diabetes-LDL control
Asthma care
Well child visits
Low back pain
Pharyngitis-Appropriate testing
URI-Appropriate treatment
Mental health-7-day follow-up
Mental health-30-day follow-up
Clinical safety
CLABSI

Supported

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No

Note. PBB = performance-based budgeting; LDL = low density lipoproteins; URI = upper respiratory infection; CLABSI = central line-associated
bloodstream infection.
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These findings lend support to Hypothesis 1. PBB was associated with performance
improvement for over half of the measures under investigation. Though these findings are
specific to PBB in military healthcare facilities, they are generally consistent with the literature
on pay for performance. The measures with stronger associations between PBB and
performance improvement tended to be process measures such as mammography and cervical
cancer screening with weaker effect sizes (or no effect) observed for outcome measures such as
diabetes management, CLABSI, and asthma care. Three measures (diabetes LDL control, and
7- and 30-day mental health hospitalization follow-ups) were not associated with any
performance effects in PBB facilities after initiation of incentives. It is unclear why this pattern
of results emerged for the mental health follow-up measures. It is possible that these measures
are more challenging for performance improvement because they require robust systems of case
management and communication between teams of healthcare professionals. Clarifying
underlying reasons for these findings is beyond the scope of this research, but it is worthy of
future investigation.
Contrary to Hypothesis 1, the results for the well child visits performance measure
appeared to show a decrease in performance for PBB facilities in the period after program
incentives were offered. It is unclear why this result was observed, but it may relate to the level
of mobility among military families during this period. Since performance on this metric spans
15 months, there is some potential for spillover effects from non-PBB facilities because patients
move between military installations. For example, a family might move from an Army facility
to a MSM and transfer care to a Navy, Air Force, or civilian facility (or vice versa). Thus,
performance from one facility may be carried over into performance in a new facility for
children between the ages of zero and 15 months.
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Additionally, during the study time period, there were a significant number of
deployments for Army personnel. When servicemembers deploy, families often move away
from military installations for the duration of the deployment. For the families remaining on
military installations, there is often a strain on the nondeploying spouse. This can potentially
lead families to forgo routine wellness care, particularly if adequate childcare resources are not
available for other children in the family in order to support participation in wellness care. This
unexpected finding warrants further investigation.
Research Question 2 of this study investigated the effects of PBB over a 5-year
postperiod to determine whether performance changes were sustained, with Hypothesis 2
predicting that quality improvements attributable to PBB programs will persist throughout the
postperiod after each metric is incentivized. The results of this analysis lend support for
Hypothesis 2. Five of six measurements demonstrated statistically significant improvement,
relative to comparison facilities, by the second half of the postperiod.
Of the measures for which PBB facilities demonstrated significant improvement in the
postperiod, three measures did not achieve that level of improvement until the second half of the
postperiod. This suggests that incentives may have a delayed effect on performance in some
cases. Since all three of these measures pertained to diabetes management, it is possible that the
delayed improvement was related to the relative complexity of performance improvement
specific to these measures. In contrast to simpler process measures, diabetes management
indicators may take longer to produce an observable improvement, possibly due to the need for
more complex and sustained patient engagement. PBB was associated with more immediate
effects for the mammography and cervical cancer screening measures, which showed significant
improvement in both phases of the postperiod. For both measures, performance in PBB
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facilities improved in the second half of the postperiod relative to the first. It is possible that the
immediate effects observed with these two measures are related to the fact that they are process
measures that can be impacted within a single visit per patient.
Table 29 presents a summary of findings for Research Question 2. The only indicator
that did not show significant improvement relative to comparison facilities in either period was
the asthma measure. It is unclear why this result was observed, but it possible that it may be
related to the abbreviated preperiod, which reduced the number of observations for that
timeframe. Due to this concern, this result should be interpreted with caution.
Overall, the empirical results suggest that PBB is associated with performance
improvement effects for a select set of quality performance measures in military healthcare
facilities. Consistent with pay for performance research, the largest effects are observed in
process measures and measures that are easily impacted with a single medical visit, such as
mammography and cervical cancer screenings. Additionally, the results of this study suggest
that PBB incentives can have long-lasting impact on performance improvement, with quality
performance either sustained or continually improved over a five-year period for most
measures. Empirical results also suggest that, for some measures, the performance
improvement response to PBB incentives may be delayed. This is particularly true of measures
pertaining to diabetes management.
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Table 29
Summary of Research Question 2 Findings Categorized by Performance Metric

Hypothesis
Research Question 2: Are quality improvements tied to
performance-based budgeting sustained over time in U.S. Army
hospitals?
Hypothesis 2: Quality improvements attributable to PBB programs
in PBB facilities will be sustained throughout the postperiod after
each metric is incentivized.
Measures
Population health
Mammography
Cervical cancer screening
Diabetes-A1C screening
Diabetes-A1C control
Diabetes-LDL control
Asthma care

Significant
improvementa
Postperiod Postperiod
1
2

Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

Performance change
Period 1 to Period 2

Hypothesis
2 supported

Improve
Improve
Improve
Improve
Improve
Improveb

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

Note. PBB = performance-based budgeting; LDL = low density lipoproteins; URI = upper respiratory infection; CLABSI = central line-associated
bloodstream infection.
a
Relative to comparison facilities.
b
PBB had a negative (but not significant) effect on asthma care in both periods, but the negative association in the second period was smaller in
absolute value when compared to the first period.
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Several sensitivity analyses were conducted in order to determine the robustness of
results in light of changes in model specification and exclusion criteria for facilities. One set of
sensitivity analyses assessed the relative impact of changes in the specification of the age and
time variables. Another sensitivity analysis was conducted to determine the impact of dropping
all model covariates. None of these changes produced significant changes to the observed
results. Two additional sensitivity analyses altered the exclusion criteria for facilities included in
the original model. One analysis excluded all facilities operating in MSMs in order to account
for the potential of spillover effects. This exclusion produced slightly larger effect sizes for
PBB, indicating that some spillover effects may be present in MSMs.
For example, for many measures the comparison group performed better than the PBB
group in the pre-intervention period. In MSMs, patients may have circulated between PBB and
non-PBB facilities, which would make the performance changes for those patients less
distinguishable in Army facilities in those markets. The fact that removing MSM facilities from
the analysis increased PBB effect sizes strengthens the evidence for this inference. Despite this,
the relative changes in effect sizes were very small and did not impact the overall interpretation
of the results. Another sensitivity analysis assessed the relative impact of changing the
thresholds for the minimum number of eligible patients required for inclusion in each analysis.
The original model excluded facilities with a denominator of fewer than 5 eligible patients. The
sensitivity analyses assessed the relative significance of changing this threshold to a minimum of
10 and 20 eligible patients. This did not have a significant impact on the results.
Another sensitivity analysis evaluated the potential for anticipatory effects on
performance in the 6-month period prior to the implementation of PBB incentives. The
underlying assumption for this analysis was that organizations might start performance
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improvement efforts ahead of time in order to maximize the potential for receiving incentives
once they are offered. For the majority of performance indicators, there was little evidence of
anticipatory effects. However, two indicators (well child visits and low back pain) did exhibit
some small performance improvements in the 6-month period prior to the implementation of
incentives, suggesting anticipatory effects.
Study Limitations
The results of this study indicate that PBB may be a promising approach for encouraging
quality performance improvement in military healthcare facilities. However, this study does
have five noteworthy limitations.
The first limitation is that this study divides the intervention and comparison groups
along military service lines, with the intervention group including Army facilities and the
comparison group including Navy and Air Force facilities. This assignment strategy presents the
possibility that unobserved or unmeasured differences between the two groups may result from
service-specific differences rather than the effects of PBB. For example, the intervention group
(Army) had significantly lower performance on many of the performance metrics in the preintervention period in comparison to the Navy and Air Force facilities. This suggests that there
may have been factors that differed between Army and comparison facilities that could not be
controlled but may be relevant to the different performance trajectories that were measured.
Since the two groups were not equal prior to the intervention, the Navy and Air Force facilities
may not have been a perfect counterfactual for what may have occurred in Army facilities if PBB
had not been implemented. Despite this, there are several research design features that were
implemented that help to mitigate this concern.
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The use of a fixed-effect model helps to address some concerns about service-specific
variations that may confound the interpretation of results. In theory, any potential servicespecific time-invariant factor is controlled through the use of fixed effects in that each study
facility is compared to itself over time with respect to each quality measure. Additionally, all
measures were examined for performance trends between the two groups prior to intervention.
Though there were some pre-intervention differences in the levels of performance, the
performance trends appeared to be similar for almost all measures. Additionally, for the
majority of the measures, there was an observable change in performance that occurred in
conjunction with the timing of the incentives for the intervention group. Because this occurred
for several measures over different periods of time, it strengthens the inference that the PBB
incentives played a key role in these performance changes.
Another limitation is that this study focuses on a narrow set of quality metrics. This was
largely due to the fact that the MHS did not collect quality performance data in an integrated
manner in the earliest years of PBB. During the beginning stages of the Army’s PBB program,
each military service collected and reported most of their data independently. Very few
measures were included in the early PBB program that had consistent data collection across the
three military services. HEDIS measures were a notable exception to this because all HEDIS
measures are collected using standardized NCQA protocols, and all three military services
participated in collecting these data. As a result, the majority of the quality measures in this
study pertain to population health and the use of evidence-based medicine, which have been the
focus of the HEDIS program.
It is possible that the results observed in the limited set of quality metrics examined in
this study may not produce similar results in other types of measures. As discussed previously,
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the results of pay for performance studies vary widely depending on the type of quality metric
examined (Damberg et al., 2014; Eijkenaar et al., 2013; Van Herck et al., 2010). Though this
study includes a mixture of process and outcome measures, most of these metrics are related to
the technical aspects of ambulatory care services and do not measure patient or physician
perception of quality. According to a policy review by Hanefeld, Powell-Jackson, and
Balabanova (2017), comprehensive measures of clinical quality should include aspects of care
that go beyond technical quality, including a comparison of clinical quality and perceived
quality; measures of quality at varying points in the patients’ pathway through the system;
measures of immediate and upstream drivers of quality care; and individual and collective
assessments of contextual variables such as power, social status, trust and values that impact
perception of quality. Though many of these aspects of quality measurement were addressed in
measures that the Army included in its PBB programs, not all of these metrics were evaluated in
this study due to the consistency issues previously discussed.
A third limitation is that some of the indicators exhibited trends that looked different in
the pre-PBB period across the intervention and comparison group (specifically, the URI and
CLABSI measures). The findings for these indicators should be interpreted with more caution
when compared to the conclusions reached for indicators where the pre-PBB trends appeared to
be more similar and stable across the PBB and non-PBB facilities. A critical aspect of the quasiexperimental DID approach is that the intervention and comparison groups must have similar
pre-intervention trends in the measurement of the variable in question. Since these preintervention parallel trends were not observed in the URI and CLABSI measures, there is less
strength in the conclusions that can be drawn from these results. In the case of the URI measure,
the pre-intervention trends for the comparison group appear to have risen and then levelled off
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around the time the incentives started. For the intervention group of PBB facilities, the opposite
was true. Performance was mostly level until just prior to the start of incentives, and then it rose
sharply and continued to rise throughout the majority of the postintervention period. Even
though the timing of sharp performance improvement in conjunction with the timing of the
incentives suggests that PBB incentives had an impact on performance, this cannot be reliably
concluded without similarity in pre-intervention performance trends for the comparison group.
With respect to the CLABSI measure, there was not enough consistency in performance from
either group in either time period to adequately assess pre- or postintervention performance
trends. As mentioned previously, this is likely due to the small sample size. A larger sample
may have generated more distinct results and enabled a better observation of pre- and
postintervention performance trends between the two groups.
A fourth limitation in this study is the use of suboptimal control variables. The variables
for patient characteristics, namely age, gender, and acuity, were derived from the encounters that
occurred within the facility, whereas the performance data were derived from the enrolled patient
population at each facility. This is due to the fact that the control variables were constructed
from data retrieved from the MHS MDR. This data repository stores multiple datapoints for
every medical encounter in the MHS. Thus, the patient variables that were aggregated for each
facility during each month or quarter were generated from the data on the visits that occurred
within each facility, not the characteristics of the underlying patient population enrolled to that
facility. In theory, the medical encounters occurring in each facility should provide a rough
approximation of the patient characteristics of all enrollees, though it is possible that these
estimates are biased. Thus, the patient characteristics used to construct the control variables may
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not have been a precise reflection of characteristics of the specific patient population to which
each performance measure pertained.
For example, if a diabetes patient is assigned to facility j at time t, but did not have an
appointment at facility j during time t, then that patient’s characteristics (age, gender, acuity)
would not have been captured in the data used to generate facility j’s aggregated age, gender, and
acuity variables. However, that same patient would have been included in the facility’s diabetes
performance measure if the patient was enrolled to facility j, regardless of whether the patient
had a medical encounter at that facility during the relevant time period. This is because the
HEDIS performance measures are constructed from enrollment data, whereas the aggregated
control variables are constructed from encounter data. Another related issue exists with the
measurement of facility-aggregated patient acuity. Since this measure is derived from patient
encounter data, it is likely that acuity estimates are biased by the exclusion of low acuity patients
who are assigned to facilities but did not seek medical care. For young, healthy active duty
servicemembers, medical encounters may be as infrequent as once per year, when the
servicemember receives a required physical exam. This can potentially create a stronger bias in
the acuity estimates for those facilities that exclusively serve active duty servicemembers.
The use of suboptimal data in constructing the facility aggregated control variables may
have contributed to the lack of significance observed in the estimates of many of these variables.
The opposite is true, however, of the DHP (munificence) control variable. The DHP variable
was problematic because it was a blunt instrument for approximating the level of munificence in
each of the facilities in the study. The DHP budget applied to the entire MHS, meaning that it
was time-variant but not facility-variant. Thus, this measure did not capture the distinctions in
the availability of resources that may have existed between facilities. Nonetheless, the DHP
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variable was significant in almost all regression models, although its association with
performance was not always in the predicted direction. For some indicators, the size of the DHP
budget and performance were inversely related. The reasons for this unexpected association are
unclear, but may be correlated with time. Due to concerns about the precision of control
variables, a sensitivity analysis was conducted to evaluate the impact of dropping all control
variables in the model. This change in model specification did not significantly alter the results
or change the interpretation of the findings. Even though the control variables were suboptimal,
they did not appear to have a substantial impact on the findings related to potential PBB
influence on the quality metrics studied.
A final limitation pertains to the generalizability of the empirical findings. The results of
this study suggest that PBB can be an effective tool for encouraging healthcare organizations to
improve performance on a select set of quality indicators. However, it is unclear whether these
results will generalize to other types of programs or government-funded healthcare
organizations. Military healthcare facilities are unique organizations for several reasons that
have previously been discussed. Most notably, military healthcare organizations have a very
centralized, top-down governance structure that may enable programs such as PBAM and IRIS
to generate performance effects that may not be actualized in other types of organizations and
governance structures. For example, it is possible that PBB is best situated for performance
change in organizations with a uniform set of priorities from a single executive agency (such as
the DHA) and may not work as well in other government-funded hospitals that must still contend
with multiple priorities from several health insurers. This study did not address the
organizational factors that may have contributed to the success of PBB in military healthcare
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facilities, so it is unknown whether these results will generalize to other types of healthcare
organizations.
Implications and Future Research Directions
Theoretical Implications
Most of the literature on PBB has previously been derived from the political science
research and has not included rigorous comparative analyses of organizations using and not
using PBB. The political science literature on PBB is centered on debates about the most
effective mechanism for linking budgetary resources (“inputs”) to government “outputs” such as
high-performing public programs. Most of this literature is devoted to defining and measuring
performance and determining how to most effectively integrate it into the budgeting process.
This study offers a new direction for PBB research by examining PBB from an organizational
rather than political perspective.
This study draws from the widely used RDT to explain how military healthcare
organizations might respond to performance-contingent changes in funding. This theoretical
approach was selected over the theories in the political science domain because it focuses on
behavior at the organizational level of a healthcare facility as opposed to examining it from the
larger governmental and legislative perspective.
The hypotheses generated from the RDT framework and conceptual model were
supported for the majority of the indicators in this study. However, this conceptual model may
not provide a complete picture of how organizations respond to PBB incentives. It does not
explain why PBB had a positive effect for some performance indicators and not others. It also
does not explain why PBB was relatively successful in the context of military healthcare
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organizations, whereas similar approaches, such as pay for performance, have not been as
successful in private sector health organizations.
For future analysis, it may be helpful to draw from a wider range of organizational
theories to develop a more complete understanding of the factors that may influence the relative
success of PBB programs in improving quality performance. For example, future studies might
draw upon the elements of contingency theory to determine which types of organizations are
most likely to respond positively to performance-based contingencies in funding, such as PBB
programs. Future studies might also draw upon the conceptual model posited by William
Ocasio’s (1997) attention-based view of the firm. Using this framework, PBB might be
considered a mechanism by which decision-makers use performance-contingent funding to focus
the attention of organizational leaders on the quality issues that are most important to leaders and
the organization as a whole. This framework also opens up many opportunities for future
research in determining the organizational contexts in which this approach might be most
successful.
Policy Implications
This study complements the existing literature on PBB by providing empirical evidence
that suggests it can be effective in military healthcare organizations in promoting quality in
certain healthcare metrics. It also adds to the wide body of extant literature on pay for
performance by examining the specific case of PBB and the unique context of federally funded
military healthcare organizations. Additionally, the findings of this study diverge slightly from
the trends observed in pay for performance research, which are often contradictory and mixed in
terms of offering evidence to support its use. The positive results from this study provide
evidence for a type of pay for performance that might be effective in the context of government
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funded healthcare facilities and programs. This warrants further investigation and replication to
determine the contextual factors that may be contributing to the success of PBB in healthcare
when much less success has typically been observed for pay for performance.
This study builds upon previous research by West, Cronk, Goodman, and Waymire
(2010) that found that the Army’s PBAM program demonstrated significant initial improvements
in productivity and the use of evidence-based medicine. That study was used to evaluate PBAM
and justify its future use. This study extends that line of research by investigating the impact of
PBAM and its successor, IRIS, to determine if those programs had ongoing positive impacts on
quality performance. This study confirms those initial findings and provides evidence that those
initial performance gains were sustained. It also provides evidence that this approach facilitated
continued success for other indicators as the programs were expanded to include a wider range of
quality measures.
As the MHS continues its integration under the DHA, leaders will have to decide
between a range of policy approaches that have been implemented individually across the three
service branches. The choice to expand the Army’s IRIS program to include all military
healthcare facilities is one such decision. This study provides some empirical support to justify
its expansion and future use. Though this study did not find evidence that PBB demonstrated
positive performance effects for all quality indicators, there were enough instances of success
that it should be considered for future use in the areas for which it had significant effects.
Because this study did not find PBB to be universally effective across all indicators, it
underscores the need for leaders to continually monitor its effects and adjust strategies and
incentives accordingly
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Finally, the results of this study offer evidence to support the future investigation of PBB
as an approach that can potentially be expanded to other government-funded healthcare facilities,
such the VHA or the Indian Health Service. It is possible that the success observed in military
healthcare facilities may generalize to other types of government-funded healthcare programs.
Suggestions for Future Research
As previously discussed, not all of the indicators demonstrated performance improvement
in response to PBB incentives. The well child visits and mental health measures should be
examined closely for potential resource shortfalls, barriers to implementation, or other factors
that may help to explain their lack of improvement. It would be helpful from a research and
policy perspective to better understand which types of performance indicators might be most
responsive to incentives so leaders can strategically craft future programs to ensure that
budgetary resources are maximized in the areas in which they are likely to be most helpful. It
would also be helpful to better understand what (if any) better alternatives exist for indicators
that do not respond well to budget incentives. For example, if poor performance is related to
resource barriers, then it is possible that resolving these issues may lead to the same types of
positive effects as financial incentives. Examining these types of questions may best be
accomplished with qualitative research such as grounded theory methods.
Qualitative research might also help to expose some of the underlying organizational
factors that either hinder or facilitate the implementation of effective PBB programs. For
organizations that are successful in improving performance, qualitative research might help to
identify the specific tools or implementation factors that were most advantageous.
Additionally, the results of this study open up many possibilities for future research in
that they offer preliminary support for the use of PBB in a military healthcare context but leave
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many research questions unanswered An important first step is to continue this line of research
to confirm that the results replicate in non-Army healthcare facilities. As military hospitals of all
three service branches integrate under the management of the DHA and if PBB is expanded to all
military facilities, it will be possible to assess the impacts of PBB on a wider selection of military
facilities. This can be accomplished using a time-phased comparison of performance change as
hospitals integrate into a unified PBB program. A study of this nature will help to address one of
the key limitations in this study, namely whether unmeasured service-specific factors may have
confounded the interpretation of results. A study of this nature would also offer an opportunity
to evaluate a more comprehensive set of quality indicators, as the three services are presently
measuring more quality indicators in a uniform manner than during the early stages of PBB
adoption.
Future studies might also consider the impact of removing incentives once a high level of
performance is achieved. Numerous studies in the pay for performance domain have found
evidence of ceiling effects or diminishing performance gains over time, usually once an
organization reaches a high level of performance (Ryan, Blustein, & Casalino, 2012; Van Herck
et al., 2010; R. Werner et al., 2011). This raises policy questions regarding the point at which
incentives could be removed or shifted to other performance areas where they may be more
beneficial. Future studies might address this question by studying the impact on performance
when incentives are removed after a long period of sustained improvement. It is possible that
performance may be sustained because organizations have already developed permanent systems
and processes for high performance. It is also possible that the removal of incentives might
cause organizations to shift attention to incentivized measures, and performance will decline for
measures that are no longer incentivized. Studies that enable more precise estimates of the

189

performance impacts of incentives and their removal will aid decision-makers in crafting policies
that maximize the use of performance-based funding incentives.
Another opportunity for future research may be to evaluate the impact of PBB on other
types of indicators within the healthcare domain. For example, the PBAM and IRIS programs
include productivity and access measures, which have not yet been rigorously studied.
Additionally, nontechnical aspects of healthcare such as patient satisfaction, employee
satisfaction and well-being, and healthcare equity are also recognized as important indicators for
robust medical systems (Hanefeld et al., 2017) and could be included in future research involving
PBB.
Conclusion
This study applied RDT as a theoretical model explaining how PBB might impact
facility-level performance on various healthcare quality indicators. Research Question 1 drew
upon a wide body of extant research on pay for performance to question the impact of a related
approach, performance-based budgeting, on quality improvement in U.S. Army healthcare
facilities. To address this question, a quasi-experimental, DID analysis was undertaken to
compare changes in quality performance among military healthcare facilities that adopted PBB
in comparison to healthcare facilities that did not adopt PBB. Performance changes were
compared for both groups before and after the implementation of incentives for a variety of
quality indicators. The hypothesis was that PBB facilities would demonstrate greater
performance improvement on incentivized quality metrics in comparison to military healthcare
organizations in other branches that did not participate in PBB programs. This hypothesis was
supported for seven out of 13 of the indicators examined, suggesting that PBB can be a helpful
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tool for encouraging performance improvement on a select group of quality measures in military
healthcare organizations.
Research Question 2 was an extension of Research Question 1, asking whether initial
performance changes attributable to PBB would be sustained over time. To address this
question, six performance measures were examined over a 5-year postperiod. The 5-year period
was divided into two 2.5-year periods, and performance was compared between the two periods.
It was hypothesized that quality improvements attributable to PBB programs will be sustained in
PBB facilities throughout the 5-year postperiod. Supporting Hypothesis 2, performance
improved in the second half of the postperiod, relative to the first half, for five of six
performance indicators. The results of this portion of the study suggest that once performance
incentives are offered, facilities sustain their performance long term or continue to improve.
Several sensitivity analyses were undertaken to examine the robustness of the empirical
results. In general, the results for Research Question 1 were robust across all model
specifications. A notable finding in one of the sensitivity analyses is that very few of the
indicators showed any evidence of significant anticipatory effects. It did not appear that
healthcare facilities improved performance prior to the start of the program in anticipation of
future incentive opportunities. This finding, taken in conjunction with the some of the findings
from Research Question 2, suggests that performance improvement is often sluggish or even
delayed in some cases. This appears to be especially true of performance indicators that likely
involve a more complex interaction between provider processes and patient variables, such as
with the diabetes management measures.
Although this study has several limitations, the results are promising from both practical
and theoretical perspectives. The study findings are relevant to clinicians and administrators in
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military and government-funded healthcare organizations, as they offer evidence to support the
future use of PBB as a mechanism for improving quality performance. This study also extends
pay for performance research by proffering an argument for classifying PBB as a unique variant
of pay for performance and offering evidence that it is effective under certain conditions. As
military healthcare leaders continue to grapple with resource allocation decisions to support the
highest level of quality healthcare, more studies are needed to examine the impact of resourcing
policies such as PBB. This study offers an important first step in understanding the degree to
which military healthcare facilities alter performance in response to funding incentives.

192

References

32 C.F.R. §199.17(p)(5) - TRICARE program. (n.d.). Retrieved from
https://www.govregs.com/regulations/expand/title32_chapterI_part199_section199.17
Adirim, T. (2019). A military health system for the twenty-first century. Health Affairs, 38(8),
1268–1273. https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.2019.00302
Agarwal, P. (2019). Allocative efficiency. Retrieved November 18, 2019, from
https://www.intelligenteconomist.com/allocative-efficiency/
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. (2015). Types of healthcare quality measures.
Retrieved November 8, 2019, from
https://www.ahrq.gov/talkingquality/measures/types.html
Allen, T., Mason, T., & Whittaker, W. (2014). Impacts of pay for performance on the quality of
primary care. Risk Management and Healthcare Policy, 7, 113–120.
https://doi.org/10.2147/RMHP.S46423
American College of Surgeons. (2019). ACS national surgical quality improvement program.
Retrieved from https://www.facs.org/quality-programs/acs-nsqip
Angrist, J. D., & Pischke, J.-S. (2008). Mostly harmless econometrics: An empiricist’s
companion. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Angrist, J. D., & Pischke, J.-S. (2010). The credibility revolution in empirical economics: How
better research design is taking the con out of econometrics. SSRN, 24(2), 3–30.
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1639809
Balakrishnan, R., Soderstrom, N. S., & West, T. D. (2007). Spending patterns with lapsing
budgets: Evidence from U.S. Army hospitals. Journal of Management Accounting
Research, 19(1), 1–23. https://doi.org/10.2308/jmar.2007.19.1.1
Banaszak-Holl, J., Zinn, J. S., & Mor, V. (1996). The impact of market and organizational
characteristics on nursing care facility service innovation: A resource dependency
perspective. Health Services Research, 31(1), 97–117. Retrieved from
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/8617612%0Ahttp://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/a
rticlerender.fcgi?artid=PMC1070105
193

Bastian, N. D., Kang, H., Nembhard, H. B., Bloschichak, A., & Griffin, P. M. (2016). The
impact of a pay-for-performance program on central line-associated blood stream
infections in Pennsylvania. Hospital Topics, 94(1), 8–14.
https://doi.org/10.1080/00185868.2015.1130542
Basu, S. (2012). DoD Moves toward more joint medical services while avoiding a unified
command. Washington, DC: U.S. Medicine. Retrieved from
http://www.usmedicine.com/agencies/department-of-defense-dod/dod-moves-towardmore-joint-medical-services-while-avoiding-a-unified-command/
Bazinsky, K., & Bailit, M. (2013, September 10). The significant lack of alignment across state
and regional health measure sets. Retrieved from http://www.bailithealth.com/articles/091113_bhp_measuresbrief.pdf
Benabbas, R., Shan, G., Akindutire, O., Mehta, N., & Sinert, R. (2019). The effect of pay-forperformance compensation model implementation on vaccination rate: A systematic
review. Quality Management in Health Care, 28(3), 155–162.
https://doi.org/10.1097/QMH.0000000000000219
Ben-Shalom, Y., Schone, E., & Bannick, R. (2019). Provider acceptance and beneficiary access
under TRICARE’s PPO health plan. Health Affairs, 38(8), 1343–1350.
https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.2019.00220
Benzer, J. K., Young, G. J., Burgess, J. F., Baker, E., Mohr, D. C., Charns, M. P., & Kaboli, P. J.
(2014). Sustainability of quality improvement following removal of pay-for-performance
incentives. Journal of General Internal Medicine, 29(1), 127–132.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11606-013-2572-4
Berwick, D. M., Nolan, T. W., & Whittington, J. (2008). The triple aim: Care, health, and cost.
Health Affairs, 27(3), 759–769. https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.27.3.759
Bolon, D. S. (2005). Comparing mission statement content in for-profit and not-for-profit
hospitals: Does mission really matter? Hospital Topics, 83(4), 2–9.
https://doi.org/10.3200/HTPS.83.4.2-10
Bond, A. M. (2018). Nonlinear physician performance contracts (Doctoral dissertation).
Retrieved from ProQuest Dissertations and Theses database. (10809951)
Bond, A. M., & Schwab, S. D. (2019). Utilization variation in military versus civilian care:
Evidence From TRICARE. Health Affairs, 38(8), 1327–1334.
https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.2019.00298
Bonfrer, I., Soeters, R., Van de Poel, E., Basenya, O., Longin, G., van de Looij, F., & van
Doorslaer, E. (2014). Introduction of performance-based financing in Burundi was
associated with improvements in care and quality. Health Affairs, 33(12), 2179–2187.
https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.2014.0081
194

Bono, R. (2017). A more integrated health system: Military medicine and the Defense Health
Agency in 2018. Brief by Director of the Defense Health Agency [PowerPoint slides], 1–
24.
Boukus, E., Cassil, A., & O’Malley, A. S. (2009). A snapshot of U.S. physicians: Key findings
from the 2008 Health Tracking Physician Survey. Data Bull (Cent Stud Health Syst
Change), Sept(35), 1-11.
Burwell, S. M. (2013). Impacts and costs of the governement shutdown. Retrieved August 7,
2018, from https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2013/11/07/impacts-and-costsgovernment-shutdown
Cain, R. (2013, September 4). Defense Health Agency leans forward to change. Retrieved from
https://www.army.mil/article/110491/Defense_Health_Agency_leans_forward_to_chang
e/
Calikoglu, S., Murray, R., & Feeney, D. (2012). Hospital pay-for-performance programs in
Maryland produced strong results, including reduced hospital-acquired conditions. Health
Affairs, 31(12), 2649–2658. https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.2012.0357
Carabajal, S. (2012, January). Community based medical homes provide quality care. Army
Medicine. Retrieved from
https://www.army.mil/article/71726/community_based_medical_homes_provide_quality
_care
Cassel, C. L., Conway, P. H., Delbanco, S. F., Jha, A. K., Saunders, R. S., & Lee, T. H. (2012).
Getting more performance from performance measurement. New England Journal of
Medicine, 1–4.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2019). About NHSN. Retrieved from
https://www.cdc.gov/nhsn/about-nhsn/index.html
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2020). Chapter 4: Bloodstream Infection Event
(Central Line-Associated Bloodstream Infection and Non-Central Line-Associated
Bloodstream Infection ). In National Healthcare Safety Network (NHSN) Patient Safety
Component Manual (pp. 1-49). Retrieved from
https://www.cdc.gov/nhsn/pdfs/pscmanual/4psc_clabscurrent.pdf
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. (2015). MACRA. Retrieved from
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Quality-Initiatives-Patient-AssessmentInstruments/Value-Based-Programs/MACRA-MIPS-and-APMs/MACRA-MIPS-andAPMs.html
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. (2018). The value modifier (VM) program. Retrieved
from https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Quality-Initiatives-Patient-AssessmentInstruments/Value-Based-Programs/VMP/Value-Modifier-VM-or-PVBM.html
195

Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. (2019a). Hospital-acquired condition reduction
program (HACRP). Retrieved from https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-forService-Payment/AcuteInpatientPPS/HAC-Reduction-Program.html
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. (2019b). Hospital value based purchasing. Retrieved
from https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Quality-Initiatives-Patient-AssessmentInstruments/HospitalQualityInits/Hospital-Value-Based-Purchasing-.html
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. (2019c). NHE historical and projections. Baltimore,
MD. Retrieved from https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-andSystems/Statistics-Trends-andReports/NationalHealthExpendData/NationalHealthAccountsProjected.html
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. (2020). Quality payment program overview.
Retrieved April 27, 2020, from https://qpp.cms.gov/mips/overview
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, (2015). Joint concept for health services. Retrieved from
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/concepts/joint_concepts/jceo.pdf
Chaix-Couturier, C., Durand-Zaleski, I., Jolly, D., & Durieux, P. (2000). Effects of financial
incentives on medical practice: Results from a systematic review of the literature and
methodological issues. International Journal for Quality in Health Care, 12(2), 133–142.
https://doi.org/10.1093/intqhc/12.2.133
Chang, R. E., Lin, S. P., & Aron, D. C. (2012). A pay-for-performance program in Taiwan
improved care for some diabetes patients, but doctors may have excluded sicker ones.
Health Affairs, 31(1), 93–102. https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.2010.0402
Chee, T. T., Ryan, A. M., Wasfy, J. H., & Borden, W. B. (2016). Current state of value-based
purchasing programs. Circulation, 133(22), 2197–2205.
https://doi.org/10.1161/CIRCULATIONAHA.115.010268
Chen, L. M., Epstein, A. M., Orav, E. J., Filice, C. E., Samson, L. W., & Joynt Maddox, K. E.
(2017). Association of practice-level social and medical risk with performance in the
Medicare Physician Value-Based Payment Modifier Program. JAMA, 318(5), 453–461.
https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2017.9643
Chien, A. T., Wroblewski, K., Damberg, C., Williams, T. R., Yanagihara, D., Yakunina, Y., &
Casalino, L. P. (2012). Do physician organizations located in lower socioeconomic status
areas score lower on pay-for-performance measures? Journal of General Internal
Medicine, 27(5), 548–554. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11606-011-1946-8
Childress, C. (2013). The impact of war on military hospital performance: A study of
organizations’ response to an environmental jolt. Virginia Commonwealth University.
Retrieved from http://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/etd/3171/

196

Christianson, J. B., Leatherman, S., & Sutherland, K. (2008). Lessons from evaluations of
purchaser pay-for-performance programs: A review of the evidence. Medical Care
Research And Review, 65(6 (Supplement)).
Coleman, E. A., Parry, C., Chalmers, S., & Min, S. (2006). The care transitions intervention:
Results of a randomized controlled trial. Comprehensive Care Coordination for
Chronically III Adults, 166, 261–275. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118785775.ch13
Collins, S. (2015). Defense Health Agency achieves full operating capability. Retrieved October
21, 2017, from https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/article/621722/defense-healthagency-achieves-full-operating-capability/
Coplin, W. D., Merget, A. E., & Bourdeaux, C. (2002). The professional researcher as change
agent in the government-performance movement. Public Administration Review, 62(6),
699–711. https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6210.00252
Damberg, C. L., Sorbero, M. E., Lovejoy, S. L., Martsolf, G. R., Raaen, L., & Mandel, D.
(2014). Measuring success in health care value-based purchasing programs: Findings
from an environmental scan, literature review, and expert panel discussions. Rand Health
Quarterly, 4(3), 9. Retrieved from
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5161317/
Deci, E. L., Koestner, R., & Ryan, R. M. (1999). A meta-analytic review of experiments
examining the effects of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic motivation. Psychological Bulletin,
125(6), 627–668. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.125.6.627
Defense Health Agency, Wounded Warrior Care Center. (n.d.). Walter Reed Bethesda National
Medical Military Center: Achieving excellence in casualty care. Retrieved July 11, 2019,
from https://www.wwcc.capmed.mil/SitePages/WarriorCare.aspx
Defense Health Agency. (2013). MHS quadruple aim. Retrieved February 8, 2019, from
https://health.mil/Reference-Center/Glossary-Terms/2013/04/09/MHS-Quadruple-Aim
Defense Health Agency. (2017). 2017 Stakeholder Report. Retrieved from
https://health.mil/Reference-Center/Reports/2018/05/01/Defense-Health-Agency-2017Stakeholder-Report
Defense Health Agency. (2018a). Evaluation of the TRICARE Program: Fiscal Year 2018
Report to Congress. Report to Congress, 1–206.
Defense Health Agency. (2018b). TRICARE for life. Retrieved from https://tricare.mil/tfl
Defense Health Agency. (2019a). About the Military Health System. Retrieved from
https://www.health.mil/About-MHS
Defense Health Agency. (2019b). Carepoint Information Portal. Retrieved April 4, 2019, from
197

https://carepoint.health.mil/
Defense Health Agency. (2019c). Defense Health Agency. Retrieved February 14, 2019, from
https://www.health.mil/About-MHS/OASDHA/Defense-Health-Agency
Defense Health Agency. (2019d). Elements of the MHS. Retrieved from https://health.mil/AboutMHS/MHS-Elements
Defense Health Agency. (2019e). Evaluation of the TRICARE program: Fiscal year 2019 report
to Congress. Retrieved from http://health.mil/ReferenceCenter/Reports/2016/05/19/Evaluation-of-the-TRICARE-Program-Fiscal-Year-2016Report-to-Congress
Defense Health Agency. (2019f). Military Health System Data Repository. Retrieved March 4,
2019, from https://www.health.mil/
Defense Health Agency. (2019g). Military hospitals and clinics. Retrieved July 7, 2019, from
https://www.tricare.mil/FindDoctor/AllProviderDirectories/Military.aspx
Defense Health Agency. (2019h). Multi-service markets. Retrieved February 10, 2019, from
https://www.health.mil/Military-Health-Topics/Access-Cost-Quality-and-Safety/Accessto-Healthcare/Multi-Service-Markets
Defense Health Agency. (2020). Defense medicial information system identification tables. Falls
Church, Virginia: health.mil. Retrieved from https://www.health.mil/Military-HealthTopics/Technology/Support-Areas/Geographic-Reference-Information/DMIS-ID-Tables
DeVries, A., Li, C.-H. W., Sridhar, G., Hummel, J. R., Breidbart, S., & Barron, J. J. (2012).
Impact of medical homes on quality, healthcare utilization, and costs. The American
Journal of Managed Care, 18(9), 534–544. Retrieved from
http://europepmc.org/abstract/MED/23009304
DeVries, M. S., & Nemec, J. (2019). Dilemmas in performance-based budgeting. In M. S.
DeVries & J. Nemec (Eds.), Performance-based budgeting in the public sector (pp. 3–
25). Retrieved from http://ebookcentral.proquest.com
Dietrich, E. J. (2013). Pay for performance in the public sector: From the National Security
Personnel System to the Affordable Care Act. American University.
https://doi.org/10.1192/bjp.112.483.211-a
Dolfini-Reed, M., & Jebo, J. (2000). The evolution of the military health care system: Changes
in public law and DOD regulations. Center For Naval Analysis, 1(July). Retrieved from
http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/d0000437.a3.pdf
Donabedian, A. (1980). Explorations in quality assessment and monitoring. Ann Arbor, MI:
Health Administration Press.
198

Doran, T. (2014). Incentivising improvements in health care delivery: A response to Adam
Oliver. Health Economics, Policy and Law, 10(3), 351–356.
https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744133114000498
Doran, T., Fullwood, C., Gravelle, H., Reeves, D., Kontopantelis, E., Hiroeh, U., & Roland, M.
(2006). Pay-for-performance programs in family practices in the United Kingdom. New
England Journal of Medicine, 355(17), 1832–1833.
https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMc062305
Doran, T., Kontopantelis, E., & Valderas, J. M. (2011). Effect of financial incentives on
incentivised and non-incentivized clinical activities: Longitudinal analysis of data from
the UK quality and outcomes framework. BMJ, 342, 1–12.
https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.d3590
Doran, T., Maurer, K. A., & Ryan, A. (2017). Impact of provider incentives on quality and value
of health care. Annual Review of Public Health, 38, 449–465.
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-publhealth-032315-021457
Dunning, D. K. (2014). Integrated resourcing and incentive system. Internal Brief by United
States Medical Command Assistant Chief of Staff [PowerPoint slides], 1–25.
Eijkenaar, F., Emmert, M., Scheppach, M., & Schoffski, O. (2013). Effects of pay for
performance in health care: A systematic review of systematic reviews. Health Policy,
110(2–3), 115–130. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.healthpol.2013.01.008
Elixhauser, A., Steiner, C., & Harris, D. R. (1998). Comorbidity measures for use with
administrative data. Medical Care, 36(1), 8–27.
Emmert, M., Eijkenaar, F., Kemter, H., Esslinger, A. S., & Schoffski, O. (2012). Economic
evaluation of pay-for-performance in health care: A systematic review. European Journal
of Health Economics, 13(6), 755–767. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10198-011-0329-8
Encinosa, W. E., & Hellinger, F. J. (2008). The impact of medical errors on ninety-day costs and
outcomes: An examination of surgical patients. Health Services Research, 43(6), 2067–
2085. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6773.2008.00882.x
Fareed, N., & Mick, S. S. (2011). To make or buy patient safety solutions : A resource
dependence and transaction. Health Care Management Review, 36(4), 288–298.
https://doi.org/10.1097/HMR.0b013e318225998b
Felt-Lisk, S., Gimm, G., & Peterson, S. (2007). Making pay-for-performance work in medicaid.
Health Affairs, 26(4), 516–527. https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.26.4.w516
Feng, Y., Kristensen, S. R., Lorgelly, P., Meacock, R., Sanchez, M. R., Siciliani, L., & Sutton,
M. (2019). Pay for performance for specialised care in England: Strengths and
weaknesses. Health Policy, 123(11), 1036–1041.
199

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.healthpol.2019.07.007
Figueroa, J. F., Tsugawa, Y., Jie Zheng, E., Orav, J., & Jha, A. K. (2016). Association between
the value-based purchasing pay for performance program and patient mortality in U.S.
hospitals: Observational study. BMJ (Online), 353. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.i2214
Flodgren, G., Eccles, M. P., Shepperd, S., Scott, A., Parmelli, E., & Beyer, F. R. (2011). An
overview of reviews evaluating the effectiveness of financial incentives in changing
healthcare professional behaviours and patient outcomes. Cochrane Database of
Systematic Reviews, 7. https://doi.org/10.1002/14651858.cd009255
Forster, A. J., Murff, H. J., Peterson, J. F., Gandhi, T. K., & Bates, D. W. (2003). The incidence
and severity of adverse events affecting patients after discharge from the hospital. Annals
of Internal Medicine, 138, 161–174.
Frakes, M., & Gruber, J. (2019). Defensive medicine: Evidence from military immunity.
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 11(3), 197–231.
https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20180167
Gillam, S. J., Niroshan Siriwardena, A., & Steel, N. (2012). Pay-for-performance in the United
Kingdom: Impact of the quality and outcomes framework—A systematic review. Annals
of Family Medicine, 10(5), 461–468. https://doi.org/10.1370/afm.1377
Glickman, S. W., Ou, F.-S., DeLong, E. R., Roe, M. T., Lytle, B. L., Mulgund, J., . . . Peterson,
E. D. (2007). Pay for performance, quality of care, and outcomes in acute myocardial
infarction. JAMA, 297(21), 2373–2380. https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.297.21.2373
Gray, A. M., Phillips, V. L., & Normand, C. (1996). The costs of nursing turnover: Evidence
from the British National Health Service. Health Policy, 38(2), 117–128.
https://doi.org/10.1016/0168-8510(96)00854-8
Green, J., Passman, L. J., & Wintfield, N. (1991). Analyzing hospital mortality. JAMA, 265(14),
1849–1853. https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.1991.03460140077030
Griffith, R. (2013). Performance based adjustment model overview. Presentation at the 2013
Healthcare Financial Management Association Texas State Conference, Austin, Texas.
Griffith, R. (2019, September 24). Interview on Army medical department performance-based
budgeting programs (2006-2019). Fort Sam Houston, TX: Joint Base San Antonio.
Gupta, N., & Ayles, H. M. (2019). Effects of pay-for-performance for primary care physicians
on diabetes outcomes in single-payer health systems: A systematic review. The European
Journal of Health Economics, 0123456789. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10198-019-01097-4
Hanefeld, J., Powell-Jackson, T., & Balabanova, D. (2017). Understanding and measuring
quality of care: Dealing with complexity. Bull World Health Organization, 95, 368–374.
200

https://doi.org/10.3109/03008208109152129
Harman, J. S., Scholle, S. H., Ng, J. H., Pawlson, L.G., Mardon, R. E., Haffer, S.C., Shih, S.,
Bierman, A. S. (2010). Association of Health Plansʼ Healthcare Effectiveness Data and
Information Set (HEDIS) performance with outcomes of enrollees with diabetes. Medical
Care, 48(3), 217–223. https://doi.org/10.1097/MLR.0b013e3181ca3fe6
Hearld, L. R., Alexander, J. A., Fraser, I., & Jiang, H. J. (2008). How do hospital organizational
structure and processes affect quality of care? A critical review of research methods.
Medical Care Research and Review, 65(3), 259–299.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1077558707309613
Herbst, T., & Emmert, M. (2017). Characterization and effectiveness of pay-for-performance in
ophthalmology: A systematic review. BMC Health Services Research, 17(1), 1–11.
https://doi.org/10.1186/s12913-017-2333-x
Hosek, S. D., & Cecchine, G. (2001). Medical readiness and operational medicine. In
Reorganizing the military health system: Should there be a joint command? (pp. 43–55).
Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. Retrieved from
https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1350.html.
Houle, S. K., McAlister, F. A., Jackevicius, C. A., Chuck, A. W., & Tsuyuki, R. T. (2012). Does
performance-based remuneration for individual health care practitioners affect patient
care? A systematic review. Annals of Internal Medicine, 157(12), 889–899.
https://doi.org/10.7326/0003-4819-157-12-201212180-00009
Hsieh, H. M., Clement, D. G., & Bazzoli, G. J. (2010). Impacts of market and organizational
characteristics on hospital efficiency and uncompensated care. Health Care Management
Review, 35(1), 77–87. https://doi.org/10.1097/HMR.0b013e3181c09956
Huang, J., Yin, S., Lin, Y., Jiang, Q., He, Y., & Du, L. (2013). Impact of pay-for-performance on
management of diabetes: A systematic review. Journal of Evidence-Based Medicine,
6(3), 173–184. https://doi.org/10.1111/jebm.12052
Huber, P. J. (1967). The behavior of maximum likelihood estimates under non-standard
conditions. Proceedings of the fifth Berkeley Symposium on Mathematical Statistics and
Probability, Volume 1: Statistics (pp. 221–233). Berkeley: University of California Press.
https://projecteuclid.org/euclid.bsmsp/1200512974
Hutter, P. J., Roski, J., Woodson, J., Middleton, A., Kneeland, R., Worthy, A., . . . Cooper, E.
(2019). Readiness of medical providers in the military health system: Overview of
operational and policy considerations. Health Affairs, 38(8), 1274–1280.
https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.2019.00336
Iezzoni, L. (2003). Range of Risk Factors. In L. Iezzoni (Ed.), Risk Adjustment for Measuring
Health Care Outcomes (3rd ed., pp. 33–70). Chicago: Health Administration Press.
201

Institute of Medicine. (1993). Access to health care in America. Washington, DC: National
Academy Press.
Institute of Medicine. (2000). To err is human: Building a safer health system. Washington, DC:
National Academy Press.
Institute of Medicine. (2001). Crossing the quality chasm: A new health system for the 21st
century. Washington, DC: National Academy Press. Retrived from
https://doi.org/10.17226/10027
Institute of Medicine. (2007). Rewarding provider performance: Aligning incentives in Medicare
(Pathways to Quality Health Care Series). Washington, DC: National Academies Press.
Retrieved from http://books.google.com/books?id=NRPi1qiTWfkC&pgis=1
Institute of Medicine (U.S.), Division of Health Care Services. (1990). Medicare: A strategy for
quality assurance. (K. N. Lohr, Ed.). Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
James, J. (2012, October 11). Health policy brief: Pay for performance. Health Affairs Health
Policy Brief, 1-6. https://doi.org/ 10.1377/hpb20121011.90233
Jha, A. K. (2017). Payment power to the patients. JAMA, 318(1), 18–19.
https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2017.7533
Jha, A. K., Joynt, K. E., Orav, E. J., & Epstein, A. M. (2012). The long-term effect of premier
pay for performance on patient outcomes. Obstetrical & Gynecological Survey, 67(7),
391–393. https://doi.org/10.1097/01.ogx.0000418567.29397.e2
Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2017). Joint Concept for Health Services. Government Printing Office.
Retrieved from http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/concepts/joint_concepts/jceo.pdf
Jones, C. B. (2005). The costs of nurse turnover, Part 2. The Journal of Nursing Administration,
35(1), 41–49. https://doi.org/10.1097/00005110-200501000-00014
Jones, T. L. (2018). Outcome measurement in nursing : Imperatives, ideals, history and
challenges. The Online Journal of Issues in Nursing, 21(2), 1–19.
https://doi.org/10.3912/OJIN.Vol21No02Man01
Jordan, M. M., & Hackbart, M. M. (1999). Performance budgeting and funding in the states: A
status assessment. Public Budgeting and Finance, 19(1), 68–88.
Kane, R. L., & Radosevich, D. M. (2011). Conducting health outcomes research. Sudbury, MA:
Jones and Bartlett.
Kazley, A. S., & Ozcan, Y. A. (2007). Organizational and environmental determinants of
hospital EMR adoption: A national study. Journal of Medical Systems, 31(5), 375–384.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10916-007-9079-7
202

Kellermann, A. (2017). Rethinking The United States’ military health system. Health Affairs
Blog, April, 1–10. https://doi.org/10.1377/hblog20170427.059833
Kime, P. (2014, October 14). Military health system: Patients say they can’t get in to see their
doctors. The Military Times [Online], pp. 1–6. Retrieved from
https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2014/10/13/military-healthsystem-patients-say-they-can-t-get-in-to-see-their-doctors/
Koehlmoos, T. P., Madsen, C. K., Banaag, A., Haider, A. H., Schoenfeld, A. J., & Weissman, J.
S. (2019). Assessing Low-Value Health Care Services In The Military Health System.
Health Affairs, 38(8), 1351–1357. https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.2019.00252
Kondo, K., Damberg, C., Mendelson, A., Motu’apuaka, M., Freeman, M., O’Neil, M., . . .
Kansagara, D. (2015). Understanding the intervention and implementation factors
associated with benefits and harms of pay for performance programs in healthcare.
Retrieved from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27054229
Kondo, K. K., Wyse, J., Mendelson, A., Beard, G., Freeman, M., Low, A., & Kansagara, D.
(2018). Pay-for-performance and veteran care in the VHA and the community: A
systematic review. Journal of General Internal Medicine, (1), 1–12.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11606-018-4444-4
Kong, D. (2005). Performance-based budgeting: The U.S. experience. Public Organizational
Review: A Global Journal, 5, 91–107.
Kouides, R. W., Bennett, N. M., Lewis, B., Cappuccio, J. D., Barker, W. H., & LaForce, F. M.
(1998). Performance-based physician reimbursement and influenza immunization rates in
the elderly. American Journal of Preventive Medicine, 14(2), 89–95.
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0749-3797(97)00028-7
LaFraniere, S., & Lehren, A. (2014a). In military care, a pattern of errors but not scrutiny. New
York Times (June 28). Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/29/us/inmilitary-care-a-pattern-of-errors-but-not-scrutiny.html
LaFraniere, S., & Lehran, A. W. (2014b, September 2). Smaller hospitals aid to put patients at
risk: Lack of cases can compromise treatment—Pentagon may cut back system. New
York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/02/us/smaller-militaryhospitals-said-to-put-patients-at-risk.html
Lang, T. A., Hodge, M., Olson, V., Romano, P. S., & Kravitz, R. L. (2004). Nurse-patient ratios:
A systematic review on the effects of nurse staffing on patient, nurse employee, and
hospital outcomes. JONA: The Journal of Nursing Administration, 34(7), 326–337.
https://doi.org/10.1097/00005110-200407000-00005
Lauth, T. P. (1985). Performance evaluation in the Georgia budgetary process. Public Budgeting
and Finance, 5(1), 67–82. Retrieved from
203

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/%28ISSN%291540-5850/issues
Lee, J. Y., Lee, S. Il, Kim, N. S., Kim, S. H., Son, W. S., & Jo, M. W. (2012). Healthcare
organizations’ attitudes toward pay-for-performance in Korea. Health Policy, 108(2–3),
277–285. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.healthpol.2012.09.002
Lester, H., Matharu, T., Mohammed, M. A., Lester, D., & Foskett-Tharby, R. (2013).
Implementation of pay for performance in primary care: A qualitative study 8 years after
introduction. British Journal of General Practice, 63(611), 408–415.
https://doi.org/10.3399/bjgp13X668203
Lin, Y., Yin, S., Huang, J., & Du, L. (2016). Impact of pay for performance on behavior of
primary care physicians and patient outcomes. Journal of Evidence-Based Medicine,
9(1), 8–23. https://doi.org/10.1111/jebm.12185
Lindenauer, P. K., Remus, D., Roman, S., Rothberg, M. B., Benjamin, E. M., Ma, A., & Bratzler,
D. W. (2007). Public reporting and pay for performance in hospital quality improvement.
New England Journal of Medicine, 356, 486–496. Retrieved from
http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMsa064964
Linking program funding to performance results: Joint hearing before the subcommitttee on
Governement Efficiency, Financial Management and Intergovernemental Relations of the
Committeee on Governement Reform. (2002). Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office. Retrieved from http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
Long, J. S. (1997). Regression models for categorical and limited dependent variables.
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Medical and Dental Care in the Armed Forces, 10 USC Ch. 55§§1071–1110b. Retrieved from
https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?path=/prelim@title10/subtitleA/part2/chapter55&e
dition=prelim
Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission. (2015). Report of the
Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission: final report.
Retrieved from https://permanent.access.gpo.gov/gpo54961/MCRMC-FinalReport29JAN15-HI.pdf
Mangelsdorff, A. D., & Finstuen, K. (2003). Patient satisfaction in military medicine: Status and
an empirical test of a model. Military Medicine, 168(9), 744–749.
https://doi.org/10.1093/milmed/168.9.744
Markovitz, A. A., & Ryan, A. M. (2017). Pay-for-performance: Disappointing results or masked
heterogeneity? Medical Care Research and Review, 74(1), 3–78.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1077558715619282
Martin, L., Nelson, E., Lloyd, R., & Nolan, T. (2007). Whole system measures. Cambridge, MA:
204

Institute for Healthcare Improvement.
Mauro, S. G., Cinquini, L., & Grossi, G. (2017). Insights into performance-based budgeting in
the public sector: A literature review and a research agenda. Public Management Review,
19(7), 911–931. https://doi.org/10.1080/14719037.2016.1243810
McGill, R. (2001). Performance budgeting. International Journal of Public Sector Management,
14(5), 376–390. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137315304
McKenzie, D. (2020). Revisiting the Difference-in-Differences Parallel Trends Assumption: Part
I Pre-Trend Testing. Retrieved April 6, 2020, from
https://blogs.worldbank.org/impactevaluations/revisiting-difference-differences-paralleltrends-assumption-part-i-pre-trend
McNab, R. M., & Melese, F. (2003). Implementing the GPRA: Examining the prospects for
performance budgeting in the federal government. Public Budgeting and Finance, 23(2),
73–95. https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-5850.2302006
Menachemi, N., Mazurenko, O., Kazley, A. S., Diana, M. L., & Ford, E. W. (2012). Market
factors and electronic medical record adoption in medical practices. Health Care
Management Review, 37(1), 14–22. https://doi.org/10.1097/HMR.0b013e3182352562
Menachemi, N., Shin, D. Y., Ford, E. W., & Yu, F. (2011). Environmental factors and health
information technology management strategy. Health Care Management Review, 36(3),
275–285. https://doi.org/10.1097/HMR.0b013e3182048e7e
Mendelson, A., Kondo, K., Damberg, C., Low, A., Motuapuaka, M., Freeman, M., . . .
Kansagara, D. (2017). The effects of pay-for-performance programs on health, health
care use, and processes of care: A systematic review. Annals of Internal Medicine,
166(5), 341–353. https://doi.org/10.7326/M16-1881
Mendez, B. (2018a). CRS in focus 10530. Defense primer: The military health system.
Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. Retrieved from
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Mendez, B. (2018b). Military medical care: Frequently asked questions (CRS Report No. 45399,
Version 4). Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.
Milstein, R., & Schreyoegg, J. (2016). Pay for performance in the inpatient sector: A review of
34 P4P programs in 14 OECD countries. Health Policy, 120(10), 1125–1140.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.healthpol.2016.08.009
Mullen, K. J., Frank, R. G., & Rosenthal, M. B. (2010). Can you get what you pay for? Pay-forperformance and the quality of healthcare providers. RAND Journal of Economics, 41(1),
64–91. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2009.00090.x

205

Natarajan, Y., & Kanwal, F. (2015). Pay for performance in chronic liver disease. Clinical
Gastroenterology and Hepatology, 13(12), 2042–2047.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cgh.2015.06.038
National Committee for Quality Assurance. (2019). HEDIS measures. Retrieved February 14,
2019, from https://www.ncqa.org/hedis/measures/
National Defense Authorization Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 114-328, 130 Stat. 2193 (2016).
Retrived from https://www.congress.gov/114/plaws/publ328/PLAW-114publ328.pdf
National Health Policy Forum. (2015, January). The basics: Relative value units, 1–5. Retrieved
from https://www.nhpf.org/library/the-basics/Basics_RVUs_01-12-15.pdf
National Perinatal Information Center. (2019). Perinatal center database. Retrieved March 4,
2019, from http://www.npic.org/
Neumann, P. J., & Levine, B. S. (2002). Do HEDIS measures reflect cost-effective practices?
American Journal of Preventive Medicine, 23(4), 276–289.
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0749-3797(02)00516-0
NPR.org. (2011, August 31). Walter Reed was the Army’s wake-up call in 2007 [Radio
transcript]. Morning Edition, pp. 1–14. Retrieved from
https://www.npr.org/2011/08/31/139641856/in-2007-walter-reed-was-the-armys-wakeupcall
Ocasio, W. (1997). Towards an attention-based view of the firm. Strategic Management Journal,
18(Summer Special Issue), 187–206. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0021-9290(96)00101-7
Office of Management and Budget (OMB). (2011, August 17). OMB Memorandum M-11-31:
Delivering an efficient, effective and accountable government [Memorandum].
Washington, DC: Lew, J.J. Retrieved from
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/memoranda/2011/m1131.pdf
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. (2004). Public Sector
Modernization: Governing for Performance. OECD Observer, (October 2004).
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. (2007). Performance budgeting in
OECD countries. Retrieved from
http://proxy.library.vcu.edu/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/58748554?ac
countid=14780
Pellerin, C. (2017). Surgeons General emphasize readiness as priority in military medicine.
Washington, DC. Retrieved from
https://dod.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1134247/surgeons-general-emphasizereadiness-as-priority-in-military-medicine/
206

Performance-based budgeting: Hearing before the Committee on Budget, House of
Respresentatives, 109th Cong., first session. (2005). Washington, DC.
Petersen, L. A., Simpson, K., Pietz, K., Urech, T. H., Hysong, S. J., Profit, J., . . . Woodard, L. C.
D. (2013). Effects of individual physician-level and practice-level financial incentives on
hypertension care: A randomized trial. JAMA, 310(10), 1042–1050.
https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2013.276303
Petrullo, K. A., Lamar, S., Nwankwo-Otti, O., Alexander-Mills, K., & Viola, D. (2012). The
Patient Satisfaction Survey: What does it mean to your bottom line? Journal of Hospital
Administration, 2(2), 1–8. https://doi.org/10.5430/jha.v2n2p1
Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. R. (1978). The design and management of externally controlled
organizations. In The external control of organizations (pp. 257–287). Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press.
Powell, L. R. (2018). CLABSI definition with case studies NHSN bloodstream infection
surveillance in 2018. U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention: National Center
for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases. Retrieved from
https://www.cdc.gov/nhsn/pdfs/training/2018/clabsi-508.pdf
Priest, D., & Hull, A. (2007, February 18). Soldiers face neglect, frustration at Army’s top
medical facility. The Washington Post, pp. 1–10. Retrieved from
file:///N:/Projects/DODPDH/Library/COMPREHENSIVE_LIBRARY--DO_NOT_ADDREMOVE/Priest(18Feb2007)WashPost-SldrFaceNglctFrust@ArmysTopMedclFac.pdf
Radin, B. A. (2000). The Government Performance and Results Act and the tradition of federal
management reform: Square pegs in round holes? Journal of Public Administration
Research and Theory, 10(1), 111–135.
https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.jpart.a024260
Ramanujan, R., & Rousseau, D. M. (2006). The challenges are organisatinal not just clinical.
Journal of Organisational Behaviour, 27(7), 811–827.
Rheney, C. (2007). PBAM & productivity: A primer for performance. Internal brief by the Chief
Financial Offcier of Dewitt Healthcare Network. [Powerpoint slides, unpublished], 1-32.
Robinson, M., & Brumby, J. (2005). Does performance budgeting work? An analytical review of
the empirical literature. IMF Working Papers, 05(210), 1.
https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451862294.001
Roland, M., & Campbell, S. (2014). Health policy report: Successes and failures of pay for
performance in the United Kingdom. New England Journal of Medicine, 370(20), 1944–
1949.
Rosenthal, M. B., & Dudley, R. A. (2007). Will the latest payment trend improve care? JAMA,
207

297(7), 740–743.
Rosenthal, M. B., Fernandopulle, R., Song, H. S. R., & Landon, B. (2004). Paying for quality:
Providers’ incentives for quality improvement. Health Affairs, 23(2), 127–141.
https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.23.2.127
Rosenthal, M. B., Landon, B. E., Normand, S. L. T., Frank, R. G., & Epstein, A. M. (2006). Pay
for performance in commercial HMOs. New England Journal of Medicine, 355(18),
1895–1902. https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMsa063682
Rosenthal, M. B., Li, Z., Robertson, A. D., & Milstein, A. (2009). Impact of financial incentives
for prenatal care on birth outcomes and spending. Health Services Research, 44(5 PART
1), 1465–1479. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6773.2009.00996.x
Rubin, D. B. (1977). Assignment to treatment group on the basis of a covariate. Journal of
Educational Statistics, 2(1), 1–26. https://doi.org/10.2307/1164933
Rude, T., York, N., Donin, N., Angeles, L., Wysock, J., Makarov, D., . . . York, N. (2017).
Anaysis of national trends in hospital acquired conditions following major urologic
surgery after implementation of the hosptal acquired condition reduction program.
Journal of Urology, 197(4), e1300. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.juro.2017.02.3037
Ryan, A. M. (2009). Effects of the premier hospital quality incentive demonstration on Medicare
patient mortality and cost: Quality and performance. Health Services Research, 44(3),
821–842. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6773.2009.00956.x
Ryan, A. M., Blustein, J., & Casalino, L. P. (2012). Medicare’s flagship test of pay-forperformance did not spur more rapid quality improvement among low-performing
hospitals. Health Affairs, 31(4), 797–805. https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.2011.0626
Ryan, A. M., Blustein, J., Doran, T., D. Michelow, M., & Casalino, L. P. (2012). The effect of
phase 2 of the premier hospital quality incentive demonstration on incentive payments to
hospitals caring for disadvantaged patients. Health Services Research, 47(4), 1418–1436.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6773.2012.01393.x
Ryan, A. M., Burgess, J. F., & Dimick, J. B. (2015). Why we should not be indifferent to
specification choices for difference-in-differences. Health Services Research, 50(4),
1211–1235. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6773.12270
Ryan, A. M., Burgess, J. F., Pesko, M. F., Borden, W. B., & Dimick, J. B. (2015). The early
effects of Medicare’s mandatory hospital pay-for-performance program. Health Services
Research, 50(1), 81–97. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6773.12206
Sanchez, E. (2018, January 29). BAMC Re-verified as Level I Trauma Center. Retrieved from
https://www.army.mil/article/199770/bamc_re_verified_as_level_i_trauma_center

208

Schick, A. (2003). The performing state: Reflection on an idea whose time has come but whose
implementation has not. OECD Journal on Budgeting, 3(2), 71–103.
https://doi.org/10.1787/budget-v3-art10-en
Schwab, S. D. (2018). You had me at hello: The effects of disruptions to the patient-physician
relationship (Doctoral dissertation). Available from ProQuest Dissertations and Theses
database. (UMI No. 2055979662)
Scott, A., Sivey, P., Ait Ouakrim, D., Willenberg, L., Naccarella, L., Furler, J., & Young, D.
(2011). The effect of financial incentives on the quality of health care provided by
primary care physicians. Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews, (9).
https://doi.org/10.1002/14651858.cd008451.pub2
Seshadri, R., Strane, D., Matone, M., Ruedisueli, K., & Rubin, D. M. (2019). Families with
TRICARE report lower health care quality and access compared to other insured and
uninsured families. Health Affairs, 38(8), 1377–1385.
https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.2019.00274
Sherry, T. B. (2016). A note on the comparative statics of pay-for-performance in health care.
Health Economics, 25, 637–644. https://doi.org/10.1002/hec
Shih, T., Nicholas, L. H., Thumma, J. R., Birkmeyer, J. D., & Dimick, J. B. (2014). Does payfor-performance improve surgical outcomes An evaluation of phase 2 of the premier
hospital quality incentive demonstration. Annals of Surgery, 259(4), 677–681.
https://doi.org/10.1097/SLA.0000000000000425
Smith, D. J., Bono, R. C., & Slinger, B. J. (2017). Transforming the military health system.
JAMA, 318(24), 2427–2428. https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2017.16718
Spence Laschinger, H. K., & Leiter, M. P. (2006). The impact of nursing work environments on
patient safety outcomes: The mediating role of burnout/engagement. Journal of Nursing
Administration, 36(5), 259–267. https://doi.org/10.1097/00005110-200605000-00019
Stoto, M. A. (2017). Population health measurement: Applying performance measurement
concepts in population health settings. Solving Population Health Problems Through
Collaboration, 2, 160–172. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315212708
Tanielian, T., & Farmer, C. (2019). The U.S. military health system: Promoting readiness and
providing health care. Health Affairs, 38(8), 1259–1267.
https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.2019.00239
The Joint Commission. (2018). Facts about ORYX® for hospitals (National Hospital Quality
Measures). Retrieved March 4, 2019, from
https://www.jointcommission.org/facts_about_oryx_for_hospitals/

209

TRICARE. (2019). Multi-service markets. Retrieved June 4, 2019, from
https://www.tricare.mil/FindDoctor/AllProviderDirectories/MSM
U.S. Army. (2012). Army medicine facilities: Landstuhl Regional Medical Center. Retrieved July
11, 2019, from https://www.goarmy.com/amedd/health-care/facilities/landstuhl-regionalmedical-center.html
U.S. Army Medical Command. (2016, June 2). Integrated Resourcing and Incentive System user
guide, Version 5.[Internally published guide].
U.S. Army Medical Command. (2017). Integrated Resourcing and Incentive System (IRIS) fiscal
year 2017 user guide. .[Internally published guide].
U.S. Army Medical Department. (2016). Warrior and family support center. Retrieved July 11,
2019, from https://www.bamc.health.mil/military/wfsc/
U.S. Department of Defense. (2013). Department of Defense Directive No. 5136.13: Defense
Health Agency. Washington, DC. Retrieved from
http://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/513613p.pdf
U.S. Department of Defense. (2011). Health Affairs Policy 11-005: TRICARE policy for access
to care. Washington, DC: Author.
U.S. Department of Defense. (2014). Military health system review. Washington, DC: Author.
U.S. Department of Defense. (2016). Department of Defense Instruction No.6200.06: Periodic
health assessment (PHA) program. Washington, DC: Author.
U.S. Department of Defense. (2018a). Defense Health Program. Fiscal Year (FY) 2019 Budget
Estimates.
U.S. Department of Defense. (2018b). Demographics 2018: Profile of the military community.
Retrieved from https://www.militaryonesource.mil/reports-andsurveys/infographics/active-duty-member-and-family-demographics
U.S. Department of Defense. (2019). Defense Health Program. Fiscal year (FY) budget
estimates 2004-2020. Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller). Retrieved from https://comptroller.defense.gov/BudgetMaterials/FY2020BudgetJustification/#defhealthprog
U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense. (2014). Military health system
review. Military health system review—Final report. Washington, DC: Department of
Defense, Secretary of Defense.
U.S. General Accounting Office. (1993). Performance budgeting: State experiences and
implications for the federal government, 12. Retrieved from
210

http://www.gao.gov/products/AFMD-93-41%0Ahttp://files/1428/AFMD-93-41.html
U.S. General Accounting Office. (1997, March). Performance budgeting: Past initiatives offer
insights for GPRA implementation. (Publication No. GAO/AIMD/GGD-99-67).
Retrieved from https://www.gao.gov/assets/230/223810.pdf
U.S. General Accounting Office. (1999, April). Performance budgeting: Initial experiences
under the results act in linking plans with budgets (Publication No. GAO/AIMD-97-46).
Retrived from https://www.gao.gov/assets/230/227280.pdf
U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2006, December). Defense health care: Access to care
for beneficiaries who have not enrolled in TRICARE’s managed care option (Report No.
GAO-07-48). Retrieved from https://www.gao.gov/assets/260/255029.pdf
U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2011, June). Defense health care: Access to civilian
providers under TRICARE standard and extra (Publication No. GAO-11-500). Retrieved
from https://www.gao.gov/assets/320/319092.pdf
U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2013, April). TRICARE multiyear surveys indicate
problems with access to care for nonenrolled beneficiaries. (Publication No. GAO-13364). Retrieved from https://www.gao.gov/assets/660/653487.pdf
U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2017, June). Department of Defense: Actions needed to
address five key mission challenges (Publication No. GAO-17-369). Retrieved from
https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/685227.pdf
U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2018a, November). Defense health care: Additional
assessments needed to better ensure an efficient total workforce additional assessments
needed to better ensure an efficient total workforce (Publication No. GAO-19-102).
Retrieved from https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/695694.pdf
U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2018b, September). Managing for results:
Government-wide actions needed to improve agencies’ use of performance information in
decision making. (Publication No. GAO-18-609SP). Retrieved from
https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/694269.pdf
U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2018c, October). DOD should demonstrate how its
plan to transfer the administration of military treatment facilities will improve efficiency.
(Publication No. GAO-19-53). Retrieved from
https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/695157.pdf
Van Herck, P., De Smedt, D., Annemans, L., Remmen, R., & Rosenthal, M. B. (2010).
Systematic review : Effects, design choices, and context of pay-for-performance in health
care. BMC Health Services Research, 10(247), 1–14.
VanLare, J. M., & Conway, P. H. (2012). Value-based purchasing—National programs to move
211

from volume to value. New England Journal of Medicine, 367(4), 292–295.
https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMp1207775
Vergun, D. (2013, June). Soldiers to see fewer PCS moves. Retrieved from
https://www.army.mil/article/104647/soldiers_to_see_fewer_pcs_moves
Vie, L., Griffith, K., Scheier, L., Lester, P., & Seligman, M. (2013). The person-event data
environment: Leveraging big data for studies of psychological strengths in soldiers.
Retrieved from https://www.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00934
Vie, L., Scheier, L., Lester, P., Ho, T., Labarthe, D., & Seligman, M. P. (2015). The U.S. Army
person-event data environment: A military–civilian big data enterprise. Big Data, 3(2),
67–79. https://doi.org/10.1089/big.2014.0055
Vokes, R. A., Bearman, G., & Bazzoli, G. J. (2018). Hospital-acquired infections under pay-forperformance systems: An administrative perspective on management and change.
Current Infectious Disease Reports, 20(35). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11908-018-0638-5
Waldman, J. D., Kelly, F., Arora, S., & Smith, H. L. (2010). The shocking cost of turnover in
health care. Health Care Management Review, 35(September), 206–211.
Waters, T. M., Daniels, M. J., Bazzoli, G. J., Perencevich, E., Dunton, N., Staggs, V. S., . . .
Shorr, R. I. (2017). Effect of Medicare’s nonpayment for hospital-acquired conditions:
Lessons for future policy. JAMA Internal Medicine, 175(3), 347–354.
https://doi.org/10.1001/jamainternmed.2014.5486.Effect
Waymire, T., & West, T. (2010, December). Performance-based budgeting worth it over long
term. Federal Times. Retrieved from
http://www.federaltimes.com/article/20101205/ADOP06/12050305/
Weech-Maldonado, R., Qaseem, A., & Mkanta, W. (2009). Operating environment and USA
nursing homes’ participation in the subacute care market: A longitudinal analysis. Health
Services Management Research, 22(1), 1–7. https://doi.org/10.1258/hsmr.2008.008002
Weil, A. R. (2019). Military health systems. Health Affairs, 38(8), 1243–1243.
https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.2019.00879
Werner, R., Kolstad, J., Stuart, E., & Polsky, D. (2011). The effect of pay-for-performance in
hospitals: Lessons for quality improvement. Health Affairs, 30(4), 690–698.
https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.2010.1277
Werner, R. M., & Dudley, A. (2012). Medicare’s new hospital value-based purchasing program
is likely to have only a small impact on hospital payments. Health Affairs, 31(9), 1932–
1940. https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.2011.0990
Werner, R. M., Konetzka, R. T., & Polsky, D. (2013). The effect of pay-for-performance in
212

nursing homes: Evidence from state medicaid programs. Health Services Research,
48(4), 1393–1414. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6773.12035
West, T., & Cronk, M. (2011). Financial officers as leaders: Lessons from Army medicine.
Strategic Finance, 92(10), 31–37. Retrieved from
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=59789978&site=ehostlive
West, T., Cronk, M., Goodman, R., & Waymire, T. R. (2010). Increasing accountability through
performance-based budgeting. Journal of Governement Financial Management, Spring,
51–55.
Weyer, S. M., Bobiak, S., & Stange, K. C. (2008). Possible unintended consequences of a focus
on performance: Insights over time from the Research Association of Practices Network.
Quality Management in Health Care, 17(1), 47–52.
https://doi.org/10.1097/01.QMH.0000308637.04850.ac
White, H. (1980). A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test
for heteroskedasticity. Econometrica, 48, 817–830.
Williams, C., & Melhuish, W. (1999). Is ABCM destined for success or failure in the federal
governement? Public Budgeting and Finance, 19(2), 22–36.
Winslow, B. R. (1994, September 6). HMO juggernaut: U.S. healthcare cuts costs, grows rapidly
and irks some doctors—A few patients are slighted, squeezed specialists say: But firm
also gets praise—How Katie avoids hospital. Wall Street Journal, p. A1. Retrieved from
http://proxy.library.vcu.edu/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/398560281?a
ccountid=14780
Wooldridge, J. M. (2013). Introductory econometrics: A modern approach (5th ed.). Mason,
OH: South-Western College.
Yeager, V. A., Menachemi, N., Savage, G. T., Ginter, P. M., Sen, B. P., & Beitsch, L. M. (2014).
Using resource dependency theory to measure the environment in health care
organizational studies: A systematic review of the literature. Health Care Management
Review, 39(1), 50–65. https://doi.org/10.1097/HMR.0b013e3182826624
Yeager, V. A., Savage, G. T., Ginter, P. M., & Beitsch, L. M. (2014). Using resource
dependency theory to measure the environment in health care organizational studies : A
systematic review of the literature. Health Care Management Review, 39(1), 50–65.
https://doi.org/10.1097/HMR.0b013e3182826624
Yip, W., Powell-Jackson, T., Chen, W., Hu, M., Fe, E., Hu, M., . . . Hsiao, W. C. (2017).
Capitation combined with pay-for-performance improves antibiotic prescribing practices
in rural China. https://doi.org/10.1377/HLTHAFF.2013.0702

213

Zemrani, A. (2019). Budgeting in the United States: From theory to practice using higher
education. In M. S. DeVries & J. Nemec (Eds.), Performance-based budgeting in the
public sector (pp. 29–60). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-02077-4_2
Zhan, C., & Miller, M. (2003). Excess Length of Stay, Charges, and Mortality Attributable to
Medical Injuries During Hospitalization. Journal of the American Medical Association,
290(14).
Zhang, N., Li, Y., & Temkin-Greener, H. (2013). Prevalence of obesity in New York nursing
homes: Associations with facility characteristics. Gerontologist, 53(4), 567–581.
https://doi.org/10.1093/geront/gnt011
Zimmerman, J. (2003). Accounting for decision making and control (4th ed.). Boston, MA:
McGraw-Hill Irwin.
Zinn, J. S. (1994). Market competition and the quality of nursing home care. Journal of Health
Politics, Policy and Law, 19(3), 555–582. https://doi.org/10.1215/03616878-19-3-555
Zinn, J. S., Proenca, J., & Rosko, M. D. (1997). Organizational and environmental factors in
hospital alliance membership and contract management: A resource-dependence
perspective. Hospital & Health Services Administration, 42(1), 67–86.
Zinn, J. S., Weech, R. J., & Brannon, D. (1998). Resource dependence and institutional elements
in nursing home TQM adoption. Health Services Research, 33(2 Pt 1), 261–273.
Retrieved from
http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=1070264&tool=pmcentrez&r
endertype=abstract

214

Vita

Kimberly Decker was born on October 7, 1981 in Hampton. Virginia. She graduated
from the University of Virginia in 2004 with a bachelor’s degree in psychology. While serving
in the U.S. Army as a Medical Service Corps officer, she received a Master of Health
Administration degree from Baylor University in 2012. During her time in the Army, she has
worked as a healthcare administrator at Irwin Army Community Hospital, Martin Army
Community Hospital, Munson Army Health Clinic, Winn Army Community Hospital, and Tuttle
Army Health Clinic. She has been a Fellow of the American College of Healthcare Executives
since 2014 and holds a Black Belt certification in Lean Six Sigma. As of the summer of 2020,
she is an instructor at the Army-Baylor University Graduate Program in Health and Business
Administration.

215

